

Vladimir Bushin

Social Democracy and Southern Africa

(1960s-1980s)



Progress Publishers
Moscow

Translated from the Russian
Designed by *Vladimir Gordon*

Владимир Бушин

СОЦИАЛ-ДЕМОКРАТИЯ И ЮГ АФРИКИ

На английском языке

English translation of the revised Russian text
©Progress Publishers 1989

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Б 0302030103 - 074 37 - 89
014 (01) - 89

ISBN 5-01-001122-0

CONTENTS

Foreword	5
Chapter One. Friend or Foe? (1960-1976)	9
1. Initial Period of Armed Struggle in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau	9
2. Upsurge in the Liberation Movement in Portuguese Colonies	17
3. Portuguese Colonies in Africa Win Independence	36
4. Struggle Against Colonial and Racist Regimes in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia in the 60s	46
5. Intensification of the Liberation Movement in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia (Early 70s)	67
Chapter Two. Moving Forward or Marking Time? (1976-1984)	89
1. The SI Programme of Action on Southern Africa	89
2. And the Social Democrats' Real Actions	99
3. Differentiation in International Social Democracy on Southern Africa	125
4. The Socialist Inter-African and Southern Africa	144
5. Cooperation Between Communists and Social Democrats on Southern Africa: Experience and Prospects	147
Chapter Three. A New Departure?	163
1. The Arusha Conference	163
2. ...And After	172
3. Back in Arusha	208
Conclusion	215

FOREWORD

Over the past three decades, the problems of southern Africa have been prominent in international relations and in the foreign policy activity of states, political parties, and inter-government and non-governmental organizations.

The increasingly sharp conflict in southern Africa has a tangible impact on the world situation, and no political force of any significance can remain on the sidelines of the conflict. This fully applies to international social democracy, which carries a lot of political weight, especially in Western Europe.

Its organizational centre—the Socialist International (SI)¹—unites 82 parties and organizations with a membership, according to official SI figures, of over 20 million; while more than 210 million voters have cast their ballots for social democratic candidates.²

Heading the governments in major West European countries (Britain, the FRG, France, Italy and Spain) for a long time, the Social Democrats were able to influence their policy, including on southern Africa, as leaders of both the cabinets and mass movements.

Social democracy's greater attention to southern Africa stems, first, from Western powers' broad economic and strategic interests in that region and their traditional ties with the colonial and racist regimes, and, second, from its desire (particularly evident since the mid-70s) to show itself as a truly international movement.

Any step to invigorate ties with the newly free countries made it necessary for the leaders of the SI and its member parties to determine their attitude to final liquidation of colonialism on the African continent. In establishing contacts with the national liberation forces in southern Africa, the Social Democrats banked on enhancing their international authority, portraying themselves as allies of those forces, and exerting an influence on them.

The policy toward the national liberation movement in southern Africa has gradually become a main direction in the activity of

international social democracy. This policy is closely linked with the Social Democrats' attitude to the developing countries, to what Western (including social democratic) literature often terms "the North-South conflict". However, it would not be correct to regard this policy as just an aspect of the question. There is good reason why SI conferences often highlight the problems of southern Africa and devote special sections of final documents to them.

The situation in southern Africa is such that one's attitude to the national liberation struggle in the region also affects other very important international issues, primarily the problem of preserving universal peace and such aspects of that problem as liquidation of the imperialist military bases on foreign territory and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. One's attitude to the struggle in southern Africa is also closely connected with the fight against fascism and reaction and for the peoples' democratic rights, and with the relations between Communists and Social Democrats.

This book focuses on the policy pursued by international social democracy in southern Africa, revealing the causes, directions and scale of evolution of that policy, comparing it with the political demands of the national liberation movements, and analyzing the differentiation in the ranks of the Social Democrats and the Socialist International's role and efforts in coordinating the activities of international social democracy in that region.

It is very important politically and practically to study the experience already gained and determine the prospects of the Communists' and the Social Democrats' jointly supporting the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle.

The 27th CPSU Congress stated in this connection: "It is a fact that the ideological differences between the Communists and the Social Democrats are deep, that their achievements and experience are dissimilar and non-equivalent. However, an unbiased look at the standpoints and views of each other is unquestionably useful to both the Communists and the Social Democrats, useful in the first place for furthering the struggle for peace and international security."³

The author sought to consider the policy of international social democracy as a whole, i.e. to analyze not only its declarations but also the actions of its organizational centre, the leading social democratic parties, and the governments they head. Borne in mind were all the contradictory aspects of the Social Democrats' policy: from imposition of reformist ideology, with its large share of anti-communism, on the national liberation movements, and

some social democratic governments' collusion with the racist and colonial regimes, to instances of substantial practical assistance to national liberation fighters.

The book uses documents and material of the national liberation movements and the Socialist International. The author was also greatly assisted by his meetings with African Communists, activists of the national liberation movements, and participants in the international movement of solidarity with the peoples of southern Africa, including members of social democratic parties, and also by his attendance at a number of international conferences against colonialism and apartheid.

Mention needs to be made of the meaning of some terms used in this work. Although SI member parties have different names (social democratic, socialist, labour, workers), for ease of presentation they are generally called social democratic, and their members Social Democrats, in this book.

The concept "southern Africa" is used more in a political than in a geographical sense. Thus, in the period of struggle against Portuguese colonialism, this concept usually included not only South Africa proper, Namibia and Zimbabwe but also Angola, Mozambique and even Guinea-Bissau, although the last-named country is located quite far from the south of the continent. It was precisely in that broad sense that the term "southern Africa" was used in that period in UN documents, for example, when organizing international conferences.

The term "South Africa" is used by the author to designate the country where a racist state—the Republic of South Africa—was established. It should be emphasized that the decision to proclaim South Africa a "republic" was taken in 1961 during a referendum in which only the white minority, making up less than 20 per cent of the population, participated. While not opposing the republican form of government in principle, South Africa's revolutionary forces reject this "white republic of black misery".

With respect to racial terminology, this work uses the terms employed by South African revolutionaries. Thus, the term "blacks" is used as a collective concept for the oppressed racial groups in South Africa—Africans, coloureds and Indians. Since the late 70s, however, the racist authorities have been calling the Africans, who used to be known as "bantus", "blacks", while only the descendants of the Dutch settlers now have the right to call themselves "Africans" ("Afrikaners").

The author regards his study not only as a piece of scientific analysis of one direction in the policy of international social democracy, but also as a publicistic work. Lenin wrote in January

1905 that even being far from the scene of events "we must try to keep pace with events, to sum them up, to draw conclusions, to draw from the experience of today's happenings lessons that will be useful tomorrow, in another place, where 'the people are still mute' and where in the near future, in some form or other, a revolutionary conflagration will break out. We must make it the constant job of publicists to write the history of the present day, and to try to write it in such a way that our chronicles will give the greatest possible help to the direct participants in the movement."⁴

The author sought to follow these words of Lenin's in writing this book.

NOTES

¹On the history of the Socialist International see: N. Sibilev, *The Socialist International*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1984.

²*Socialist International Press Release*, No. 21/86, p. 2.

³Mikhail Gorbachev, *Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1986, p. 94.

⁴Lenin, "The Revolutionary Days", *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 104.

CHAPTER ONE

FRIEND OR FOE? (1960-1976)

1. Initial Period of Armed Struggle in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau

The year 1960 has gone down in history as Africa Year: 17 African countries proclaimed political independence. This resulted from the courageous struggle of the African peoples, which was waged in the favourable conditions created by the victory of the USSR and its allies over Nazi Germany in the Second World War, by the emergence of socialist states in Europe and Asia, and the weakening of the economic, social, political and military positions of the major colonial powers.

During the subsequent period leaders of social reformist parties of the ex-mother countries did everything to underscore what international social democracy had done for African decolonization. The documents adopted in the first ten years of the Socialist International did indeed contain many words of sympathy for the colonial peoples and of condemnation of imperialism, but, as a rule, they did not include concrete demands for independence to the oppressed countries or assistance to the national liberation movements. Thus, the declaration "Aims and Tasks of Democratic Socialism" adopted at the First Congress of the Socialist International (Frankfort on the Main, June 30-July 3, 1951) contained only a few general words of criticism of imperialist expansion and a promise that the "democratic socialists" would fight "the oppression or exploitation of any people".¹ The fact that in the early 60s the SI had not a single African member is further evidence of its insufficient attention to the problems of the national liberation struggle.

The expansion and intensification of the national liberation movement on the African continent forced the leadership of international social democracy to establish contact with the political forces which were coming to power in the emergent states. The April 1960 SI Council Conference, held in Haifa (Israel) and attended by guests from African countries, had "The Situation in Africa" as a main item on the agenda. Speaking on this question, Golda Meir, then Israeli Foreign Minister, offered

the Zionist state itself as a model of social and political system for the African countries. Declaring its "wish to enter into a new and deeper relationship with the new leaders of Africa," the conference recorded "its deep conviction, that ... the principles of democratic Socialism can and must be adapted" to the conditions of the new independent states. That was in effect a definition of the Social Democrats' principal objective—to spread the reformist ideology of "democratic socialism" on the continent and adapt it to African realities.

Yet the conference resolution avoided the question of support for the struggle of the peoples still under the colonial yoke.

At the turn of the 60s, Portugal's ruling circles, unlike the other economically more developed mother countries, would not agree voluntarily to replace the old methods of exploitation with neocolonial ones or to grant political independence to Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and other colonies. On 4 February 1961, Angolan patriots, led by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), attacked a police station and prison in Luanda where political detainees were being held. This heroic act sparked off the armed independence struggle of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies.

A few months after those events, in October 1961, the Seventh SI Congress, which was to discuss and approve a new policy declaration, convened in Rome. A number of political parties from Asia, Africa and Latin America had been invited to the congress. During the preliminary discussion of the declaration, serious disagreements came to light between those invited and SI leaders. The British Labour-leaning weekly *Tribune* noted that the representatives of Afro-Asian countries attending the congress were astonished by the anti-communist, pro-Western and pro-NATO character of the draft of the main document.

The congress passed a resolution on Africa which, among other things, condemned "Portuguese oppression in Angola, Mozambique and other territories" and demanded that "action be taken by the United Nations and its member States to see that the principles of the UN Charter are put into application in these territories".² But declarative criticism of colonialism had political strings attached to it: the African countries were required to join the anti-communist campaign conducted by the right-wing social democratic leaders and to adopt "parliamentary democracy" as a model state system.

Soon after the Seventh Congress, two SI delegations toured Africa in order to "discover the role ... of democratic socialist ideas" in the newly independent countries.³ At the same time it was hoped

that there were "strong currents of Socialist thinking in the national movements" and no "political philosophy whatsoever" among the 230 million Africans.⁴

The report made by these delegations to the SI Council Conference in Oslo in June 1962 contained no proposals whatsoever on supporting the African peoples' independence struggle. At the same time its conclusions reflected the Social Democrats' growing disappointment in the attempts to set up, with the aid of the Africans who used to be members of the social democratic parties of the mother countries, "a bridgehead for the universally applicable socialist principles in Africa". "These days are over," Gunther Markscheffel, member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), said at the conference. "What is now appearing in many parts of Africa under the name of African Socialism constitutes a confused mosaic composed of countless stones."⁵

The Oslo Conference approved as a policy document a declaration entitled "The World Today: The Socialist Perspective", which, in the section "Socialism and Emergent Nations", recognized the right of all nations to self-determination but did not say whether that also included the creation of independent states. It should also be noted that, unlike the Seventh SI Congress, discussion at the Oslo Conference did not involve representatives of African countries (only Social Democrats of Madagascar were present).

The situation in Angola was the focus of the discussion of African problems. The whole world was outraged at the Portuguese colonialists' brutal reprisals against the African population (almost 3,000 Africans were killed in Luanda on 5 February 1961 alone). This was also reflected in the Oslo resolution, which demanded "an end to Portuguese oppression and the granting of complete independence".⁶

However, the statement on complete independence did not figure in subsequent documents of SI congresses. Thus, the resolution of the Eighth Congress, held in Amsterdam in September 1963, made no mention of supporting the demand for independence for the Portuguese colonies. The congress urged all SI member parties "to support with all suitable means anti-colonialist movements which aim at real freedom and genuine democracy".⁷ But the Social Democrats and the national liberation fighters had quite different interpretations of "real freedom" and "genuine democracy". SI leaders were demanding that the Africans recognize that Western-style parliamentary democracy was desirable, while the independence fighters in the Portuguese colonies were aiming to establish people's power and carry out socio-economic transformations.

After the Angolan patriots, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) began armed struggle for independence in 1963, and the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) in 1964. These progressive organizations encountered not only the brutal repression of the colonialists, who enjoyed NATO support, but also the manoeuvres of internal reactionaries to create "parallel" movements – FNLA and then UNITA in Angola, FLING in Guinea-Bissau, and COREMO in Mozambique.

But the SI and major social democratic parties continued to confine themselves to verbal condemnation of the colonial authorities' actions. In the early 60s the leadership of the social democratic parties in NATO countries, far from taking measures to end military and political cooperation with the Portuguese colonialist and fascist regime, even backed this cooperation on several occasions.

The pretext for this policy was the "need" to resist "communist expansion" in Africa in view of Portugal's contribution to "West European defence" as a NATO member. This policy was reflected both in the wording of resolutions of SI leading bodies and in the actual moves of social democratic parties.

A resolution of the 10th SI Congress, held in May 1966 in Stockholm, once again merely expressed "abhorrence of colonialism" and "concern [over] the situation in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea" and vaguely promised to "work through the United Nations to eradicate these and other vestiges of colonialism".⁸

In the first half of the 60s the most active member of the Socialist International was the British Labour Party, whose representative, Albert Carthy, was an SI secretary up to June 1969. The 1961 Labour Conference passed a resolution which deplored the Portuguese government's actions in Angola and urged that "every step be taken to assist the suffering peoples in Angola".⁹ Having replaced Hugh Gaitskell in 1963, the new Labour leader Harold Wilson stated that a Labour government would not only ban export of British arms to Portugal for use in its African colonial territories (a decision to ban arms exports to Portugal for use in Africa was taken by the Conservative government back in 1961 but was constantly violated), but would also do everything possible at the UN and in other organizations to end such deliveries from other countries as well.¹⁰ The Labour leadership also criticized the Tories for voting with Portugal and South Africa at the UN and for "cowering in humiliating abstention".¹¹

This stance made the leadership of the national liberation movements hope for positive changes in British government

policy in the future. But even before the Labour Party won the elections on 16 October 1964 signs appeared that they were going back on their promises. FRELIMO's organ published an article headlined "The British Labour Party Supports the Colonialist Policy of Salazar". It spoke of "a party which says it follows a socialist line, but lauds Portuguese colonialism, and implicitly denies the legitimacy of our right to independence". These criticisms were sparked off by an August 1964 trip to Angola and Mozambique by a group of Labour MPs at the invitation of the Portuguese government. The trip went ahead despite FRELIMO's warning that it would mean "at least a moral support of Portuguese colonial policy". This warning proved fully justified: on their return from Africa, the Labour MPs praised the Portuguese government's actions and stated that it was "necessary to look at the problems of Portuguese Africa with friendship and not to confuse them with ... those of other territories of the African continent".

Accusing the Labour Party of having always supported Portugal's colonialist policy, the FRELIMO organ concluded: "Most of the parties or movements of the Western countries cannot merit our confidence even when they present themselves labeled as 'progressives', 'liberals' or 'socialists'... That lesson teaches us too that for the defence of the principles and aims of the Mozambique Revolution we must be alert and vigilant in order to be able to recognize and unmask the false friends of the Mozambique people."¹²

The Labour government formed after the party won the October 1964 elections also pursued a double-faced policy. Harold Wilson did indeed declare in the House of Commons that Britain would no longer sell Portugal arms that could be used in its colonies (the Portuguese authorities replied that they had no need of such deliveries since they were being supplied with arms on more favourable terms by the FRG and other NATO allies¹³), but the Labour leadership took no measures whatsoever within NATO or the SI to end military cooperation with Portugal on the part of Britain's allies. What is more, despite the promises, the military supplies to Portugal continued. As early as 1965 the Portuguese army received 200 jeeps from Britain, and then a frigate (the arms on it were installed by Portugal).

The British colonial authorities in southern Africa were also co-operating with the Portuguese colonialists. In Swaziland (then a British protectorate) several Mozambican refugees were arrested on charges of links with FRELIMO and handed over to the Portuguese. FRELIMO President Eduardo Mondlane publicly con-

demned this fact as a plot between the British colonial authorities and the Portuguese. There were also arrests of MPLA members in Northern Rhodesia.

After the 1965 trip to ascertain the situation in Guinea-Bissau, the British military attache expressed total solidarity with the Salazar government. This caused grave concern among left-wing Labourites. Following Mondlane's visit to London, the British Committee for Freedom in Mozambique was set up in 1968. In 1969 it was renamed the Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea, with Lord Gifford becoming its chairman and Basil Davidson, a prominent student of Africa, its leading member, both Labour left-wingers.

Concern over the situation in the Portuguese colonies was also voiced by the Social Democratic Party of Germany even before the armed struggle began. In an article entitled "Our Role in the Development of African Nations", an SPD leader Hans Jürgen Wischniewski wrote: "We must unconditionally acknowledge the right to self-determination of all African peoples and their right to independence. The age of colonialism is gone for ever. This applies to Algeria, it applies to Portuguese possessions, and it must also apply to the Union of South Africa." He predicted that if the Portuguese colonies "are not guided towards independence ... we shall witness conflicts just as tragic as those in Algeria today."¹⁴

But, in Wischniewski's opinion, the development of the FRG's ties with African countries, which would be facilitated by recognition of the peoples' right to independence, should help to prevent an increase in the GDR's international prestige. Wischniewski expressed the hope that if the African countries were given aid by the FRG they would in future support it at the UN on "the problem of a divided Germany".¹⁵

However, even after the SPD entered the "broad coalition" government in 1966 along with the CDU-CSU, instead of assisting the African peoples to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, the FRG continued its multifaceted cooperation with Portugal's colonialist and fascist regime. Under an agreement signed in 1964, the FRG supplied its NATO ally with arms, ammunition and military equipment. The FRG's military attaches paid regular visits to Portuguese colonies in Africa to familiarize themselves with antiguerrilla actions.

This stance of the coalition government was sharply criticized by MPLA President Agostinho Neto, FRELIMO President Eduardo Mondlane, and PAIGC General Secretary Amílcar Cabral, who described it as complicity in the suppression of the African peoples, fighting for their liberation.¹⁶

The position of the political forces in the mother country itself was of especially great importance for the independence struggle of the Portuguese colonies. Portuguese Communist Party General Secretary Alvaro Cunhal noted that for many years only the revolutionary proletariat and its party, the PCP, had condemned the Portuguese colonialists and advocated the colonial peoples' right to self-determination and independence. In 1961, the Socialists, who had participated in the anti-fascist movement (at that time there was no socialist party in Portugal; several groups of social reformists, among whom Mario Soares had considerable influence, operated in the country itself and in exile), signed along with the Liberals a "Programme for the Democratization of the Republic", which, in Cunhal's words, in a scarcely veiled form defended continued colonial exploitation and domination.

In the mid-60s, having set up the Portuguese Socialist Action (ASP) following the split in the Social Democratic Action, of which they had been members together with the Liberals, the Portuguese Socialists called for immediate talks with the nationalist forces fighting in the various colonies and for "loyal respect for the principle of self-determination and of all its consequences (including independence)". However, they at the same time placed emphasis on preserving the "legitimate interests of the Portuguese population settled in the colonies".¹⁷

After Marcelo Caetano replaced Salazar as Prime Minister in September 1968, the Portuguese Socialists conceded that it was possible to democratize the regime and end the colonial war.

A broad movement—Democratic Electoral Commissions, which included Communists and other democratic forces—took shape during the political campaign launched following the Caetano government's announcement of National Assembly elections in 1969. However, backed by the Socialist International, the ASP broke with this movement, the attitude to the colonial question being a very important aspect of the disagreement. The Socialists established their own movement—Electoral Commissions of Democratic Unity—which, while timidly criticizing the government's colonial policy, opposed withdrawal from the colonies.

In the period in question, the social democratic parties of non-NATO countries were most active in establishing contacts with the national liberation movements. For example, the Social Democratic Labour Party of Sweden (SAP) established contacts with FRELIMO and PAIGC in the mid-60s. A party Solidarity Fund set up in early 1968 was used to give them material assistance, initially on a fairly modest scale: in the first year FRELIMO and

PAIGC received 10,000 kronor each out of the aid sumtotaling over 300,000 kronor.

Social democratic parties and also the governments they headed invigorated their ties with the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies due to the generally increasing interest in Sweden and other Nordic countries in the problems of Asia and Africa following the launching of a powerful movement in the region against US aggression in Indochina. In 1966 the organizations opposing colonialism and apartheid were recognized "as partners with whom direct assistance [by the Swedish government. —V.B.] was being discussed".¹⁸ In December 1968 Swedish Foreign Minister Torsten Nillsen officially declared that his government was "prepared to give support to the oppressed peoples of Africa" in the form of material assistance in the area of education.¹⁹ Such assistance was given, for example, to the Mozambique Institute, which was located in Tanzania and closely linked with FRELIMO, though formally an independent organization.

But parallel with material assistance to the national liberation movements was Sweden's preservation of advantageous economic ties with Portugal. Furthermore, Sweden refused to bring pressure to bear on Portugal within the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Attempts by the national liberation movements to obtain political support from the Swedish government were unsuccessful. FRELIMO President Mondlane stated in 1968: "If we are to take Sweden's assurances of solidarity seriously, we naturally expect Sweden to bring pressure on Portugal inside the EFTA."²⁰ But Swedish Minister of Commerce Gunnar Lange asserted that sanctions within EFTA were out of the question, admitting at the same time that Sweden did not want to lose its place on Portugal's markets.

On the whole, by the end of the 60s the SI had established no firm ties with either the political parties in the independent African countries or with the national liberation movements. What is more, compared with the mid-60s, these ties even grew weaker as a result of the sharp conflict between the SI leadership and the African guests invited to the 10th SI Congress, held in May 1966 in Stockholm, over international social democracy's refusal to condemn Britain's stance on the Rhodesian problem.

In the report submitted to the 11th SI Congress (Eastbourne, Britain, 1966), Albert Carthy sought to justify the prevailing situation by the fact that political forces in Africa were "at present looking inward" and showed "as yet no desire for commitment to international association". The report said nothing about the

popular struggle in Portuguese colonies and southern Africa but slandered the Soviet Union as "the sole colonial empire".²¹

The more farsighted figures in international social democracy were dissatisfied with this stance of the leadership. It was increasingly obvious that it was out of harmony with the situation on the African continent and in the world as a whole.

2. Upsurge in the Liberation Movement in Portuguese Colonies

At the end of the 60s armed struggle in the Portuguese colonies in Africa was gaining momentum. The Portuguese regime had sent over 50,000 soldiers to Angola and 40,000 to Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, but they were unable to suppress the independence struggle. Vast liberated regions were established in all three countries, power there being exercised by the national liberation movements.

The MPLA, FRELIMO and PAIGC scored their victories with growing assistance on the part of the USSR and other socialist countries, independent African states, and progressive forces the world over. The peoples' struggle was helped by the general change for the better in the world situation and the gradual transition from a state of cold war to international detente. In these conditions it was increasingly difficult for the social democratic leadership to use NATO interests as justification for its cooperation with the reactionary Portuguese regime. In a situation of detente and bankruptcy of the imperialist cold war policy, international social democracy got an opportunity to move away from a pro-American course and take up "their natural position on the middle ground",²² as prominent British Labourite Alan Day put it.

Hence the emergent change in the SI attitude to the national liberation struggle.

In the late 60s public organizations (solidarity committees, support groups, and the like) appeared in many West European countries, their aim being to render various types of aid to the peoples of the Portuguese colonies. The so-called New Left and church circles worked actively in some of them alongside Communists and Social Democrats. On the whole, these organizations served as a kind of catalyst in changing the position of the leading political parties on the problems of southern Africa.

At the same time the social democratic leadership was increasingly worried over the enhanced prestige of the USSR and

other socialist countries on the African continent, largely thanks to their clear position in support of and their concrete assistance to the peoples' anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle.

However, all these factors influenced the policy of each social democratic party to varying degrees, which is why the move by international social democracy as a whole to more active ties with the national liberation movements was a long process that occurred between the 11th and 12th SI congresses, i.e. between 1969 and 1972.

It was at the 11th SI Congress (Eastbourne, Britain, 1969) that it first became apparent that a clearer stance in support of the national liberation movements was needed in order to strengthen relations with the political parties in the independent African countries.

Addressing the Congress, Kalevi Sorsa, General Secretary of the Finnish Social Democratic Party, spoke of the need for international social democracy to "take the side of the struggle for freedom of the developing countries, against colonialism, neocolonialism and oppression. Economic and political support must be given especially to the movement of national liberation."²³

However, that viewpoint was not yet predominant in the Socialist International. For example, Mario Soares, the Portuguese Socialists' leader, who was a special guest at the 11th Congress, spoke only of the need to re-establish "peace in the colonies by seeking political solutions based on negotiations and on recognition of the principle of self-determination."²⁴

As did previous ones, the resolution of the 11th Congress spoke of the SI's "abhorrence of colonialism" and expressed "solidarity with the people of Africa still fighting colonial and Fascist oppression", in particular with the freedom fighters of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. A new element was recognition of the responsibility of social democratic parties of NATO and EFTA countries for those organizations' policy toward Portugal. The parties were urged to press their governments to use all possible sanctions to put an end to Portugal's use of its membership in those organizations to finance the colonial wars in Africa.²⁵

It is also significant that new SI General Secretary Hans Janitschek, representative of the Socialist Party of Austria, made a long tour of African countries immediately after his election to that post. In an article on the results of his trip he wrote: "We must learn much, in Africa, about their tribal way of life which in many ways could set an example for the West..."²⁶ Janitschek needed this "tribal plain living" to broaden the Socialist International

geographically. However, plans to intensify ties with political parties in independent Africa called for concrete support of the national liberation fighters by international social democracy rather than such laudation. A move in this direction was set out in a report entitled "African Roads to Socialism" drafted by a special working group of the SI's Sub-Committee on Developing Areas.

Janitschek's introductory article to this report, which was published as a special issue of the SI magazine, calls it "a milestone in the development of democratic socialist thinking on the problems of the African continent" that should open "a new era in relations between African socialism and democratic socialism". This document may be described as an attempt to adapt the principles of "democratic socialism" to African conditions. It admits that "democratic socialism as a concept and an organization cannot simply be transplanted" from Europe to other continents. Evidently in an effort to win the sympathy of African political leaders for the SI, the report was more critical than resolutions of SI leading bodies of the "medieval and fascist rule" in the Portuguese colonies. The crimes of Portugal's colonial regime and the regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia were condemned not only as violations of human rights but also as a threat to universal peace. Unlike previous SI documents, the report spoke of the need for an active support of the African liberation movements waging armed struggle against their oppressors, and not only on the part of the social democratic parties but also in those cases where the Socialists form the government.

Publication of the report was accompanied by Janitschek's promise that "the year 1970 will see the opening of new initiatives by the international democratic socialist movement in Africa".²⁷ But this did not happen. The SI leadership continued to take a very diffuse position toward the African peoples' anti-colonial and anti-racist struggle, and it was difficult for it to attract any substantial forces in Africa. There was not a single SI member on the continent (only the Social Democratic Party of Madagascar and the Labour Party of Mauritius were members at that time). The plans to set up a "system of mutual relations" between the SI and African political parties also remained on paper.

At the same time the social democratic parties of Scandinavia (especially Sweden) were greatly invigorating their contacts with the national liberation movements. PAIGC General Secretary Cabral and a FRELIMO leader Marcelino Dos Santos were guests at the 24th SAP Congress (Stockholm, 1969).

The change in Sweden's policy toward the struggle against Portuguese colonialism was closely connected with the name of Olof

Palme, who became SAP Chairman and Swedish Prime Minister in October 1969. Displaying great interest in the situation in Africa, Asia and Latin America and sincerely sympathetic to the national liberation forces, Palme went considerably further than his SI colleagues in establishing ties with anti-imperialist fighters in various regions—from Vietnam to Angola.

At the 27th SAP Congress Palme announced plans to give FRELIMO and PAIGC substantial government aid. This drew a sharp reaction from the Portuguese government, including the recall of its ambassador from Stockholm.²⁸ The resolutions of the 1969 Congress of the Finnish Social Democratic Party also declared that "international social democracy must come down firmly on the side of liberation for the developing world and firmly oppose colonialism, neocolonialism and oppression. National liberation movements in particular must be given both economic and political aid."²⁹

While appreciating the fact of aid on the part of social democratic parties and the governments they headed, the leadership of the national liberation movements sought to ensure that it was not confined to "humanitarian purposes" but was based on recognition of their struggle's political objectives. They rightly believed that support rendered on a "sentimental" basis was not reliable, as was confirmed by the zig-zags in the SAP's policy. The Swedish government gave FRELIMO aid to the tune of £9,000 in 1969/70, but it gave none in the following year. This was due to the political infighting within FRELIMO between the revolutionary forces and a small group headed by the former member of the Presidential Council, Uriah Simango. The group included L. Mutaka, then FRELIMO representative in Stockholm, whose expulsion from FRELIMO was behind the refusal of the Swedish leadership to continue granting its aid.

In an effort to broaden the movement in support of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies, primarily in Western Europe, and, in the words of Dos Santos, "to turn abstract charitable solidarity into political solidarity", the national liberation movements initiated an international conference of solidarity with the peoples of the Portuguese colonies to be held in a West European country. The preparatory work was carried out directly by the MPLA, FRELIMO and PAIGC and the Mobilization Committee on which the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) and the World Peace Council (WPC) were active. The conference was held in Rome in June 1970 and to a certain extent helped to change the positions of a number of social democratic parties on decolonization and motivated them to start giving practical

assistance to the independence fighters. The MPLA, FRELIMO and PAIGC leaders described the conference as historic: it was attended by 177 international and national organizations and made a strong impact on world public opinion. This impact was further enhanced by the fact that the Pope received the FRELIMO, MPLA and PAIGC leaders after the conference ended.

In Rome, the representatives of the national liberation movements demanded that the West end its support for Portugal's colonial wars and give every assistance to their struggle. Speaking at the conference on the FRG's military cooperation with Portugal, PAIGC General Secretary Amilcar Cabral directly addressed the leadership of the Social Democratic Party and Free Democratic Party coalition that had come to power in the FRG in October 1969: "We ask: does the new FRG government intend to continue its policy of collusion with the Portuguese government? How can one combine recognition of our people's right to independence and right to fight for that independence with conniving at the colonial war being waged by Portugal?"

Cabral compared the FRG's policy with that of Sweden, and welcomed the Swedish government's decision not only to continue but also to increase aid despite the clamorous propaganda campaign launched by the Portuguese government.

The PAIGC General Secretary underscored that aid to the independence fighters should have no political strings attached: "There are people in Western Europe who say that they want to help us but they begin by asking whether we get aid from communist countries. We cannot understand that. Our people's specific living conditions and the difficult struggle we are waging fully justify our accepting any assistance. We must say clearly to our West European friends who criticize us for receiving aid from communist countries that we are not anti-Communists. Let those who want to help us, help us, but without setting any conditions."

The anti-colonial fighters regarded the very fact of the successful holding of such a broad international conference as a concrete example of the possibility of uniting all anti-imperialist and anti-colonial forces.

The Rome meeting was not only a powerful demonstration of the support of the world's progressive forces for the struggle against Portuguese colonialism; it also gave the fighting organizations an opportunity broadly to inform the international, and primarily the West European, public of the situation in their countries and the leading Western powers' connivance at the colonial wars. The documents approved in Rome called, among

other things, for public pressure on governments to follow Sweden's example and end assistance to Portugal, and for aid to the liberation movements. Both before and after the conference FRELIMO, MPLA and PAIGC representatives made numerous trips to Europe. Thus, an MPLA delegation headed by Agostinho Neto was received by Palme, who agreed to assist the MPLA with medical and school supplies. A direct result of the talks was that the MPLA opened an office in Stockholm with the rights of an information centre, like the FRELIMO and PAIGC had done before it.

Meetings between Angolan delegations and leaders of social democratic parties and anti-colonial public organizations also took place in Finland, Norway and Denmark.

The favourable reception accorded them in the two latter countries by both the social democratic parties and the bourgeois coalition governments meant that substantial alterations were being made even in the policy of countries connected with Portugal in the NATO bloc.

The SI Council Conference held in Helsinki in 1971 passed a special resolution on Africa. Although the section on the Portuguese colonies was largely a repetition of the 11th Congress resolution, it contained an appeal to SI member parties "to campaign in their own countries against companies and governments giving economic or technical aid for the economic exploitation of Portuguese colonies. The Socialist International demands that no democratic Government should deliver military aid to the Portuguese regime and that those member parties which are in opposition should continue to express a clear stand against military aid and arms deliveries."³⁰

This call was a reflection of the more and more frequent criticism of the passivity of the Socialist International and its member parties in the ranks of Social Democrats. With the growing successes of the national liberation movements, they had an increasing desire "not to miss the train", to "be involved" in those successes. Addressing the Helsinki Conference, Pekka Kuusi, a leading figure in the Finnish Social Democratic Party (SSP), stated: "In the Socialist International the social democratic parties have a tool that has not been used effectively enough to support the oppressed nations of the Third World. In this connection, it seems worth considering that the international solidarity activities of the social democratic parties be extended." The Finnish Social Democrats expressed their willingness "to support both economically and politically those national liberation movements in developing countries which, for want of

other alternatives, have had to resort also to armed action in order to fight exploitation and oppression".³¹

Against the generally more realistic attitude to the liquidation of the colonial regimes, disagreements were growing ever more manifest in the Socialist International and, in particular, in parties from NATO countries. This became obvious during the early June 1971 NATO Council session. The fact that this session was held in Lisbon, the capital of a country whose government was waging colonial wars in Africa, raised an international outcry and sharp criticism on the part of the national liberation movements. Protests also came from the Social Democrats of Norway (the Norwegian Labour Party had come to power by then) and Denmark. In this connection a special 22 May 1971 FRELIMO statement noted: "A few of the NATO members expressed their reservations about holding the next meeting in Lisbon but did nothing about it, being easily swayed by the stronger reactionary powers like the US, Britain, West Germany and France." The FRELIMO leadership assessed actions of those powers (including the Social Democrat-led government in the FRG) as indication that "more open and direct involvement" in support of Portugal's colonial policy was "in the offing".³²

A plenary session of the MPLA Executive Committee described the NATO meeting in Lisbon as "a manifestation of that organization's support for Portugal's colonial policy" but at the same time stated that "the MPLA appreciates the stand of the countries in that bloc which have come out against the colonial war".³³ This was a reference to the criticism of Portugal's policy made at the session by Norway and Denmark. For example, Andreas Cappelen, Foreign Minister in the government of the Norwegian Labour Party, condemned Portugal's colonial wars as "contrary to humanity's interests and incompatible with the principles defined in the Charter of the organization [NATO. — V.B.]".³⁴

NATO Secretary General Josef Luns was displeased at the criticism of the Portuguese regime by NATO members and entered into a public polemic with K.B. Andersen, a prominent figure in the Social Democratic Party of Denmark.

When the Social Democrats came to power in spring 1971 in Norway and in autumn 1971 in Denmark, the governments of those countries began to give material assistance and partial political support to the national liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies. Soon after becoming Foreign Minister, Andersen paid a visit to Dar es Salaam, where he held talks with FRELIMO President Samora Machel at the FRELIMO

headquarters. The importance of the government's decision to establish ties with and assist FRELIMO was also evident in the reaction of the Portuguese government which recalled its ambassador from Copenhagen. The FRELIMO headquarters was later visited by Norwegian Foreign Minister Cappelen, who also confirmed the readiness of his government to give material aid directly to FRELIMO in addition to its assistance to the OAU's Liberation Committee.

The social democratic governments of Norway and Denmark also established ties with other national liberation movements. Thus, a PAIGC delegation led by PAIGC Assistant General Secretary Aristides Pereira visited Norway in March 1972, where it received a promise of one million kroner in material assistance, and then Denmark.

In September 1971 Olof Palme paid an official visit to Tanzania and Zambia. Addressing the Congress of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), Palme condemned Portuguese colonialism and the governments of South Africa and Rhodesia as "crucial obstacles to a policy of worldwide relaxation of tension and a danger to peace" and promised to step up support for PAIGC, FRELIMO and MPLA.³⁵

The Dutch Party of Labour took a position close to that of Scandinavian social democracy in relation to the national liberation movements of the Portuguese colonies. On its initiative the Dutch coalition government began to assist the Mozambique Institute in Tanzania through the Eduardo Mondlane Foundation that had been set up in 1969 (Eduardo Mondlane was killed by Portuguese agents on 6 February 1969). In early 1970 the second (lower) house of the Dutch parliament passed a Social Democrat-supported resolution condemning military aid to Portugal and urging the government to insist that the Western allies which were supplying Portugal with arms respect the letter and spirit of the Security Council resolutions.

However, as was noted earlier, by no means all SI member parties sought to establish ties with and assist the national liberation movements. In a letter published in *Socialist Affairs* Charles Wood reflected the concern over the situation: "The question that arises is whether social democratic parties will ever have the political will to pursue genuinely progressive policies towards the Third World. Certainly the antecedents (the French Socialist Party and Algeria, then Suez, the Labour government and Vietnam, etc. etc.) are not promising. Which is typical of social democracy—these scandalous blots, or the admittedly fine record of some Scandinavian social democratic parties in giving solidarity

to progressive forces in the developing countries? Sadly, I know what most socialists in the Third World would answer to that question."³⁶

Indeed, neither the SI as a whole nor most of its member parties could boast about concrete support for the peoples' liberation struggle.

An attempt to somewhat change the situation was made at the November 1971 London session of the SI Bureau, which, on a proposal by Relus ter Beek, International Secretary of the Dutch Party of Labour, decided that on each May Day beginning in 1972 fund-raising campaigns by member parties would be coordinated, "the proceeds to be donated to the liberation movements of southern Africa".³⁷ Explaining the importance of the proposal, that party's spokesman Fenna van den Berg wrote in *Socialist Affairs* that it had been put forward because it was felt that a main task facing the Socialist International was to establish friendly relations with the freedom movements in southern Africa. "You don't get these friendly relations just by uttering sweet and friendly words and giving them a pat on the back. What you need is to translate your feelings of solidarity into practice through actual deeds and the best way to set about this is by collecting money which the movements themselves then will know best how to spend."³⁸

The Party of Labour itself set up about 150 fund-raising centres on 1 May 1972, held some 100 rallies, and also made use of the press organs and radio and television stations connected with it. An appeal to British Labourites to raise funds came from Judith Hart, a leading party left-winger and chairwoman of the Labourites' Southern Africa Solidarity Fund.

Judging by *Socialist Affairs*, the SI leadership expected that the funds raised by social democratic parties would make up an "impressive sum" and that this would undoubtedly be an unprecedented act of solidarity with the African liberation movements. However, later issues of the magazine carried no information about realization of this hope. An indirect indication of the results of this "unprecedented act of solidarity" was given by the fact that, in spite of Hart's appeal, the Labourites' fund totalled a mere £5,000-6,000 a year later (in a party with a membership of six million!).

At the 12th SI Congress (Vienna, June 1972) definite positive changes occurred in international social democracy's stand on European security, detente, and attitude to communist parties. The April 1972 Bureau decision that social democratic parties may act freely on the question of cooperation with communist parties

was confirmed. This position of the SI leadership, which essentially sanctioned the already established practices, offered greater scope for joint actions by the progressive forces in support of the national liberation movements.

In his speech at the congress, K.B. Andersen raised the question of an SI programme of cooperation between developed and developing countries, stressing that the lack of such a programme was preventing "democratic socialism" from enhancing its influence among the developing countries. Andersen also admitted that the countries which had won independence after the Second World War did not want to follow a capitalist path and that those countries could not be required to adhere to "parliamentary democracy".

The leaders of international social democracy advocated greater flexibility in relations with the political forces in developing countries and with the national liberation movements. It was in this context that Andersen proposed to discuss the question of whether governments could support liberation movements in other countries.

He regarded such support as "an exception to the general principle" since "negotiations on development aid should take place between governments and only between governments". But this position was tantamount to legitimization of the Portuguese colonial regime's authority, since it was considered a "government" in relation to the colonies in Africa. Andersen justified this "exception" with references to UN Security Council resolutions and its appeal for aid to the oppressed peoples of the colonial territories. While advising that "the Danish government like other Scandinavian governments has decided to make a modest contribution to establishment of contacts with liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies in Africa", he added that this cooperation would be "subject to special conditions". For example, aid "will not be extended in the form of cash and consequently it cannot be used for purchase of weapons. The aid will consist exclusively of equipment and supplies for the accomplishment of educational and humanitarian tasks in territories beyond the reach of governments."³⁹ This phrase demonstrated that the Social Democratic Party of Denmark, which had established contacts with the national liberation movements, intended to distance itself from their armed struggle and underground activity on the territories still under Portuguese control, and to avoid using the term "liberated areas".

A number of speeches at congress plenary meetings voiced concern over international social democracy's weak positions in Africa.

Thus, Joan Lestor, prominent left-winger of the Labour Party and a leader of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, said that the lack of parties from the mainland of Africa among the SI members was "a sad reflection on the International's failure to become truly international".⁴⁰ In her opinion, there had to be an end to the EEC's cooperation with South Africa and a "gradual economic disengagement by Britain" from that country in order to win the African parties' trust or respect. Lestor urged that EEC countries should ensure "that Portugal is refused all contact" with the European Community "until she establishes democracy at home and grants independence to her colonies"; otherwise the Community "will suffer the same guilt by association [with Portugal. — V.B.] which has so discredited NATO", and "African socialists will judge European socialists as being strong on word and weak on action". Expressing satisfaction that "a number of socialist parties", including the Labour Party, "now give moral and material support to Liberation Movements" (it will be recalled that this was on a very limited scale. — V.B.), she proposed going further "to commit ourselves at government level to recognize the Liberation Movements as the only legitimate representatives of these countries and their people" and to provide "State Funds" for their struggle.⁴¹

In his speech, British Labour leader Harold Wilson warned that if the SI did not meet expectations, "a hungry world in its desperation will turn away from democracy, away from democratic socialism—and they will turn to others". He urged the Socialist International to bring more African parties into its ranks so as "to exert its full potential for influence in world affairs".

British Labourite Alan Day, editor of *Socialist Affairs*, wrote in this connection that the Labourites' main line in Vienna was to show that democratic socialism should become a worldwide movement. Unfortunately, he noted, the Vienna Congress gave a striking example that the International could easily turn into a "European club", because less Third World parties were present at the Congress than at any other SI conference in recent years.

Neither were the congress organizers satisfied with the attendance. Thus, of 57 member organizations, only 39 attended, and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, and Chilean President Salvador Allende, who were invited as special guests, merely sent greetings to the congress. The congress organizers' failure was all the more noticeable because the problems of developing countries were high on the agenda. The London newspaper *The Guardian* wrote that amendments made to the Charter allowed non-European parties to join the SI

as observers or associated members and that among SI members they numbered more than the European parties. However, "their influence—more's the pity—is about as effective as cleaning your teeth with a brush without any bristles".⁴²

On the whole, considerably more delegates than ever before insisted at the 12th SI Congress on establishing ties with the national liberation movements and giving them concrete aid, including at the government level. At that time the successes of the MPLA, FRELIMO and PAIGC were fairly obvious and sympathy for them was growing among rank-and-file Social Democrats in many West European countries. But although the proponents of maintaining ties with Portugal and South Africa did not openly advocate their positions in official speeches at the congress, the congress resolution on Africa shows that they continued to carry a lot of weight in the SI leadership.

The resolution said in part: the "Congress congratulates those member parties who are providing aid to the anti-imperialist liberation movements, and encourages other member parties to devise appropriate ways of similarly providing aid to them".⁴³ However, the resolution did not demand assistance at government level, which was what the left-wing Labourites had pressed for and which was being given by Scandinavian Social Democrats.

The *Tribune* revealed what had led to such an outcome of the debates. The text drafted by Judith Hart would require the Social Democrats to render support "by every means available to them". As she explained, "any kind of support" should mean "a commitment to an armed struggle". But the SPD delegate, who chaired the commission session, wanted such support to be qualified as "humanitarian and political". The Congress reached the compromise formulation "to assist the liberation movements of southern Africa".⁴⁴

During the period following the 12th Congress, the Socialist International experienced considerable internal difficulties. The 13th Congress was postponed several times, and the SI leadership's authority among member parties was quite low.

In the early 70s, it was not so much the organizational centre of international social democracy as individual SI parties, especially those of Scandinavian countries, that invigorated their relations with the African national liberation movements. For example, Scandinavian Social Democrats supported the initiative of the OAU and the UN on a UN-sponsored international conference on southern Africa. During a visit to Scandinavia by an OAU delegation, the government of the Norwegian Labour Party agreed to hold the conference in Oslo. And although a bourgeois

coalition had come to power in Norway by the time it was held (9-14 April 1973), the Social Democrats continued to play a prominent role in preparing and holding the conference and were part of the Norwegian delegation. Along with Norway, Sweden and other Scandinavian countries assisted the conference financially, covering much of the expenses, including those of the national liberation movement delegations in Oslo. The Oslo meeting received wide press coverage; special publicity was given to the Nordic governments' support for the national liberation movements. At the close of the conference, the national liberation representatives were invited to Sweden, where they met with SAP and government leaders.

At the same time, it needs to be noted that the conference preparations were affected by the limited nature of political support for the anti-colonial and anti-racial struggle on the part of Scandinavian social democratic parties, and by the fact that they were not prepared for broad cooperation with the international community. This was evident from the very name of the meeting—International Conference of Experts in Support of Victims of Colonialism and Apartheid in Southern Africa. The national liberation movement delegates, who spoke at the conference, emphasized that it should be a question of support primarily for the fighters against the racist regimes rather than the victims. They felt that the limited level of representation ("experts") allowed the governments which sent delegations to the conference not to consider themselves responsible for decisions taken. (It should be noted that in the documents and material published by the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies the words "in support of victims" were omitted from the name of the conference.) Furthermore, during preparations for the conference attempts were made to prevent progressive international public organizations from attending. It was only at the insistence of the national liberation movements and the OAU that WPC and AAPSO leaders were invited.

Criticism of the social democratic parties at the conference also came from within their ranks. For example, Lord Gifford, Chairman of the British Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea, called for action to be taken against cooperation with Portugal during the upcoming NATO Council session in Copenhagen, saying that this would "act as a spur to those political parties in Europe like the British Labour Party ... whose principles should demand that they support the liberation struggle, but whose record has not matched their principles."⁴⁵

There were very good grounds for such a statement. As early as 1970, the 69th Conference of the British Labour Party had passed

a resolution envisaging "full support, moral and material" for the national liberation movements.⁴⁶ (The decision to assist the liberation movements was taken after the party lost the elections and became the opposition.)

In connection with the aforementioned resolution, Walter Padley, Chairman of the Labour Party's Overseas Committee, said that "the Executive ... must control the scale, the extent and the organizations to which moral and material support is given".⁴⁷ That, apparently, was also the purpose of setting up the special Southern Africa Solidarity Fund mentioned earlier.

Numerous protest demonstrations marked the July 1973 visit to London by Portuguese Prime Minister Marcelo Caetano in connection with the Tory government-initiated celebration of the 300th anniversary of the "oldest alliance" – that between Britain and Portugal. The Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea was instrumental in organizing the protest demonstrations.

Not long before Caetano's visit, FRELIMO Vice-President Marcelino Dos Santos and Acting President of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, Oliver Tambo, were in London as part of the celebration of FRELIMO's anniversary (25 June) and South Africa Freedom Day (26 June). Dos Santos had been invited to Britain by the Committee for Freedom, but the Labour Party leadership also paid attention to him. He met with Harold Wilson and James Callaghan. At the 72nd Labour Party Conference Harold Wilson and other party leaders also paid studied attention to the national liberation movement representatives.

However, such actions did not mean preparedness to take tangible moves against the colonial racist regimes after coming to power.

The Labour government formed after the February 1974 general elections took no effective measures whatsoever to support the African peoples' struggle. What is more, a number of delegates to the April 1974 Oxford Easter Conference – a meeting of solidarity committees and groups supporting the peoples of the Portuguese colonies – were detained at the airport by British immigration.

Let us now examine the attitude to the independence fighters in the Portugal colonies on the part of another major SI Party – the Social Democratic Party of Germany.

In April 1973 the Hannover Congress of the SPD adopted a special resolution which said in part: "In their fight against colonialism and racism, the SPD is on the side of the nations of the Third World... We will therefore concede to the national

liberation movements all our solidarity and our political and humanitarian support."⁴⁸

This resolution was cabled to the International Conference on Southern Africa which was then under way in Oslo and which the Social Democrat-led government of the FRG had boycotted. The SPD's promise of "humanitarian" aid to the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid fighters was greeted with distrust by progressive Africa. For example, the newspaper *Revolution Africaine*, organ of the Algerian National Liberation Front, wrote on 3 May 1973: "Should one expect much from this moral aid of the SPD? The West German government is currently one of the biggest economic partners (not to mention sales of arms, planes and warships) of Rhodesia, Portugal and South Africa."⁴⁹

On 14 January 1972, FRG Defence Minister Helmut Schmidt stated in Nairobi during a visit to Kenya that his government opposed Portugal's use of arms supplied to it beyond NATO's zone of operation, and on 21 January 1972 it was officially announced that the government would not supply Portugal with arms in the future.

But, in spite of these declarations, FRG-Portuguese military cooperation continued. It was only in 1973 that the FRG government decided to discontinue the agreement on use of the air force base in Beja but agreed to finance the building of an aircraft construction plant. The FRG had earlier helped to set up an aircraft construction company in Portugal.

At a UN Security Council session held in 1972 in Addis Ababa Marcelino Dos Santos described the Cabora Bassa hydropower project on the Zambezi, which the FRG was helping to build, as "the most striking example" of the West's economic cooperation with Portugal.⁵⁰

The West German public was also expressing growing protest against the FRG government's position. A Congress for the Freedom of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique was held on 13 and 14 January 1973 in Dortmund and attended by over 800 delegates from mass movements and anti-colonial organizations, including many SPD members, and by MPLA, PAIGC and FRELIMO representatives. The Congress staged a mass demonstration against the involvement of the West German government and imperialists in the war and the plunder of the Portuguese colonies. A telegram was sent to Federal Chancellor and SPD Chairman Willy Brandt protesting against the West German government's assistance to Portuguese colonialism.

In July 1973, in connection with the colonialists' reprisal against the population of the Mozambican village of Viriyamu, 22 social

democratic Bundestag deputies published a document urging the government to oppose associated EEC membership for Portugal until democratic institutions were established in that country and the peoples of the colonies granted the right to self-determination, and to end arms deliveries to Portugal within NATO. But as early as January 1972 the government had declared that it would no longer be making arms deliveries to Portugal. It can only be assumed that the SPD deputies themselves had no confidence in that declaration.

In this situation the SPD leadership decided to invite a FRELIMO delegation to the FRG. This decision was passed on by Hans-Jürgen Wischniewski, then Chairman of the SPD's Foreign Affairs Committee, and the visit took place on 2-8 August, 1973.

The results of the visit were summarized, as it were, in the headline of an article published in the FRELIMO organ *Mozambique Revolution*: "FRELIMO and the West German SPD: No Grounds for Cooperation".

Explaining why FRELIMO had accepted the SPD invitation, the magazine referred to the Front's principled position of "trying to win to our side all forces opposed to Portuguese colonialism and establish a basis of co-operation with them".⁵¹ Account was also taken of the above-mentioned SPD Hannover Congress resolution in support of the anti-colonial and anti-racist struggle. How was this position realized during the talks?

The FRELIMO delegation, led by Vice-President Dos Santos, stated that it hoped the talks would result in an end to arms deliveries to Portugal by NATO and other countries; an end to other forms of support for Portuguese colonialism, including investment in the colonies; and establishment of friendly relations between the peoples of the FRG and Mozambique.

In his turn, Wischniewski, head of the SPD delegation, said that the SPD opposed all colonial and racist policies and arms deliveries to Portugal, considered colonialism incompatible with the principles of the NATO alliance, and was prepared to give humanitarian aid to FRELIMO.

The FRELIMO delegation proposed that, in line with its declared principles, the SPD should pressure the West German government to end arms deliveries to Portugal and other forms of military aid to the Portuguese colonial government; do all in its power to force West German companies with investments in the colonies, especially in the Cabora Bassa project, to withdraw them; and place all aid which the SPD wished to give FRELIMO on a political rather than a humanitarian basis.

However, the SPD delegation refused to assume such commitments and "insisted that its support should be confined to giving FRELIMO humanitarian aid". The FRELIMO delegation took especially strong exception to the SPD delegation's attempts to prove that the FRG's investments were advantageous for future independent Mozambique. A FRELIMO spokesman described them as disrespect for Mozambican sovereignty and an attempt to teach the Mozambican people what was good for them.

It was concluded from the SPD's position during the talks that the party "does not in fact live up to its anti-colonialist statements" and that at this stage there were no grounds for cooperation with the SPD.⁵² Interviewed by the Tanzanian newspaper *Daily News*, Dos Santos also noted that the SPD opposed Portuguese colonialism only as a party and not as a government.

While the FRELIMO organ was writing about the absence of "grounds for cooperation", Wischniewski told the newspaper *Hamburger Morgenpost* that agreement had been reached on a number of questions.⁵³ However, he cited the form of struggle for independence as one question on which there had been disagreement (and this at a time when the armed struggle in Mozambique was already in its ninth year). Contrary to the facts provided by FRELIMO and other national liberation movements, Wischniewski claimed that "no German weapons have turned up recently in the colonial war". Despite FRELIMO's clear rejection of SPD aid, he stated that talks would continue on "humanitarian assistance", particularly medicine.

"The report is the second major embarrassment for chancellor Willy Brandt's SPD in recent weeks, following SPD's unsuccessful attempt to persuade FRELIMO to accept its aid," was how the Tanzanian *Daily News* described the information leaked to the press about the Messerschmitt company's involvement in the building of an aircraft construction plant in Portugal. And the first embarrassment was "the Pentagon's disclosure in August that for the past three years Portuguese fighter pilots have been receiving training at US bases in West Germany". The *Daily News* called these facts "examples of the kind of West German support for Portuguese fascism that influenced FRELIMO's decision to reject SPD aid".⁵⁴

Although the FRELIMO delegation did not achieve the objectives it had set itself, the fact that bilateral contacts had been established with the SPD had a certain positive significance, serving as it did to invigorate and consolidate the anti-colonial forces both in the SPD and in the FRG as a whole.

With respect to the position taken toward the Portuguese colonies' national liberation struggle by the Social Democrat-in-

fluenced trade unions, it should be noted that the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) continued to co-operate mainly with splinter organizations even after the American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) temporarily left it in 1969 and the West European Social Democrats strengthened their positions in its leadership. Thus, the ICFTU did not assist the MPLA-linked trade unions but supported the Kinshasa-based "General League of the Angolan Working People", which was connected with the splinter FNLA grouping.

Against the attitude adopted by most social democratic parties and organizations, Swedish government assistance to national liberation movements in Portuguese colonies stood out even more visibly. While assistance to FRELIMO, MPLA and PAIGC was £684,000 in 1971/72, in 1974/75 it totalled £4,863,000.

For a long time the Scandinavian countries did not directly assist the national liberation movements but operated through organizations and funds connected to but formally independent of them—the Mozambique Institute (Dar es Salaam), Institute de l'amitié (Brazzaville), and others. A crucial change favouring direct aid came only in 1969 when the Swedish parliament passed a resolution which, referring to a UN decision, said that humanitarian aid to the African liberation movements and assistance to them in education did not contradict Article 2 (Para. 7) of the UN Charter.

But this Swedish parliament resolution did not fully disclose the content of the UN Charter and UN resolutions since assistance to the independence struggle in its armed form does not contradict the UN Charter and had been repeatedly provided for in General Assembly resolutions.

Let us look at the motives behind the Swedish Social Democrats' policy. Between 1973 and 1974 a bill was drafted in Sweden to ban investment in southern Africa, but its operation was to be confined to the Portuguese colonies and Namibia. With the expanding armed struggle in the Portuguese colonies, Swedish entrepreneurs avoided investing there, banking on making investments and obtaining broader access to markets and raw material resources of African countries after independence had been won. After the collapse of Portuguese colonialism this conclusion was confirmed by the fact sheet of the British organization Africa Bureau: "It is certainly true that Swedish enterprise benefited enormously after the collapse of Portuguese rule, from the goodwill the country had established during years of support for the liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau."⁵⁵

At the same time, the social democratic leaders aimed to disseminate their political views among the liberation movements.

Furthermore, the SAP leadership used assistance to the peoples of the Portuguese colonies to divert radicals' attention from complicated internal problems.

In April 1973 Finland's coalition government, headed by the SSP's leader Kalevi Sorsa, also adopted a new policy, similar to that of the other Nordic countries, under which the national liberation movements would receive direct aid that used to be given only via international funds.

Like the Scandinavian Social Democrats, the Dutch Party of Labour also invigorated its contacts with the MPLA, FRELIMO and PAIGC. Against the will of the party leaders, a majority of delegates at its 1972 Congress approved a resolution saying that "Holland will have to leave NATO in four years, if Portugal is still a member of NATO and still suppressing the populations of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde".⁵⁶ The Congress called for state-sponsored aid to the national liberation movements, and a decision to that effect was taken by the coalition government, of which the Social Democrats were members, in early 1973.

A broad anti-colonial movement existed in Portugal during this period, and was part and parcel of the struggle against the fascist regime. A joint document was adopted at an April 1973 meeting of "democratic commissions" from all provinces. It not only demanded an end to the colonial war but also recognition of the colonies' right to independence. This movement brought together broad opposition forces: Communists, Socialists, Catholics. However, the leadership of the Portuguese Socialist Party (PSP) displayed a certain inconsistency: abroad it supported independence for the colonies, but at home it tried not to go further than recognition of their right to autonomy.

Resolutions in support of the national liberation movement and against Portugal's colonial war were passed by other social democratic parties as well between 1972 and 1974.

On the whole, during the period of upsurge in the independence struggle in the Portuguese colonies most social democratic parties established contacts with national liberation movements. These parties and the governments they led began to give FRELIMO, MPLA and PAIGC material aid or expressed their readiness to do so.

However, such a stance did not mean full support for the national liberation movements' fundamental political demands: rec-

ognition of the Portuguese African colonies' right to independence and recognition of FRELIMO, MPLA and PAIGC as the sole legitimate representatives of their peoples. On the contrary, as the final stage of the armed struggle for the independence of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and other Portuguese colonies in Africa showed, the leadership of international social democracy refused to support these demands by practical steps, thereby demonstrating that there was a gap between their declarations and concrete actions.

3. Portuguese Colonies in Africa Win Independence

The proclamation of the independent Republic of Guinea-Bissau (RGB) was the first serious test of the Social Democrats' readiness to support the Portuguese colonies' right to create sovereign states.

The PAIGC leadership announced plans to proclaim the country's independence after the patriots had won control of roughly 80 per cent of the territory, which had a majority of the population. In preparing this important political action, it hoped that, along with the socialist countries and most Afro-Asian states, some West European countries, especially Scandinavian ones, would also recognize the RGB. There were good grounds for this.

For example, Arne Arnesen, editor of the Norwegian Labour Party (NAP) organ *Arbeiderbladet*, described Norway's stance as "a clear and full identification with the liberation movements in southern Africa". He advocated recognition of Guinea-Bissau's independence when proclaimed: "When that day arrives, when the conditions are ripe for this step and such a request for diplomatic recognition is sent to the other nations of the world, I hope that as many countries as possible, including the government of Norway, will give a positive response."⁵⁷ But when "that day arrived", on 24 September 1973 neither the Norwegian government nor any other social democratic government recognized the independent republic.

The FRG and a number of other countries with Social Democrat-headed governments abstained in November 1973 during UN General Assembly voting on a resolution urging recognition of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. Yet the Netherlands, where the Party of Labour was leading a coalition government in 1973, voted for the resolution. Many Party of Labour members participated in a campaign launched in the country for recognition of Guinean independence. On 5 February

1974 the second chamber of the country's parliament called on the government to address other Western powers with a proposal of joint recognition of the RGB.

However, a PAIGC delegation which visited the Netherlands in February 1974 was disappointed by its meeting with Dutch Foreign Minister Max van der Stoep. It was the government's view that recognition of Guinea-Bissau by the Netherlands and a few other countries would have little effect. By that time, 74 states, a majority of UN members, had already recognized the RGB. But at a press conference on 5 February 1974, a Dutch government spokesman said that the government shared the opinion with the Scandinavian countries that "Guinea-Bissau does not yet meet criteria for recognition" as an independent state and that the countries which had already recognized the RGB had applied international law "somewhat carelessly".⁵⁸

Negative changes also occurred in the Dutch stance on aid. Pronk, the same Social Democrat who, as Minister of Development Cooperation, had advocated "aid without conditions", on 6 March 1974, during a trip to Tanzania, "put beyond doubt that the Dutch government will abide by its refusal to allocate money for the purchase of arms".⁵⁹

The PAIGC leadership placed special hopes on Sweden. However, answering a Communist MP in the Riksdag after the RGB had been proclaimed, Foreign Minister Krister Wickman said that Sweden would only consult "with other Nordic countries", but that meanwhile the government would increase economic aid,⁶⁰ in other words would buy its way out of meeting the freedom fighters' political demands. Since the UN General Assembly was to consider the RGB's application for membership in autumn 1974, the newspaper *Dagens Nyheter* wrote: "It will be very strange if Sweden supports the membership application of a country which it has not yet accorded diplomatic recognition."⁶¹

The 25 April 1974 revolution in Portugal "saved" the Swedish and other West European Social Democrats from that "difficulty". The subsequent talks between the new Portuguese authorities and the PAIGC and the signing of an agreement recognizing the independent RGB forced the social democratic governments to alter their position. But they were in no hurry even after April 1974: for example, Sweden recognized the RGB even later than, say, Switzerland, whose government gave no assistance to the national liberation movements.

The Portuguese revolution was connected to the many years of courageous struggle by the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, a struggle which spread anti-colonial sentiments

both among the masses and directly in the Portuguese armed forces. Portugal's first provisional government, established on 16 May 1974, included representatives of the Portuguese Socialist Party (PSP) along with ministers from the Portuguese Communist Party and bourgeois parties. PSP leader Mario Soares became Foreign Minister, giving the Portuguese Socialists a direct possibility to contribute to the decolonization of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe.

The position of the new Portuguese authorities on the colonial question was formed in a fierce struggle between different political forces. On the one hand, the first statements by the Chairman of the Council of National Salvation, Antonio de Spínola (who later became the country's President), only mentioned plans to achieve a peace which would preserve the "overseas territories" links with Portugal. On the other hand, the Communist Party continued to carry on a principled line of supporting the colonies' independence struggle. The Portuguese Socialist Party also supported the right of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and other countries to independence, but although the PSP leadership refrained from making open anti-communist statements in the immediate post-April revolution period, in practice, backed by the Socialist International, it sought to prevent genuinely left forces from strengthening their positions in both Portugal and its colonies. Actually, on the decolonization question the position of PSP leader Soares and his supporters was not very different from that of Spínola.

Thus, on 16 May 1974 contact was established in Dakar between PAIGC leaders and Soares, and he took part in the official negotiations which started in London on 25 May and later on moved to the Algerian capital. However, they soon broke down because of disagreements on the procedure for granting independence to Cape Verde. The Algerian news agency noted that "the main concern of Mario Soares and the Portuguese government was the upcoming NATO session in Ottawa. It is in this light that a few questions need to be asked: does Portugal really want to begin a real process of decolonizing its African territories; are the negotiations with the PAIGC not a subterfuge by the Portuguese government which is too closely connected with NATO?"

A breakthrough at the negotiations with the PAIGC was made only after the 17 July 1974 formation of the second provisional government, led by Vasco Gonçalves, in which the left forces' positions were stronger. In October 1974 Portugal recognized the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and withdrew all its troops from there.

But Mario Soares, who remained Foreign Minister in the new government, continued to protract the process of granting independence to the rest of the colonies, saying that it could happen in two or three years. Considerable difficulties arose during the June 1974 negotiations in Lusaka between a Portuguese delegation and FRELIMO representatives. While Soares insisted on a cease-fire between FRELIMO and Portugal, the FRELIMO delegation demanded that Mozambique's independence should first be recognized, and that the negotiations should only concern the mechanism for transferring power in the country.

FRELIMO's demand, which was supported by the PCP and the left forces in the Armed Forces Movement, socialist countries, and independent African states, was accepted by the Portuguese authorities after the change of government in Portugal. At the negotiations, which were renewed in Lusaka on 5 September 1974, an agreement was signed envisaging immediate creation of a transitional government and proclamation of independence on 25 June 1975, on FRELIMO's 13th anniversary, i.e. in keeping with a timetable to which Soares had originally objected.

The SI leadership shared Soares's views on the way to resolve the Portuguese colonial question. After his May 1974 trip to Lisbon, Hans Janitschek wrote: "As Soares succeeds in arriving, during his negotiations with the liberation movements, at a solution which offers self-determination to the colonies while keeping up their relationship with Portugal, he without doubt contributes substantially to the prestige and credibility of the regime."⁶² But the formulation "self-determination while keeping up their relationship with Portugal" did not satisfy the national liberation forces, who wanted clear recognition of their right to full independence.

It is necessary to deal specifically with the role of the Portuguese Socialist Party and the social democratic parties of other countries in resolving the question of Angolan independence.

Unlike Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, the situation in Angola was complicated by the puppet organizations, the FNLA and UNITA, which were backed by the imperialist circles and reactionary forces in Africa.

Soares advocated talks with the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA since, he said, "all three were fighting on the battlefield".⁶³ But that did not reflect the real state of affairs. The FNLA had very little influence inside the country and its units were only making occasional incursions from Zaire. The UNITA and its leader Jonas Savimbi were in contact with the Portuguese colonial authorities, as was proved, among other things, by documents published in the Paris magazine *Afrique-Asie* in July 1974.

Unlike the PSP leadership, the Portuguese Communists emphasized the need for talks only with the MPLA from the very outset. Alvaro Cunhal declared: "The Communists' position is quite clear. It is a question of opening negotiations with the liberation movements, i.e. with the PAIGC, FRELIMO and MPLA." Portugal's progressive forces rightly compared the puppet organizations in Angola with similar ones in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau which were not allowed to attend the talks. However, Soares advocated negotiations with Savimbi and on 18 June 1974 it was announced that a cease-fire agreement had been reached with UNITA, although military operations were not being carried on for all intents and purposes.

After the abortive coup of 28 September 1974, Spínola was forced to resign the presidency. Following this, Portugal's armed forces command in Angola concluded a cease-fire agreement with the MPLA, and on 15 January 1975 an agreement granting independence to Angola from 11 November 1975 was signed in Alvorá. A transitional government of representatives from the MPLA, FNLA, UNITA and Portugal was set up, and elections were to be held before independence. A pullout of Portuguese troops from Angola began and was completed by 11 November 1975.

However, along with reactionary Portuguese settlers, the puppet organizations thwarted implementation of the agreed measure. Armed clashes started and then the imperialist forces resorted to direct armed intervention in Angola. Armoured columns of South African troops advanced on Luanda from the south in late October 1974. UNITA established its puppet power in the regions it occupied. The FNLA units, formed in Zaire and supported by mercenaries and regular Zairean troops, pressed toward Luanda from the north-east. The FNLA and UNITA units were supplied by South Africa, the US and some other Western countries.

Backed by Cuban internationalists who had come to Angola, the units of the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) managed to check the invaders in hard battles on the southern and north-eastern approaches to Luanda. On 11 November 1975 MPLA President Agostinho Neto proclaimed the formation of the People's Republic of Angola (PRA), which was recognized by the USSR, other socialist countries, and progressive African states. However, in the difficult first months of its existence, not one Western government announced recognition of the PRA.

In September 1975 the Portuguese government was reshuffled, and this strengthened the position of the PSP. It was this

government which had to decide whether or not to recognize the PRA. Along with ministers from the bourgeois People's Democratic Party and some military, the Socialists were against recognition. They managed to thwart the expected attendance of an official Portuguese delegation at the ceremony proclaiming the PRA.

The PSP leadership not only opposed recognition of the PRA government but also encouraged political forces in other countries to establish contact with the puppet organizations. Thus, US Senator Dick Clark supported the idea of a "coalition government" in Angola led by Jonas Savimbi. He made direct reference to Soares: "Portugal's Socialist Party leader Mario Soares, who is currently in Washington, also 'had the impression' that Dr. Savimbi would be the best leader."⁶⁴

On 14 February 1976 the Portuguese Communist Party issued a statement demanding that the government "take a clear position on recognizing the sole legitimate government of Angola formed by the MPLA", a demand also made by many rank-and-file Socialists and some PSP leaders. But it was only after the "stream of recognition" of the PRA on the part of West European countries had begun (France was the first to recognize the MPLA on 16 February 1976) that the PSP was forced to change its line.

In an effort to justify his position of confrontation with the MPLA, Soares stated at a 1 February 1976 press conference that the Socialist Party did not take any ideological considerations into account and that the refusal to recognize the PRA stemmed from a desire to prevent an African Vietnam. However, in his report from Lisbon, well-known American journalist Cyrus Sulzberger quoted statements by Soares which showed that it was ideological motives—an unwillingness to recognize the Angolan people's right to choose their path of development—that underlay the PSP position: "Totalitarian regimes have been installed there [in the ex-Portuguese colonies.—V.B.],” Soares declared.

Sulzberger wrote that one reason why the Socialist Party opposed recognition was its desire to win the votes of the *retornados* in the upcoming April 1976 elections (the *retornados* were immigrants from the Portuguese colonies, many of whom were anti-MPLA). Another reason was a desire "to avoid irritating the West". "But these were all forgotten," Sulzberger writes ironically, "when Western capitals, led by Paris, rushed to acknowledge MPLA's regime."⁶⁵

The imperialist circles used the events in Angola to undermine the process of detente and to launch an anti-Soviet and anti-communist campaign. The Western press described the PRA

government as a "Marxist regime" and Soviet internationalist aid as "intervention". This was, though on a limited scale, a relapse into a cold war policy, and on the Angolan question some leaders of international social democracy essentially slid back into positions typical of the late 40s-early 50s.

In shaping its foreign policy, the MPLA leadership took account of the fact that a number of social democratic parties had been expressing their support for the movement for a long time. In an interview granted to the Paris-based *Afrique-Asie* magazine on the eve of proclamation of Angola's independence, Agostinho Neto expressed his hope that African, nonaligned and socialist countries, as well as those in Western Europe who had supported the MPLA, would recognize the new state without delay.

However, the fact that no social democratic government had recognized the PRA before France did so on 16 February 1976, betrays definite coordination of action between individual SI member parties.

Thus, at a time when the situation in Angola was aggravated, the British Labour government, formally neutral, was in fact unfriendly to the progressive forces in Angola. While expressing "profound regret" at the presence in Angola of armed forces, weapons and ammunition from many regions of the world, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs David Ennals declined to condemn South Africa's intervention.

As a matter of fact, the British authorities themselves participated to a certain extent in the intervention in Angola on the side of the puppets and racists. The London *Sunday Telegraph* wrote: "British Intelligence and private interests—especially Tanganyika Concessions and Lonrho, which loaned UNITA its pilots—remained in close liaison with UNITA and arranged delivery of smaller items such as radio equipment. UNITA leaders frequently came to London for medical treatment and to lobby British MPs."⁶⁶ Savimbi met with government leaders of Britain, the FRG and France during his trip to Western Europe in April 1975. In late October 1975, when South African troops, together with UNITA bands, began an offensive on Luanda, Savimbi was again in London, this time on a secret visit, and met with British Foreign Office officials.

Contacts with leaders of the puppet organizations continued even following proclamation of the PRA. A UNITA leader, Jorge Sangumbe, was in London in late January 1976 for meetings with government officials and businessmen, and, in his own words, expected Britain to provide financial aid and aid in the form of arms deliveries, and political and diplomatic backing. A *Times*

correspondent reported on 10 March 1976: "The officials said that British aid went exclusively to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola... They said they believed that it began last spring and included some communications equipment." And when the patriots' success became obvious, the aid was halted, and from early January 1976 the British government began to publicly condemn foreign interference.

At this time progressive British organizations, in which left Labourites were active, launched a campaign for recognition of the PRA and an end to recruitment of mercenaries in Britain for the puppet organizations, notably the FNLA. The issue of British mercenaries became especially acute following reports from Angola about their death, for example, the shooting of a group of mercenaries by their own commander. During a 26 January 1976 debate in the House of Commons, Stanley Newens, Chairman of the public organization Liberation (earlier called Movement for Colonial Freedom) and a left Labourite MP, demanded that the government take measures against recruitment of mercenaries. However, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs James Callaghan merely expressed regret. While condemning the recruitment, Harold Wilson only proposed that a committee be set up to consider new legislation banning recruitment. Labour MP Robert Hughes said that this would "lead to delays in measures to stop mercenaries being recruited" causing "considerable disappointment in Britain and in Africa."⁶⁷

Labour leaders spoke of their friendship for the MPLA yet they questioned the organization's nationwide character. James Callaghan declared in the House of Commons on 28 January 1976 that "the MPLA is an important element in any settlement in Angola, but it is not an exclusive element there. The Government should not neglect the other interests of other peoples in that territory."⁶⁸

A principal reason for the negative attitude of a number of social democratic leaders to the MPLA was their desire to ensure for their countries' monopolies in Angola more favourable conditions than could be expected under an MPLA government expressing the masses' vital interests. Stephen Kelly wrote in *Tribune* that when Angola gained independence many social democratic parties that used to back the MPLA changed their position and began to support the splinter FNLA and UNITA movements. Doing the British monopolies' bidding, London called for support to be directed to those "who have our economic interests at heart... The European Community falls into the same category with social democratic governments discovering that the ideals of their parties con-

flict with those of big business."⁶⁹ This assertion fitted the reality. Thus, the FRG government not only refused to recognize the PRA but even aided the FNLA and UNITA under the pretext of taking an "equal attitude" to the Angolan organizations.

The EEC leadership also opposed all economic ties with the PRA (at that time Social Democrats either led or were members of the governments of a number of EEC member countries).

A more positive attitude to the PRA was taken by the leadership of Scandinavian social democracy and the Dutch Party of Labour, though this position, too, was of a dual nature. An MPLA delegation visited Copenhagen in early February 1976 at the invitation of the Social Democratic Party of Denmark and Danish trade unions. Danish Federation of Trade Unions Chairman Thomas Nielsen promised that the Danish trade unions would press for immediate recognition of the MPLA government by Denmark, but Foreign Minister Andersen declared that the PRA government would only be recognized when it acquired effective control over Angola.

Some social democratic leaders who supported the MPLA did not hide their desire to impede PRA relations with socialist countries. The very same Andersen later admitted: "Our support for the MPLA was motivated by a desire to weaken its conviction that only the communist world is interested in it."

Among SI leaders, Olof Palme most consistently supported the MPLA in that period. Unlike many of his SI colleagues, the SAP leader did not place the racists' intervention in and socialist countries' aid to the PRA in the same bracket. He rightly noted in an article that "the war in Angola is a continuation of the war of liberation" and that the USSR and Cuba were assisting the legitimate PRA government since the racist South African regime had carried out direct intervention against Angola.⁷⁰ Still, Palme saw the arrival of Cuban internationalists in Angola as "foreign intervention", although his social democratic government rejected the right-wing parties' demand to end Swedish aid to Cuba because of that country's military aid to Angola.⁷¹ An Angolan delegation, led by Jose Eduardo dos Santos, was accorded a studiously warm reception in Stockholm in January 1976, but even the Swedish government delayed official recognition of the PRA until mid-February 1976.

Social democratic governments' refusal to recognize the People's Republic of Angola immediately was strongly criticized by the left wing of international social democracy, especially the youth. A number of personages in West European SI parties openly opposed this position and participated in numerous

national and international actions in support of the MPLA, the major being the Emergency International Conference of Solidarity with the People of Angola, held on 2-4 February 1976 in Luanda on the initiative of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization.

The independent African states, most of which had recognized the PRA by February 1976, were also increasingly displeased at the SI leaders' position.

Let us also look briefly at the attitude to the PRA taken by African political parties connected to the Socialist International. By the mid-70s, following the Social Democrats' failure in Madagascar, only the Labour Party of Mauritius had remained in the SI. Like its European partners, it vacillated greatly on the Angolan question. At the January session of the OAU Council of Ministers, Mauritius was among the countries advocating so-called "reconciliation" with the puppets. The Mauritius government delayed recognition of the PRA until late January 1976.

Two other African parties maintaining close contacts with the SI—the Destour Socialist Party of Tunisia and the Progressive Union of Senegal—also opposed recognition of the People's Republic of Angola.

From the early 60s the Tunisian leadership maintained active ties with FNLA leader Holden Roberto and gave him assistance, including military aid. The Tunisian authorities facilitated contact between the FNLA and Mario Soares in summer 1974. During the very days when the FNLA was organizing armed provocations against the MPLA in Luanda, Roberto was invited to a colloquium on "Planned Liberalism and the African Roads to Socialism" held in the Tunisian capital in June 1975 on the initiative of the President of Tunisia Habib Bourguiba and Senegalese President Leopold Senghor (with SI backing).

The leadership of Senegal's social reformists took an even more negative position in relation to the MPLA. Both during and after the battles with the interventionists, President Senghor, leader of the Senegalese ruling party, attacked the internationalist aid of the USSR and Cuba to the Angolan people. Senegal's ruling quarters feared that the truly progressive forces that had come to power in Angola and a number of other African countries would demonstrate a real alternative to development along a capitalist path, even one concealed by social reformist slogans.

An analysis of international social democracy's policy with respect to the 15-year armed struggle of the Portuguese colonies for independence shows its gradual evolution toward recognizing the

national liberation movements as the representatives of those countries' peoples and toward giving them some practical assistance. This evolution was forced and fairly slow. After its first statements on recognition of those peoples' right to independence, made in the early 60s when the number of independent African states was growing rapidly, the Socialist International for many years, during the most difficult days of their struggle, confined itself to general condemnation of Portuguese colonialism. It was only at the turn of the 70s, with international detente and the obvious successes scored by the MPLA, FRELIMO and PAIGC, that the social democratic parties began to establish relations with those movements.

The change in policy was initiated by the leadership of Swedish social democracy, headed by Olof Palme. Other Nordic parties followed suit. At the same time the leaders of a number of SI parties (notably the SPD) continued to maintain ties with the Portuguese colonial regime right up until the April revolution in Portugal. But the left wings in those parties were demanding a new policy toward the anti-colonial struggle, as was particularly manifest in the British Labour Party.

Among the principal factors determining social democracy's position on the national liberation movements was a desire to prevent a strengthening of the most progressive forces within them and their closer relations with socialist countries. This was particularly evident at the final stage of the independence struggle in the Portuguese colonies, especially in Angola, when the leadership of the SI and most of its member parties impeded consolidation of the independent republic, headed by the Angolan people's vanguard—the MPLA.

4. Struggle Against Colonial and Racist Regimes in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia in the 60s

In the early 60s, along with the Portuguese colonies, in the south of the African continent colonial and racist regimes existed in the Union of South Africa, Namibia (South-West Africa) occupied by it and Zimbabwe, which, known as "Southern Rhodesia", was part of the so-called Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. These countries' international legal status varied: the Union of South Africa was a dominion of the Commonwealth, South-West Africa was a former mandate territory which the Union of South Africa had refused to transfer to the UN trusteeship system, while Southern Rhodesia was a British "self-governing colony". However, a com-

mon feature was the existence of colonialism, though in distinctive forms.

"The Road to South African Freedom", the programme of the South African Communist Party approved in 1962, calls the system in the country "a special form of colonialism".⁷² Obtaining the League of Nations mandate to govern South-West Africa following the First World War, the Union of South Africa actually turned it into a colony and then began to annex the country, making it its "fifth province". Supreme power in Southern Rhodesia remained in the hands of the British government, but as part of "self-government" the local racists followed a policy of discrimination against the indigenous population, the policy that was increasingly similar to that of the South African authorities.

After the Second World War, the oppressed majority of South Africa stepped up their struggle against racial discrimination, which acquired its most sinister form—apartheid—when the National Party government came to power in 1948. A mass disobedience movement was launched in the country under the leadership of progressive organizations: the African National Congress (ANC), the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), the Coloured Peoples Congress and the Congress of Democrats. Active in the work of the mass political and trade union organizations were the South African Communists, who, following the 1950 ban on the legal Communist Party of South Africa, re-established it underground as the South African Communist Party (SACP).

The Freedom Charter—a programme of broad democratic change—was adopted at an ANC-initiated Congress of the People held on 26 June 1955 and attended by representatives of all racial groups of South Africa. In support of their demands the oppressed majority conducted mass disobedience campaigns, general strikes and boycotts. However, at the turn of the 60s it became increasingly clear that non-violent action alone could not force the government to make concessions. A decisive clash between the masses and the apartheid regime was in the offing. Events were speeded up by the authorities' brutal reprisal against Africans in Sharpeville and Langa: the shooting of peaceful demonstrators on 21 March 1960. The government introduced a state of emergency; the African National Congress and the so-called Pan-Africanist Congress were banned, and many opposition leaders and activists suffered repression. There was a simultaneous step-up in the Africans' struggle to liquidate the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and achieve independence for Northern and Southern Rhodesias and Nyasaland (now Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi), which were parts of the Federation.

The international public increasingly condemned the racist regimes. The world's progressive forces—the socialist countries, the international communist and working-class movement, and independent African and Asian states—supported the anti-apartheid and anti-racist struggle.

The SI Council discussed the problems of southern Africa at its 1960 Conference in Haifa. The Social Democrats condemned the principles and practice of apartheid and called on the South African government to change its policy before it was too late, and to seek a new racial solution based on freedom, equality and fraternity. But the SI resolution only contained an appeal to UN member states to take positive action to persuade the South African government to fulfill the Security Council resolution of 1 April 1960 which urged the South African government to renounce apartheid.

And in considering the problems of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the SI Council echoed the neocolonialist claims about the danger of "African domination" over the white population. The resolution emphasized that in a multiracial society, especially in Central Africa, any solution based on "racial discrimination, either by the minority over the majority or vice-versa"⁷³ was unacceptable.

The Seventh SI Congress (Rome, October 1961) again discussed "the principles and practice of apartheid" and reiterated "the rights of all peoples to self-determination and equal rights on the basis of 'one man one vote'".⁷⁴ The problem of South-West Africa (Namibia) was addressed for the first time. However, while the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO), set up in 1960, wanted an immediate end to the South African mandate over the country and its transfer to UN administration, the SI Congress resolution envisaged preservation of South African rule if "the terms of the mandate" were applied. On the question of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Congress did not express support for the peoples of the African countries which the colonialists had made parts of the Federation but merely spoke of its "support" for the British Labour Party "in its struggle for self-government on a democratic basis in the territories concerned".⁷⁵

The report presented to the Congress by SI Secretary Albert Carthy also manifested a negative or restrained attitude to independence for the African colonies, and expressed concern over the fact that "the pressure of the struggle for national independence has pushed into the background" the task of defining "Socialist thought and organization in African terms".⁷⁶

However, a year later the SI Council conference (Oslo, June 1962) recognized that "the peoples of Nyasaland and Rhodesia must be free to secede from the Central African Federation imposed on them by the British Government".⁷⁷ By that time the situation in southern Africa had further aggravated. The racist government's unwillingness to meet the demands of the oppressed population forced South Africa's progressive forces to launch an armed struggle. On 16 December 1961 the first armed actions were carried out by Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), an organization founded by the ANC and SACP leadership.

The South African authorities (South Africa was proclaimed a "republic" on 31 May 1961 following a white voter referendum) launched a persecution campaign against apartheid's opponents. The 1963 arrest of a group of their leaders was a hard blow against the underground ANC and Umkhonto we Sizwe. Earlier the police had managed to track down and arrest Nelson Mandela, the Africans' acknowledged leader and commander-in-chief of Umkhonto we Sizwe. Along with his comrades-in-arms he was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1964.

The courageous struggle of the ANC and its allies had the growing sympathy of the international community, including members of social democratic parties. A group of staff members at the Research Department for International Affairs of the Dutch Party of Labour prepared a report on the situation in South Africa. "An increasingly large number of non-Whites," the report stated, "are coming to the conclusion that ... a violent clash is inevitable."⁷⁸ The report outlined possible measures for exerting international pressure on the South African government (even 20-odd years later some of them have still not been implemented by social democratic governments). They included an end to arms deliveries, economic sanctions, boycott of cultural and sport ties, and the EEC's refusal to enter into any special relations with South Africa. The report also recommended establishing contacts, through the agency of the Socialist International, with exiled leaders of political organizations banned in South Africa so as to obtain information about their objectives, policy and ways to support the anti-apartheid struggle, and also to set up a fund for apartheid victims as proof of the Socialist International's solidarity.

However, in spite of these recommendations, the leading South African national liberation organization—the African National Congress—was not represented at the Eighth SI Congress. Only N. Mahomo, representative of the splinter Pan-Africanist Congress, attended. (Mahomo later headed the Southern Africa de-

partment of the African-American Labour Centre, an organization set up by AFL-CIO leaders to extend their influence to the African trade union movement.)

A congress resolution expressed regret at the continuing racial discrimination in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. It confirmed earlier resolutions which had condemned "the increasingly repressive legislation imposed by the South African Government", reiterated support for the Security Council resolution of 7 August 1963 on arms deliveries to South Africa, and urged "member parties to exert the maximum influence on their respective governments to bring about the immediate ending of all arms supplies to South Africa". With respect to measures to support the anti-apartheid struggle, the social democratic parties merely called for exploring "other methods of effective pressure upon the South African Government".⁷⁹

International social democracy's enhanced attention to the problems of southern Africa was directly connected with its desire to spread its influence in independent African countries, some of its leaders regarding this as a long-term task. Participating in a *Socialist Affairs* discussion on "African socialism", Robert Rauscher wrote: "The issue is not whether democratic socialism can take root in Africa today but whether in the future it can stand up to African criticism [in relation to southern Africa. —V.B.] and then develop into a decisive partner in the building of Africa."⁸⁰ But even today, 25 years later, some "democratic socialists" cannot stand up to African criticism of their links with the racist regime and are by no means "decisive partners", though many words condemning the racists have indeed been said.

Thus, a special resolution passed at a SI Bureau session (London, May 1964) expressed concern over the possible passing of death sentences on the ANC leaders, but the concrete measures proposed against the racists only included urging governments to observe the embargo on arms deliveries to South Africa.

The Socialist International Centenary Declaration deplored "the inhuman tyranny of apartheid in South Africa—a tyranny which may soon be paralleled in Southern Rhodesia".⁸¹ The situation in Southern Rhodesia indeed "paralleled" that in South Africa, and this had largely resulted from the British Labour Party leadership's conniving at the racists.

The problems of Africa, and especially of southern Africa, have traditionally been important in the public life of Britain, which was leading the world in investment in and trade with South Africa in the early 60s. Broad cultural ties were also preserved. Persons of British extraction account for about 40 per cent of the white

South African population, and English is the principal link language of whites, Africans, Indians and coloureds. The coming to power of the Afrikaner-oriented National Party in 1948, an event accompanied by a strengthening of Afrikaners' positions in the state apparatus and the economy, evoked a negative reaction among the white Anglophones, and this was reflected in British public opinion as well.

The Labour Party's documents during its time in opposition evidenced a desire to show the difference in the approach of the Labourites and the Conservatives to the problems of southern Africa, and criticized "Tory imperialism and colonialism". At the same time they stressed the close link between African "nationalist movements" and "the British Labour movement and the international Socialist movement since their inception", and stated that Labourites, as Socialists, were concerned "to see these new States established on the principle of democratic Socialism".⁸²

The Labourite leadership's attention to Africa was also underscored by its decision to mark 1960 as Africa Year, among the objectives of the planned campaign being a boycott of South African goods and a change of British government policy toward the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

The Labour leaders undoubtedly took into consideration the strong anti-colonial sentiments in the country, including in their own party.

Left Labourites were active in the anti-colonial and anti-racist public organizations. For example, in the early 60s the Movement for Colonial Freedom, led by left-wing veteran Fenner Brockway, included 160 local Labour Party branches, trade unions with a membership of three million, and over 100 Labour MPs. After ANC President Albert Luthuli's 1959 call for a boycott of South African goods, a Boycott Movement was created in Britain and involved many Labour personages and a number of local Labour Party organizations. The support of the Labour Party and the British Trades Union Congress for the month-long boycott of South African goods in March 1960 was designated as that movement's first success by the ANC journal *Sechaba*.⁸³ In June 1960 the Boycott Movement developed into the Anti-Apartheid Movement, which included Labourites, Communists, Liberals and individual Tories, as well as political exiles from South Africa. Labour Party figure Barbara Castle became the organization's first president.

In 1961 the ANC and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) were invited to the 60th Labour Party Conference, and in 1962 ANC leader Nelson Mandela and current President Oliver

Tambo were received in London with "great sympathy"⁸⁴ by Hugh Gaitskell and Denis Healey.

While condemning the apartheid regime and actions of the government of Southern Rhodesia, the Labour leadership proposed very limited measures to change the situation. Their much touted colonial policy principle of "one man — one vote" was not to be applied to South Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

As a rule, and this is clear from the evolution of the Labour Party's position on the Rhodesian problem, the Africans' demands were supported only when the need to recognize them became obvious. But the Labour leadership sought as far as possible to delay independence so as to strengthen Britain's neocolonial positions. Thus, in 1961 the annual Labour Conference urged that a constitution be effected in Southern Rhodesia which would envisage "a more equitable and realistic African franchise".⁸⁵ It is evident, however, that this formulation still did not reflect the principle of "one man — one vote".

At the same time the Labour leadership sought to keep Africans within the bounds of "constitutional actions". Addressing the House of Commons on the Rhodesian problem, John Strachey, a leading Labour specialist on the colonial question, spoke of Britain's duty "to the millions of Africans who place their trust in us, who have admired our record in colonial questions and who are entitled to ask that we should not create a situation in which, to gain their legitimate aspirations, they are forced to turn to unconstitutional action".⁸⁶ Thus, the Africans' resolute actions against the racist regimes were being called "unconstitutional action", even though the Labourites themselves had criticized the so-called 1961 constitution of Southern Rhodesia. As to the Africans' "admiration" for Britain's earlier colonial policy, it is appropriate to cite information on the use of British troops to suppress anti-colonial actions: between 1949 and 1966 they participated in 65 operations, including 22 major ones, against independence fighters.

The African Communist, the South African Communist Party magazine, showed how the Labourites acted in the interests of British imperialism's neocolonial policy. In countries where the granting of independence was becoming inevitable, along with repression "with the approval of the Labour leaders", the British authorities employed flexible tactics: they "nominated African members in Legislative Councils, constitutional talks, elections on a limited franchise, more constitutional talks, African Ministers in imperialist-dominated governments, more constitutional talks,

internal self-government, more constitutional talks or discussions, and, eventually independence". These tactics were also employed in relation to the countries making up the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Here one could see "neocolonialism at work in all its aspects, with its slow, evolutionary time-table, designed to give imperialism time to create new obstacles for the independence movements, time to create fresh divisions in the movement, to seek out elements who are prepared to collaborate with imperialism, to soften up some people by letting them taste the fruits of office, to create new economic burdens for emerging governments so as to leave them still dependent on imperialism".^{87*}

Harold Wilson's speech at a 17 March 1963 mass rally in Trafalgar Square called by the Anti-Apartheid Movement may be called the culmination of the Labourites' declarative criticism of apartheid. The Labour leader strongly opposed "the help that Western countries are giving in building up the forces of a country, which, by its actions, has put itself beyond the pale of human civilization".⁸⁸ He promised that a Labour government would ban arms exports to South Africa.

Later, the party's 62nd Conference expressed "deep concern at the growing dangers to world peace which arise from apartheid and racial repression".⁸⁹ However, the Labour leadership took a very restrained attitude to the prospect of real sanctions against South Africa. Addressing the House of Commons in June 1964 Harold Wilson stated that "opposition [the Labour Party. — V.B.] have never supported, and do not support the idea of unilaterally-imposed economic sanctions". In his words "the idea of an international blockade ... would be appropriate only in conditions in which South Africa by external action endangered the peace of nations, whether *vis-a-vis* Southern Rhodesia, the Protectorates, or South-West Africa".⁹⁰ This statement contradicted not only the position of the national liberation organizations and independent African states but also UN General Assembly resolutions. (The Labour leadership still opposed comprehensive sanctions even later when South Africa refused to accept the UN decision ending the mandate on Namibia and when it sent punitive forces to Rhodesia in 1968 and regular troops to Angola in 1975.)

* This description of Britain's neocolonial methods remained true for the duration of the Zimbabwean people's independence struggle in the 60s-70s: there were splits provoked by the imperialists and a search for elements prepared to collaborate; puppets like Muzorewa acquired a taste for ministerial posts; and when power was handed over to the government of independent Zimbabwe in 1980, attempts were made to limit to the utmost the country's freedom of action in the economic sphere.

It would seem that the Labour victory in the 16 October 1964 general elections offered an opportunity to implement the declared policy on southern Africa. Hopes for real changes were also raised by the fact that the Labour cabinet included persons who had actively supported the anti-apartheid struggle. In addition to Barbara Castle, trade union figure Frank Cousins also became a minister. This was the same Cousins who, not long before the general elections, had told a British TUC Conference: "We must get people in who will discontinue this governmental trading with South Africa."⁹¹

But the first months of Labour rule were a disappointment for the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid fighters. Britain's many-sided cooperation with South Africa continued, including in the field of nuclear energy, and an agreement on Britain's use of the naval base in the South African port of Simonstown remained in force. Though in principle the Wilson government reiterated its promise not to sell arms to South Africa, it simultaneously agreed to fulfill an earlier concluded contract to deliver Buccaneer bombers (they were later used in South Africa's aggressive actions against Angola) and took no measures seriously and urgently to study the question of economic sanctions against South Africa, as the left Labourites proposed, referring to the UN General Assembly resolution.*

Analyzing the motives for such actions, *The African Communist* recalled that Harold Wilson, Barbara Castle and a number of other Labour ministers were Anti-Apartheid Movement members. It wrote that it would be an oversimplification to consider the Labour leaders hypocrites and to suppose that they had changed their opinion after becoming ministers. The principal reason for their policy lay in the fact that "once having undertaken to maintain capitalism, in accordance with the thoroughly muddled and bourgeois political and economic ideas of British Social Democracy", the Labourites could not resist the pressure of "the powerful financial and capitalist interests which dominate the economy, a pressure which could only be resisted by mobilizing the organized strength of the entire Labour movement for the

* A 4 November 1962 General Assembly resolution recommended that all UN members break diplomatic relations with the racist regime, close their ports and airports to South African vessels and aircraft, prohibit vessels from calling at South African ports, boycott South African goods and not export goods to South Africa, especially arms and ammunition. A year later the General Assembly made special mention of the need to halt oil deliveries to South Africa. In 1963 the UN Security Council passed two resolutions urging an end to deliveries of arms, ammunition, and equipment for their production to South Africa.

implementation of progressive policies to which the Party is pledged".⁹²

The first months of the Labour government coincided with a further aggravation of the situation in and around Rhodesia. (After Northern Rhodesia was declared the independent Republic of Zambia in October 1964, the Southern Rhodesian authorities changed the name of that country to "Rhodesia".) The Rhodesian Front government speeded up preparations for unilateral declaration of independence on 25 October 1964. Harold Wilson warned of the "serious consequences" of such a step, stating that the terms of independence should be acceptable to the people as a whole, i.e. to the African majority as well. He said he could not believe that the government and people of Southern Rhodesia would take the irrevocable step of unilaterally declaring independence, which "would be an open act of defiance and rebellion".⁹³ During the 1964-1965 talks with Ian Smith, Rhodesian Front leader and Prime Minister of Rhodesia, the Labourites did everything to prevent that. The British government's demands did not include the "one man—one vote" principle but merely the "principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule"⁹⁴ already envisaged by the 1961 Constitution of Southern Rhodesia. According to Wilson himself, speaking in connection with the renewal of talks with Ian Smith, the door was "wide open to an acceptable, agreed and constitutional solution".⁹⁵

From 25 to 30 October 1965 when Wilson was in Salisbury holding talks with Smith and other racist leaders, he essentially handed them a carte blanche. In a meeting with ZAPU President Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole, then leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union—ZANU (formed in August 1963 when ZAPU split), who were brought out of detention, the Labour leader warned them that Britain would not resort to military intervention if independence was proclaimed unilaterally and that they should not expect majority rule in the country in the near future. Furthermore, on 1 November Wilson declared that the government would use force only against "subversion" in Rhodesia, whether from "African or European extremists".⁹⁶ But the racists in power were not regarded as "extremists", i.e. the British government was prepared to use force primarily against possible decisive actions by the African population fighting for true independence. Of course, this Labour government position facilitated the racists' unilateral actions by guaranteeing the Rhodesian authorities not only against possible decisive opposition on Britain's part but also against possible actions by the African patriots.

A SACP Central Committee statement on the Rhodesian "independence" had every reason to say: "It was Wilson and his so-called Socialist Cabinet which appeased the Smith gang with one unprincipled concession after another and finally gave them the green light with a promise not to use violence in the event of illegal declaration of so-called independence."⁹⁷

The 11 November 1965 "proclamation of independence" and the racist-adopted "Constitution" were declared illegal in Britain. In Parliament Wilson condemned the Smith government's action as an act of rebellion against the crown and stated that any measure taken to legitimize that act would be regarded as high treason. He announced the introduction of an embargo on tobacco and sugar purchases in Rhodesia, Rhodesia's exclusion from the sterling zone, freezing of the Rhodesian bank assets in London (most of which had been withdrawn by the bank shortly before the proclamation of "independence") and non-recognition of passports issued by the Rhodesian authorities after 11 November 1965.

The Labour government faced a difficult task: on the one hand, to prevent the UN from taking real international measures against the Rhodesian racists, and, on the other, to avoid being criticized by the Afro-Asian Commonwealth members and keep that organization from falling apart. Wilson went to New York to address a UN General Assembly session. Along with condemnation of the "rebels" and justification of the Labour government's decision not to use armed force to suppress the racist rebellion, he spoke of his attitude to the national liberation movement in Zimbabwe, reiterating his government's refusal to transfer power to the people's true representatives and introduce majority rule: "I believe – and I have said this many times to Mr. Smith – that it is a tragic commentary upon the European record in Rhodesia that there is not in Rhodesia as elsewhere an African Nationalist Movement capable of the responsibility of self-government... It is for these reasons that I have had to make clear ... a return to constitutional rule would not and could not mean an immediate advance to majority rule."⁹⁸

It was therefore not only unwillingness to agree to majority rule but also a refusal even to make "immediate advance" toward that goal. Twenty-seven African leaders walked out of the Assembly hall during the Labour leader's address to express their indignation at the British government's neocolonial line. And nine African countries broke off diplomatic relations with Britain in keeping with an OAU decision.

The advent of the Labour government, noted eminent British Marxist Rajani Palme Dutt, had given the national liberation

leaders hope, the more so because Wilson himself had been elected party leader by the left and centre, while the right-wingers had supported George Brown. A number of left Labourites who had been active in the Movement for Colonial Freedom and the Anti-Apartheid Movement were included in the government, but they later had to speak in defence of "imperialist policies". This tactic aimed to gag and disorganize the left-wing of the Labour Party since the left-wingers who had been given ministerial posts did not have a decisive vote.⁹⁹ Commenting on the limited sanctions against Rhodesia, Palme Dutt noted that oil sanctions were being held "in reserve" (the decision to halt oil deliveries to Rhodesia was only taken on 17 December 1965 when the Rhodesian problem was being discussed at the UN). "The first consideration was not how to defeat the racist dictators in Rhodesia, but how to defeat the ... majority in the United Nations."¹⁰⁰

The Rhodesian experience, Palme Dutt wrote, hit hard at the illusions of those who looked at the Labour Party as a possible ally in the struggle for African freedom. That is why it took great efforts on the part of the Labour government to get the January 1966 Commonwealth Conference in Lagos to approve a compromise resolution. The text referred to Wilson's statement that economic sanctions could end the rebellion within weeks but at the same time did not exclude the possibility of using armed force.

On 30 January 1966 the Labour government announced a complete ban on trade with Rhodesia. This step was accompanied by an expression of willingness to settle the Rhodesian problem on the basis of the five principles declared by Wilson on 9 October 1965. A sixth principle was later added which said that there should be no oppression by the minority or of the minority by the majority, an addition designed to placate the white settlers, who feared black majority rule.

The events in Rhodesia caused disagreements both inside the British Labour Party and in international social democracy as a whole. These disagreements were clearly evident in the headline under which the SI organ published information on the position of individual parties: "Rhodesia: Economic Sanctions or Military Force?"¹⁰¹

The Scandinavian social democratic parties actively supported the UN resolutions on sanctions against Rhodesia. In line with a Security Council resolution of 23 November 1965, the Swedish government announced an end to all trade ties with Rhodesia, i.e. adopted this measure considerably earlier than the government of Britain itself. The West German Social Democrats were quite

restrained in their attitude to the economic sanctions proposal. On 24 November 1965 the SPD weekly *Vorwärts* wrote: "The whole world could impose economic sanctions against Smith's rebel colony—but they would in the first place hit the suppressed coloured population."¹⁰²

Yet it was precisely the "suppressed coloured population", the African majority to be more precise, that was demanding comprehensive sanctions against the Smith regime, correctly supposing that their strict implementation would create more favourable conditions for the liberation struggle. (It should be noted that the arguments produced by the opponents of effective measures against the Smith regime are still being used today, more than 20 years later, with respect to the burning question of comprehensive sanctions against Pretoria.)

The disagreements within the ranks of the Social Democrats and especially between the Socialist International and Africa's progressive political forces were manifested during the preparations for the 10th SI Congress and during the congress itself, which was held in Stockholm in May 1966. The organizers sought to avoid criticism of the British government at all costs (it will be recalled that the then SI Secretary was British Labourite Albert Carthy, while Harold Wilson was one of three Vice-Chairmen) but at the same time wanted to expand their influence on ruling African parties, which meant inviting them to the congress. It was even envisaged that a closed session would discuss the question of "contacts between parties showing common political objectives, inside and outside Africa".¹⁰³

On the eve of the congress, a special conference "Socialist Thought and Action in New Countries" was held in the Swedish city of Uppsala and attended by six guest parties, including from Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, as well as SI member parties. It was a kind of tactical manoeuvre on the part of the SI leadership. The parties of the independent African countries and the national liberation movements were given an opportunity to "say their say", so to speak, outside the congress, while being denied the opportunity to criticize the social democratic leadership (and above all the British Labour government's policy on Rhodesia) at congress sessions.

Although it was a compromise, the statement adopted at the Uppsala Conference confirmed the "principle of democratic self-determination of peoples and majority rule for all", and spoke of the need for international solidarity against underdevelopment.¹⁰⁴ The conference reported "to the Congress, and particularly to the representatives of parties in government, the urgent appeal of both

the representatives of independent developing countries and the national liberation movements ... for rapid and coordinated action to give effect to demands which they share in common for the establishment of majority rule, peace, well-being and human dignity for all the peoples of the world"¹⁰⁵ and urged the Congress to take a clear and unequivocal position on the urgent problem of southern Africa.

How did the 10th Congress react to these appeals? Congress guests were asked "to address the Congress with the press and public present on the Uppsala statement". This proposal, the SI magazine wrote, "was not acceptable to the African representatives of non-member parties, who desired participation in the Congress itself".¹⁰⁶ And when the "fraternal guests"—the national liberation movements—refused to confine their speeches to the Uppsala Statement, they were not allowed to speak at all. Such crude actions were taken against political figures of note in Africa, among them FRELIMO President Eduardo Mondlane, Zambian government members, and the special envoy of the Tanzanian President.

The Congress passed a special resolution on the Uppsala Statement which did not even mention the national liberation movements but emphasized that "democratic Socialism is the only system" suitable for developing countries. In a resolution on the international situation, the Congress condemned the apartheid system in South Africa and urged "respect for the fundamental human rights and civil liberties so brutally suppressed by the present regime". However, not a word was said about "rapid and coordinated action" in support of the struggle for those rights, as urged by the Uppsala Conference Appeal to the 10th Congress, while the Namibian problem was bypassed altogether. The resolution also noted that the Congress would "strive to end the illegal Smith regime in Rhodesia, to restore constitutional rule and to introduce African majority rule as soon as possible. The Congress therefore urges full support for the efforts of the British Labour Government in accordance with the UN resolution."¹⁰⁷ Thus, while progressive African political forces, including the ruling parties of Zambia and Tanzania represented in Stockholm, were sharply critical of the British Labour government, the SI supreme forum urged full support for its actions. Like the Congress organizers' disrespect shown toward the guests whom they themselves had invited, this stymied for a long time the attempts by international social democracy's organizational centre to establish contacts with African political parties, especially in countries bordering on the colonial racist regimes.

The fundamental disagreements between the British Labour government and the anti-apartheid fighters in both African and Western countries, including in the ranks of the Social Democrats, remained and even aggravated following the Stockholm meeting. Instead of effective sanctions against Rhodesia, the Labour government engaged in a false bustle around Smith's "rebellion", this being a British neocolonial tactic aimed to mask the true objectives. While asking the UN to introduce sanctions against Rhodesia, the British government itself facilitated the breaching of those sanctions by opposing measures against countries continuing to trade with Rhodesia, primarily South Africa. Later, while sending a patrol of the Royal Navy to prevent oil destined for Rhodesia from passing through the Mozambican port of Beira, it encouraged the British oil monopolies to supply Rhodesia via South Africa. There was good reason why the 6-14 September 1966 Commonwealth Conference in London was also divided by major disagreements, which were reflected in its communique.

The SI magazine published an article entitled "The Prospects for Southern Africa" on the results of that meeting. Written by Swiss Social Democrat Otto Hurlimann, it stated that "Harold Wilson's prophecy that a few months would be sufficient to bring down Ian Smith to his knees under the pressure of sanctions applied against him has been shown up as wishful thinking". However, while recognizing that "the coloured participants in the Commonwealth" had the right to doubt whether sanctions produced results, Hurlimann did not believe that there were "sufficient grounds for moving forward ... to ruthless escalation into military aggression".¹⁰⁸ (Under "aggression" he meant a possible military intervention to overthrow the Smith regime.)

Such an ambivalent position was also characteristic of the SI as a whole and of most of its member parties. But it had to be admitted that Hurlimann was able to foresee what the future conduct of the racists' accomplices would be: "The white masters base their policies on pure cynicism, but they should not be surprised if, on the day when their domination is overthrown, all the foreign spectators of such a disaster have only one worry: how to be on good terms with those who will be tomorrow's masters over South Africa's and Rhodesia's natural wealth."¹⁰⁹ That had happened in Zimbabwe and that was bound to happen in Namibia and South Africa.

Following the Commonwealth conference, the British government renewed official contacts with Ian Smith (they in fact had never ceased) despite the objections of a majority of member countries. In December 1966 talks held on the British naval vessel *Tiger*

in the Strait of Gibraltar between Harold Wilson and Ian Smith resulted in the approval of a draft Rhodesian Constitution containing substantial concessions to the racists. But an "honourable settlement" did not suit the majority in the Rhodesian Front party, with whose view Smith later agreed.

Under these conditions, the British government, in a show of "firmness", sent George Brown, its Foreign Secretary and Deputy Labour leader, to the UN where he submitted to the Security Council a draft resolution calling for partial mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia by all UN member states. Only African pressure resulted in the inclusion of a proposal to ban oil deliveries to Rhodesia, but no measures to oppose its transportation through South Africa were envisaged. At the same time Wilson categorically announced in the House of Commons on 20 December that all proposals on a constitutional settlement in Rhodesia would be withdrawn until majority rule was established. However, less than a year later Commonwealth Secretary George Thomson arrived in Salisbury to renew talks or, as the British authorities termed them then, "talks about talks".

It was no surprise that both within the Labour Party and other social democratic parties, and among the international community as a whole dissatisfaction was constantly mounting with the line of the Labour leadership, which was increasingly characterized as betrayal of the people of Zimbabwe rather than "efforts to bring about a just solution". Attempts to reach a compromise with the racists were being made behind the back of Zimbabwe's national liberation organizations, which had already switched to decisive forms of struggle. In 1966 ZANU conducted the first military operation on Zimbabwean territory, and between 1967 and 1968 joint ZAPU-ANC units engaged the Rhodesian troops, backed by a South African contingent hastily transferred to that country. This was the start of many years of armed struggle to overthrow the racist regime and establish majority rule in the country.

Officially this was also the goal of the British Labour government but far from supporting these decisive actions, it raised obstacles in their way. While opposing the use of force to impose a constitutional settlement, the Labour government did not rule out its use to restore law and order, i.e. against the patriots who violated the racist order. When South Africa brought its troops into Zimbabwe, Britain refrained from taking any counter measures though it officially continued to regard that country as its colony. On the contrary, the Labour government demanded that Zambia prohibit the Zimbabwe freedom fighters from passing through its territory,¹¹⁰ and soon after hostilities started

it began to "study" the possibility of renewing arms deliveries to South Africa, and only on 12 December 1967 did Wilson announce in parliament that the decision "to conform to the Security Council Resolution of 18 June 1964, remains unchanged".¹¹¹

Labour Party members were increasingly opposed to these actions by the leadership. On the eve of the Labour Party conference (30 September-4 October 1967 in Blackpool) a mass meeting was held on the initiative of the Anti-Apartheid Movement and attended by conference guests, among them ZANU, ZAPU and ANC representatives. The government's policy was also sharply criticized at the conference itself. Of great importance (if one takes into account the government's condemnation of the armed struggle of the Zimbabwean patriots) was the conference call for "aid to Rhodesian nationalists".¹¹²

The following fact makes it clear that the dividing line on the Rhodesian question ran mainly between the leadership and the party rank-and-file. In Blackpool, the Anti-Apartheid Movement distributed among the delegates a petition urging the government to abide by its commitment. It was signed by about half the delegates, but only four among them were members of the party's executive committee and a few members of parliament.

The resolution passed at the Blackpool Conference was a warning, as it were, against the deal with the racists prepared by the Wilson government. But despite it and contrary to earlier statements, the British Prime Minister met with Ian Smith in October 1968, this time on board the warship *Fearless*. To the previously discussed conditions the British government added the proposal to earmark funds to educate the Africans so that in time more of them could meet the education qualification and thus obtain the right to vote. Once again substantial concessions were made to the racist regime at the meeting: it was envisaged that power would not be handed over to a British governor during the "transitional period" but would remain in the hands of Smith, who was to form a broad-based administration. After another refusal by Smith to compromise, the British premier did not withdraw his proposals for a settlement. On the contrary, addressing the House of Commons on 15 October 1968, Wilson declared: "We for our part are keeping the door open."¹¹³

Betrayal of the Africans' interests in Zimbabwe was supplemented by a very moderate policy on the part of the Labour Party and the British Trades Union Congress toward the apartheid regime in South Africa. Describing this policy, *The African Communist* wrote in connection with the British government's refusal to support measures against trade with Rhodesia via South

Africa: "The very Labour men who, not long ago, when they were in opposition, were supporting sanctions against apartheid South Africa, were flagrantly and publicly using every possible manoeuvre to see that in no circumstances should there be any 'confrontation' with the apartheid regime."¹¹⁴

Material published by the SI and outlining the Labour government's position on Rhodesia and South Africa makes it possible also to judge to a certain extent the SI general line on southern Africa. Its leading bodies were silent on the armed actions against the racists in Rhodesia: for example, this question was not mentioned in the resolutions of the October 1967 SI Council conference in Zurich. At the Council's next conference (Copenhagen, August 1968), George Brown prefaced the discussion of the international situation by expressing the hope that "many African countries will see in Social Democracy a philosophy and system of government uniquely suited to their needs at this time". He justified the policy of a Rhodesian settlement "based on the principles and pledges which successive British governments have laid down", i.e. he actually admitted that the Conservative and the Labour leaders had a common position on this problem. The draft resolution which he submitted contained only a promise of "unimpeded progress to majority rule".¹¹⁵

It should be said that the resolution approved by the Council used more decisive terms, stressing, for example, that any solution should be clearly based on the principle of no independence until there was African majority rule. However, it spoke only of full SI support for all practical measures to bring about speedy and peaceful settlement in Rhodesia but did not express its attitude to the liberation movements, which had started an armed struggle against the racists.

The SI Council also condemned the policy of apartheid and (this was a new element in its position) "the maintenance of South African domination of South-West Africa in the face of world opinion expressed through the United Nations".¹¹⁶

As was noted, the actions of the Social Democrats of Sweden and other Scandinavian countries played a major role in the general evolution of the Socialist International's policy on southern Africa. Their contacts with the national liberation movements, with the ANC for example, dated back to the early 1960s. An important political act against apartheid was the awarding of the 1960 Nobel Peace Prize to ANC President Albert Luthuli. However, the Scandinavian Social Democrats did not support the ANC leadership's policy of developing the armed struggle against the racist regime.

In those years the Scandinavian Social Democrats were active mostly in the UN. On 25 September 1963 Danish Foreign Minister, Social Democrat Per Hækkerup, outlined at a General Assembly session a joint Scandinavian plan on South Africa. Emphasizing its value, the SI organ referred to the London *Times*, which called the plan the "first constructive approach in the United Nations to the problem of Apartheid in South Africa".¹¹⁷ This implied that earlier UN resolutions aimed at isolating the racist regimes and supporting the anti-apartheid fighters had been "destructive".

The position of the Norwegian Labour Party government in 1964 and 1965 when Norway was a permanent Security Council member also impeded decisive UN measures against South Africa.

For example, in June 1964 the Norwegian representative introduced a draft resolution which did not call for mandatory sanctions against South Africa but spoke only of involving the whole population in consultations about the future system and of setting up a committee of experts to study the feasibility, effectiveness and effects of measures that the Security Council could adopt in the future. The only point that could be actually implemented was the proposal to draw up a plan to educate and train South Africans abroad. It is not surprising that the draft was backed by the US, Britain and other allies of the racists.

Swedish social democracy was active on the problems of southern Africa, but in Sweden, too, there was a fairly wide gap between declarations and concrete actions. Thus, a boycott of South African goods was quickly ended when the management of the Swedish consumer cooperatives, which were under SAP influence, decided to begin purchasing them once again. In response to the public demand (including from Social Democrats) for a fresh ban on importing South African goods and for the breaking of diplomatic relations with that country, the SAP leadership, like the bourgeois opposition parties, declared that it was necessary to operate only through the UN. Neither did it place any obstacles in the way of greater Swedish investment in South Africa. At the 22nd SAP Congress in 1964, Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson again opposed a South African boycott, saying that it "would be a demonstration on the country's part and no more".¹¹⁸

Social democratic organizations also took a contradictory position on fund raising for the national liberation movements. Thus, in 1967 the newspaper *Aftonbladet* collected 100,000 kronor for the Namibian freedom fighters, which were evenly distributed between SWAPO and the so-called South West Africa National Union (SWANU), an organization which by then had lost

influence both inside Namibia and abroad. In 1968 an SAP Solidarity Fund was created, but of the 300,000 kronor collected in its first year, only 15,000 were given to ZANU and ZAPU in Zambia, no aid going to the ANC and SWAPO.

Material assistance from the Swedish government, which began in 1965, did not go directly to the national liberation organizations but to a Special UN Fund for Southern Africa, the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, and the World Council of Churches fund. By the end of 1969 Sweden's assistance to "the victims of the apartheid policy of South Africa" totalled eight million kronor.¹¹⁹

The SAP's policy stood out as a positive one against the background of that of some other parties, especially the SPD. In 1960 that party's Board declared "its solidarity with those peoples who have still to fight for their independence and against racial discrimination" and pledged to "develop friendly relations with suitable organizations in Africa".¹²⁰ But the southern African national liberation organizations were obviously not considered "suitable", for 10 years later contact with them had yet to be established. At the same time, even after the SPD became part of the broad coalition government in 1966, political, economic and military cooperation with South Africa continued to develop and contacts in the area of atomic energy research, later described by the ANC as a "nuclear conspiracy", were established.

The 11th SI Congress (Eastbourne, June 1969) brought to light differences on the problems of southern Africa. In his address, Harold Wilson again justified non-interference in Rhodesia and said nothing about the national liberation movements in that and other southern African countries. At the same time, as was stated earlier, Kalevi Sorsa, Finnish Social Democratic Party General Secretary, insisted on economic and political support for precisely the national liberation movements. The congress resolution was therefore also a compromise. Unlike those of the previous congress it no longer spoke of supporting the Labour government's efforts but, on the contrary, suggested that independence should not be granted to Rhodesia until there was majority rule. Referring to a Security Council resolution of 29 May 1968, the delegates urged all member parties and all governments to take appropriate action on the section of the UN resolution calling for moral and practical aid to those fighting for freedom. Solidarity was also expressed with "those men and women of all races [but not with specific organizations. — V.B.] seeking to bring respect for fundamental human rights and civil liberties to these lands (South Africa and Namibia)".¹²¹

This represented a definite, though very slow, evolution of the SI stand on the problems of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia. SI congress resolutions were a resultant, as it were, of the forces operating in its ranks: both of member parties and of individual sections within them. Expressing the opinion of left forces in international social democracy in an article published in the ANC organ, British Labour MP Andrew Faulds urged Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, the FRG, Finland and Denmark to recognize the national liberation movements as East European governments had done. But the Labour leadership's inconsistency was discouraging: "We [the British Anti-Apartheid Movement.—V.B.] have even mustered support from some politicians. But the trouble with politicians is that when they become government ministers they seem to forget the lessons we taught them." Faulds therefore believed it was necessary to "devise a programme of aid, a people's programme of popular support" for the liberation movements so as to change the policy of West European governments.¹²²

But during that period it was particularly difficult to enlist "popular support" for the southern African national liberation movements even of rank-and-file Social Democrats. Irish researchers and Anti-Apartheid Movement figures Kader and Louise Asmal pointed out that South Africa's repression forced the liberation movements to operate underground and their activity therefore seemed unorganized. In the latter half of the 60s "the white power structure had looked so enormously powerful that there seemed to be little hope of an early change. In the Scandinavian countries, it had become difficult to recruit voluntary workers for anti-apartheid campaigns."¹²³

The late 60s were indeed a difficult and complicated period for the national liberation forces of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia. In South Africa, brutal police repression dealt a major blow at the ANC underground structure. The first armed actions did not trigger a mass uprising against the regime, which the ANC leaders had expected. Neither did the heroic struggle of the Umkhonto we Sizwe members in the joint ZAPU-ANC units in Zimbabwe achieve the main goal of penetrating South African territory. Along with the failure of the first military operations, the situation in the national liberation movement in Zimbabwe was also complicated by the continuing disagreements between ZANU and ZAPU.

The South West Africa People's Organization was also experiencing serious difficulties. When it started military operations in 1966, the South African racists intensified repression and in 1968

brought to trial Andimba Toivo Ja Toivo, a SWAPO founder, and other Namibian patriots.

This situation also affected the evolution of the SI position. On the whole it was determined by the above-mentioned factors, but the desire to "be involved" in the national liberation movement's successes in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia was less manifest since those successes were not as appreciable as those of the MPLA, FRELIMO and PAIGC. That is why the need to establish and develop ties with the organizations heading the struggle of the peoples of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia was recognized by the leadership of the Socialist International and its member parties only later.

5. Intensification of the Liberation Movement in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia (Early 70s)

The early 70s ushered in a new stage in the liberation struggle in southern Africa. This was facilitated by a general change in the international situation and the world correlation of forces. A direct impact on that struggle was exerted by the MPLA and FRELIMO successes, which made it possible to begin moving armed units of patriots from independent African countries across the liberated regions of Angola and Mozambique to Namibia and Zimbabwe.

In keeping with decisions of the May 1969 ANC Consultative Conference held in Morogoro (Tanzania), measures were taken to restore the organization's underground structure and send trained cadres into South Africa despite the terror and police persecution. The enlarged plenary meeting of the SACP CC that took place in 1970 was of great importance in determining the strategy and tactics of the South African Communists' struggle and in strengthening the party organizations inside and outside South Africa. The SWAPO Consultative Congress, held in late December 1969-early January 1970 in Tanga (Tanzania), strengthened the positions of progressive forces within SWAPO.

Measures were taken to coordinate ZANU and ZAPU efforts. In January 1972 agreement on joint action was reached between the two parties. At the end of that year ZANU units began vigorous actions in north-east Zimbabwe.

The mass strike of Namibian workers in late 1970-early 1971 was a fundamentally new phenomenon in the political situation in Namibia and southern Africa. It was followed by working people's

actions in South Africa, especially in the province of Natal. About 250,000 people went on strike in South Africa during 1973.

A new youth movement of oppressed racial groups, known as the Black Consciousness Movement, appeared in South Africa at the turn of the 70s. Despite its limited political character and declared adherence to "non-violent actions", it was, on the whole, a positive phenomenon since it expressed black protest in a situation in which the activity of the ANC and its allies was being brutally suppressed.

The changing situation in southern Africa enhanced public interest in Western Europe in the national liberation struggle. The left Social Democrats also stepped up pressure on the leadership of their parties and the governments which they led.

After the situation in southern Africa was discussed at a session of the SI Bureau (Paris, October 1970), the problems involved in it became a focus of the discussion and decisions of the SI Council conference (Helsinki, May 1971). As usual, the tone of the British Labour leaders changed after their party had become the opposition. Opening the discussion, Harold Wilson expressed regret that in southern Africa there had been "no significant movement towards a peaceful settlement of basic, atavistic conflict", and criticized the "illegal regime in Rhodesia", the apartheid system in South Africa, and the "archaic colonial war" in "Portuguese Africa".

Now that his party was in opposition, the leader of the Labour government, which had openly held talks with Ian Smith, secretly encouraged oil deliveries to Rhodesia and agreed to sell South Africa warplanes and other military equipment "as an exception", was speaking of the need to exclude the Rhodesian regime "from the community of nations, both politically and economically", and calling on "all members of the International to urge their governments to deny to the South African regime the weapons to enforce apartheid".¹²⁴

The conference resolution expressed "the greatest alarm" over "the possibility of a resumption of negotiations between the British Government and the illegal regime in Rhodesia". The SI Council urged "all member parties and all governments" to provide moral and practical assistance "to those who are resisting the illegal Rhodesian regime" in line with the UN resolution. It also expressed "continued support for all those in South Africa and Namibia who are seeking the destruction of apartheid".¹²⁵

Wilson's address at the Helsinki Conference reflected the line of the Labour leadership after it became the opposition. At the party's 69th Conference in October 1970 the speakers criticized

the Tory government's steps to renew talks with Smith and its decision to deliver individual types of arms to South Africa. They urged the government "to curb further investment in South Africa, with particular reference to investment in the armaments industry". For the first time the Labour Party resolution called for "full support, moral and material, to the liberation movement in Southern Africa".¹²⁶ This position was confirmed at subsequent Labour conferences. However, although the resolutions were passed unanimously, that did not mean there was unity among the Labourites on southern Africa.

On his return from a trip to Zambia and Tanzania in 1971, Labour MP Frank Judd published an article proposing that the Labour Party should "do everything possible to back the liberation movements", "not honour any agreements between the Conservative Government and South Africa ... on the supply of arms" and recognize the impossibility of "an honourable deal with Smith" and the illegality of continued South African control over Namibia.¹²⁷

Ex-defence minister Denis Healey took a much more moderate position on these questions. While in South Africa, he met not only with Nelson Mandela (the Pretoria government allowed him to visit the Robben Island prison by way of an exception) and representatives of legal opposition, but also with Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller and members of parliament from the ruling National Party. In essence he questioned the need to assist the liberation movements: "I certainly think they deserve moral encouragement but one would want to know precisely who they are, and what they are doing, how they are working with one another."¹²⁸ The question "who they are, and what they are doing" was being asked by a politician who ten years earlier had, along with Hugh Gaitskill, met with Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo and after the Labour Party Conference decided to give the liberation movements both moral and material assistance.

It is also significant how Healey explained his earlier position on arms deliveries to South Africa. He denied *The Times* report of 26 December 1970 that he had actively tried to revise the Labour government's position on arms deliveries to South Africa, but he admitted that in 1967 when the question of reducing government spending was raised, a number of ministers, himself included, decided not to miss any opportunity to stabilize the budget. "If we were considering abolishing free school milk and meals, ... restoring prescription charges, we should also be looking at the possibility of selling some weapons to South Africa."¹²⁹ Thus, Healey had not excluded the possibility that British school meals

could be paid for through the sale of arms which were used in African countries against civilians, including children!

In the period immediately preceding the 12th SI Congress, the problems of southern Africa (Rhodesia in particular) were repeatedly discussed at the SI Bureau sessions. The Bureau supported the position of the Labourites, who had condemned the proposed solution to the Rhodesian problem agreed on by the Tory government and the Ian Smith regime. On 14 February 1972 a meeting was held at SI headquarters between General Secretary Hans Janitschek and Bishop Abel Muzorewa, then Chairman of the African National Council—an organization initiated by the liberation movements and aiming to demonstrate the African population's disagreement with the above-mentioned deal. The SI's moral support for the campaign against mending relations with Smith was in itself a positive thing, but during the meeting Muzorewa opposed that campaign to the actions of the national liberation movements.¹³⁰

At the 12th SI Congress (1972), British Labourite Joan Lestor explained the reasons for the encouragement of the racist Pretoria regime: "Britain has allowed herself over the years to become too enmeshed in the economy of South Africa".¹³¹

International social democracy's enhanced interest in the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle in the early 70s did not always mean readiness to establish ties with the national liberation movements heading it. Social Democrats had a greater desire to initiate contacts with the legal opposition in South Africa, as a rule behind the back of the ANC. This was the policy of the West European right-wing trade union leaders, the British Trades Union Congress in particular. They aimed to back up the reformist trade unions in South Africa and thwart international solidarity with the revolutionary detachments of the labour movement in that country.

The world trade union movement was in sympathy with the wave of strikes in South Africa. At a conference of the International Labour Organization (ILO), the largest international trade union associations agreed to hold a World Trade Union Conference Against Apartheid under the UN auspices. Participating actively in its preparation, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), which counted the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) among its members, approved at the 22nd session of its General Council in November 1972 a resolution which noted that it would be "the first time since 1945 that the trade unions of the world, without exception, will have cooperated on a given subject".¹³²

Held in Geneva in June 1973, the conference was attended by representatives of 186 million trade union members. It condemned apartheid and racial discrimination as a crime against humanity and urged governments, trade unions and employers to boycott racist South Africa and extend moral and material support to the workers and people of South Africa "through their authentic trade union and political organizations".¹³³

These resolutions were passed despite the opposition of the right-wingers in the international trade union movement. *The African Communist* wrote that at the conference "the friends of the South African Government—trade union leaders in those countries that invest heavily in South Africa, i.e. the USA, West Germany and Britain, together with the African-American Labour Centre, a CIA outfit, worked for a division of the forces ranged against racist South Africa".¹³⁴

This warning was quite timely. In October 1973, soon after the Geneva Conference, a British Trades Union Congress delegation was hosted in South Africa by the reformist Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA), the same organization which had been working "to torpedo the Geneva June resolutions".¹³⁵ The TUC visit coincided with a TUCSA decision to accept as junior partners "parallel" trade unions of African workers, a move which, in the assessment of the South African Communists, was an attempt "to control and direct the evolution of African trade unionism along constitutional lines".¹³⁶

The specific proposals contained in the report of the British trade union delegation were largely directed against the interests of the South African workers. By proposing that the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the British Trades Union Congress set up a national African trade union centre in South Africa, the delegation, in the opinion of South African revolutionaries, displayed not solidarity but a "form of imperialism" working with its allies in the South African white labour aristocracy.*

In the words of the SACTU General Secretary the TUC leadership was giving "first priority to the British investments in South

* Such actions, aimed to strengthen the reformist and anti-communist elements in the South African labour movement, had been taken by Social Democrats in the past as well. Thus, W. Ballinger, an emissary of the right-wing leadership of the British trade unions, was sent there to bring the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, whose members were Africans, under their influence. In the late 50s and early 60s the ICFTU tried to undermine SACTU positions using the so-called Federation of Free African Trade Unions of South Africa (FOFATUSA).

Africa which reap fantastic profits from cheap African labour than to principles".¹³⁷ This was subsequently confirmed by the TUC's financial assistance to the conciliatory organizations in the South African labour movement. Thus, in February 1975 the TUC donated 20,800 rands to the Urban Training Project in South Africa, which the trade union delegation had described in its report as a modest and careful organization working within certain political boundaries. The TUC agreed to cover expenses in the amount of 18,000 rands for the Institute for Industrial Education (offering correspondence courses), that was set up in May 1973 in Durban and had as its "chancellor" Gatscha Buthelezi, head of the KwaZulu bantustan administration. Reporting on this contribution and on ICFTU assistance, a TUC official stressed that the Institute would provide "straightforward trade union training — no frills and no politics".¹³⁸

Later, in 1974, the British Ruskin College (the Labourites' main educational institution) established close ties with this "Institute", against the wishes of the students and SACTU.¹³⁹

Along with support for the reformist forces in the South African labour movement, social democratic parties and foundations associated with them supported and gave material assistance to the South African Students Organization (SASO) and the Black Peoples Convention (BPC) which held to the "black consciousness" ideology. The Social Democrats regarded them as a "third force" which could stand between the racists and the ANC.

Taking advantage of the political immaturity of SASO and BPC leaders, some Social Democrats made efforts to raise their international prestige by presenting them as the "true representatives" of the black South Africans unlike the ANC "leadership in exile". As advocates of non-violent struggle, they were contrasted with the ANC "terrorists".

A special role was played by the International University Exchange Fund (IUEF), an organization which was formally independent but closely linked with international social democracy. Representatives of Scandinavian social democratic parties have held leading posts in the organization since its inception,* including the posts of president and director, and Social Democrat-led governmental organizations of Sweden, Denmark and Norway were the fund's principal donors in the first decade of its existence. The

* The IUEF was founded in 1961 on a decision of the International Student Conference (ISC), and from 1969 it began to operate as an independent organization. The reason was that after ISC leadership's ties with the CIA were exposed, it was forced to disband.

importance which social democratic leaders have attached to this organization is seen in the fact that Bernt Carlsson, then SAP International Secretary, stayed on as a member of the Fund Bureau even after his 1976 election as SI General Secretary.

The IUEF assisted the national liberation movements by granting scholarships to their activists, helping to finance conferences, publishing information, and the like. However, most of the scholarships were not granted through the national liberation organizations but on an individual basis, including to persons opposed to those organizations. Thus, in the 1971/72 academic year, 49 non-FRELIMO Mozambicans studied on IUEF scholarships in Kenya. They were mainly ex-students of the Mozambique Institute who had been involved in the 1968 actions which FRELIMO president Samora Machel described as "open rebellion against FRELIMO, against the popular line in education".¹⁴⁰

The IUEF's desire to circumvent the national liberation organizations and in fact to remove the young people going abroad to study from their influence directly contradicted the interests of the anti-apartheid and anti-colonial struggle. A leader of the Zimbabwe patriotic movement against the racist Smith regime, T. George Silundika, later a minister in the government of the Republic of Zimbabwe, said in this connection: "Those people who are engaged in the liberation of their country, should be eligible for educational scholarships. The international community must not assist people who are professional 'dodgers' of the struggle; these people constitute a group that is subversive of the struggle."¹⁴¹

An ambiguous position in relation to the national liberation movements was also taken by other international non-governmental organizations where Social Democrats played a leading role, for example, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ).

Participating in the preparations for the International Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations against Apartheid and Colonialism, held in Geneva in September 1974, ICJ General Secretary and former British Labour minister, Niall Macdermot, insisted that Clemens Kapuuo, the puppet "supreme chief" of the Herero people appointed by the South African authorities, should be invited to represent Namibia along with SWAPO. And during the conference he tried to prevent the telegram being sent to Harold Wilson protesting the joint British and South African naval exercises.

Between the 12th and 13th SI congresses, activity around the problems of national liberation was displayed not so much by the Socialist International itself as by individual member parties and primarily by Scandinavian social democracy.

When it came to power in 1971, Denmark's social democratic government considerably increased its "aid to the victims of the suppression of the African population in southern Africa", which reached \$1.3 million in 1973. But these funds were sent to various international funds, including the IUEF and the Danish Refugee Council, rather than directly to the national liberation organizations.¹⁴²

The Swedish government agreed to the opening of ANC, SWAPO and ZANU missions in Stockholm and began to give those organizations material assistance. This was done via a government body—the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), while political contacts with the national liberation movements were maintained mainly through the apparatus of the Social Democratic Labour Party of Sweden. However, the bulk of that aid still went to "the refugees from and victims of apartheid" and was often used to support forces ranged against the national liberation movements. Thus, while direct aid to the ANC, ZANU, ZAPU and SWAPO totalled £22,000 in 1972/73, £120,000 in 1973/74, and £280,000 in 1974/75, aid to "refugees from and victims of apartheid" totalled £711,000, £830,000 and £948,000 respectively.

At the UN, Sweden voted for recognition of the liberation movements as the representatives of the peoples of southern Africa, but in practice the Swedish Social Democrats, like those of other Scandinavian countries, sought a reformist solution to the region's problems and tried to oppose conciliatory elements to the revolutionary forces.

Let us cite a concrete example. In a situation of stepped-up liberation struggle in southern Africa and under the influence of the left forces, in 1973 the largest SAP-linked Swedish trade unions made a joint statement which said that continued Swedish investment in South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies meant in practice that Sweden was continuing to help strengthen the regime of oppression and colonialism in Africa. But two years later a delegation from these very trade unions visited South Africa and, despite the earlier stance, did not propose withdrawal of investments from South Africa but rather measures to be taken by the companies to improve the conditions of the black workers. The delegation's report presented the ANC and SACTU as "organizations in exile". Although this document was sharply criticized by the SAP left-wing, contact with the SACTU was established by the Swedish trade unions only in 1977.

Finnish social democracy also developed its ties with the national liberation movements, focussing on Namibia, where a

mission of the Finnish Protestant Church has been functioning since the last century. In connection with the establishment of the International Solidarity Fund of the SSP in February 1971, Party Board member Pekka Kuusi noted that its "main objects are in Africa and Vietnam".¹⁴³ SWAPO was among the first to receive financial aid from the Fund.

The Dutch Party of Labour also held a position on southern Africa that was close to that of the Scandinavian Social Democrats. When a coalition government was formed, Prime Minister and Labour Party leader Joop den Uyl declared on 28 May 1973 that it would cease financial aid to those emigrating to South Africa and intensify supervision of the UN embargo against South Africa and the sanctions against Rhodesia. The Labour Party Conference held in April 1974 passed a resolution calling for an extension of contributions "for humanitarian and educational projects to liberation movements" and "practical rejection of the principle of apartheid by ending all state involvement in investments in South Africa".¹⁴⁴

The November 1974 Congress of the Belgian Socialist Party resolved to review Belgium's policy with a view to giving the liberation movements "all necessary assistance—political and material" and "ceasing all political, economic and military assistance to the colonial, neocolonial and racist authorities". The Congress approved a new programme which included a point on "establishing honest relations with the liberation movements" and recognizing them as "the true representatives of the peoples fighting for their independence".¹⁴⁵ The Belgian Socialists (above all the activists of the Committee in Support of the Anti-Colonial and Anti-Apartheid Struggle and other public organizations) participated jointly with the Communists in holding a number of important international meetings on southern Africa in Brussels, for example, the May 1972 International Conference on Namibia.

An attempt to elaborate a detailed programme on southern Africa was also made by the leadership of the British Labour Party. A foreign policy paper published on 24 May 1973 called for strict observance of the embargo on arms deliveries to South Africa, withdrawal from all relationships resulting from the Simonstown agreements, and refusal to allow South African police agents to enter Britain. Unlike past practice whereby material aid to the national liberation movements was rendered only from the Labour Party fund and in very small amounts, it was recommended to give financial aid along government lines to all liberation movements for use for humanitarian purposes. A special working group was instructed to also study the possibility of using other

measures, up to and including withdrawal of British investments from South Africa.¹⁴⁶

However, the actions of the Labour government formed following the February 1974 election victory were again at odds with the pre-election declarations. Although it refused to permit the export to South Africa of a Wasp helicopter which had yet to be delivered under the Tory government, it nevertheless agreed to hold major joint naval exercises in October 1974 during which South Africa would use helicopters of the same type delivered earlier. Paradoxical as it may seem, Frank Judd, who had earlier been against all military cooperation with Pretoria, became Labour Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Navy).

As a joint 6 January 1975 statement of the Communist Party of Great Britain and the South African Communist Party noted, "the role of the British Labour Government in relation to South Africa has been rightly condemned by its own supporters".¹⁴⁷ For example, a special 30 October 1974 statement of the Labour Party Executive Committee expressed regret at actions which ran directly counter both to party policy and to precise assurances given by the government itself.

The indignation of the British and world public forced London to renounce the Simonstown agreements soon after the naval exercises. But contacts were simultaneously established between NATO and South Africa on possible further use of the base in Simonstown.

In diplomatic ties with the racist regime the Labour government went even further than its Conservative predecessors. The Anti-Apartheid Movement organized a meeting near the South African embassy in London on 10 December 1974—Human Rights Day—to demand the release of political prisoners. It was attended by prominent Labourites, including deputy leader James Callaghan. However, one month later, in January 1975, the same Callaghan made a trip to South Africa as Foreign Secretary, something which none of his predecessors had done for the past 15 years. This visit promoted the so-called detente policy which South Africa was pursuing at that time in an effort to gain influence over the independent African states and get them to cease their aid to the national liberation movements in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia.

In 1974-1975 international social democracy paid increased attention to the problem of Namibia, especially when it became clear that the changed situation in Angola was helping to invigorate SWAPO activity. Following the 31 March 1974 SI Bureau resolution against South Africa's illegal occupation of

Namibia and in support of the Namibian political prisoners, the situation in Namibia and possible SI action in this connection were discussed by the SWAPO representative in London and SI Assistant General Secretary R. Balond.

However, in practice international social democracy's support for the Namibian people's struggle was limited in character. For example, the Labour Party's 1974 election manifesto called, among other things, for an end to uranium imports from Namibia, but the Labour government maintained in force the agreements concluded under the Conservatives and merely stopped encouraging British trade with and investment in Namibia. A SWAPO representative called this measure a gesture which in no way diminished the role of British capital in backing the illegal South African regime in Namibia. While noting that the Labour government's recognition of the South African presence in Namibia as illegal was an important step forward, he demanded specific measures, in particular the breaking of the contract for uranium ore deliveries from Namibia to Britain.

As before, the Social Democratic Party of Germany lagged far behind the other SI member parties in establishing ties with the national liberation movements and ending cooperation with South Africa. As head of the 1969 coalition government, the SPD leadership continued a policy of encouraging trade with South Africa and facilitated the penetration of FRG monopolies into southern Africa. In defence of their position the social democratic leaders claimed that "trade is one thing, and political relations another". In this connection the ANC magazine *Sechaba* was right in saying: "When the same imperialist power is building engineering plants, supplying poison gases, making rockets and also training the army, then trade and politics are certainly the same thing—it amounts to collaboration with the ruling powers for the suppression of the people's resistance and assisting them to prepare to war."¹⁴⁸ Two years later the magazine published an article entitled "The Bonn-Pretoria Axis" which noted that the FRG was using "the full force of its industrial might for its neocolonialist penetration of the Third World and subverting the liberation movement". The ANC, the article stressed, had not been fooled by the declarations of the FRG authorities, but "would have expected ... a qualitative progressive development from Adenauer to Brandt. To date we see none, at least not in FRG-South African relations".¹⁴⁹

The SPD declared its support for the struggle against colonialism and apartheid at its 1973 Hannover Congress, i.e. much later than most other social democratic parties. However, notwithstand-

ing the resolutions, the FRG continued to collaborate with South Africa in the military field and in the use of atomic energy. A special issue of the ANC organ, headlined "The Nuclear Conspiracy. FRG Collaborates to Strengthen Apartheid", cited concrete data on the participation of West German (including partly state-owned) firms in projects that were strategically important for South Africa, and on financial subventions given to those firms by the Federal government. Thus, even after 1969, deliveries were made to South Africa of Milan anti-tank missiles of French-West German make, BO-105 helicopters, army trucks, Transall transport planes (also produced jointly with France) and equipment for the ship and aircraft tracking centre in the Silvermine area. The South African Defence Ministry was supplied with secret NATO data on codification of materiel, which were necessary to purchase spare parts. A corvette for the South African navy was built with an FRG license.¹⁵⁰

Collusion with the racists was increasingly opposed in the FRG, including in the SPD ranks. Ex-Minister for Development and Cooperation Erhard Eppler, and Chairman of the Bundestag Committee on Economic Development Uwe Holtz were against collaboration with South Africa in the nuclear field. The Young Socialists (an organization embracing all SPD members below the age of 35. — *V.B.*) adopted a similar position at the February 1975 Congress. The proponents of ties with the racists were therefore forced to manoeuvre and conceal their plans. Thus, in 1974 General Rall, the FRG's representative at NATO headquarters, visited South Africa under an assumed name. It is significant that the organizers of this trip, which included a visit to nuclear centres, were worried that certain forces in the SPD would prevent it.

In the early 70s the FRG ruling circles also became active on the Namibian problem. This was mainly connected with the large number of persons of German origin (up to 25,000) living in that country, many of whom preserved their West German citizenship.

In September 1973 a SWAPO delegation led by Sam Nujoma visited the FRG and met with representatives of public organizations against colonialism and racism, and also with some SPD men, for example, Erhard Eppler, who was Minister for Development and Cooperation at the time. In its recommendations the SWAPO leadership insisted on a closure of the FRG Consulate in Windhoek and cessation of activity by West German monopolies in Namibia.¹⁵¹ But these recommendations were not met by the FRG government, which was banking on "moderate" African leaders like Kapuuu as an alternative to SWAPO, which the UN recognized in 1973 as the sole representative of the Namibian people.

Following his June 1974 trip to the FRG and Britain, Kapuuu announced that he had received the Bonn government's assurances of support and of aid (construction of schools) for political refugees from Namibia living in Botswana and Zambia. This gesture was in fact an attempt to pull political Namibian exiles away from SWAPO and from participation in the armed struggle for independence. This was at a time when, following the toppling of the fascist regime in Portugal, hundreds of young Namibians were rushing across Angolan territory to Zambia to join the SWAPO-led People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN).

However, the rise in SWAPO's authority in Namibia itself and in the international arena, a rise that was especially marked in a situation in which Angola had ceased to be a "buffer" between Namibia and independent African countries, forced the FRG authorities to hasten to seek contacts with this organization. The methods used to this end deserve consideration since they were characteristic of the attitude of the FRG ruling quarters in general to the national liberation fighters during that period.

In 1975 the West German government sent to SWAPO three air tickets along with a lot of dried fish as "material assistance". When word of this reached the SWAPO leaders while the cargo was still on the way, they categorically refused to accept it, declaring that it was first necessary for the FRG to clarify its political position on Namibia. It was only after this that SWAPO was officially invited to send a delegation to the FRG, an invitation which was also turned down.

A few days later SPD leaders tried to establish contacts with SWAPO. They invited a SWAPO delegation to the party's regular congress, which was held in Mannheim. But the SWAPO leadership again declined, stating that the FRG government should first end support for South Africa and, among other things, close its consulate in the Namibian capital of Windhoek. This fact shows, on the one hand, that the SPD had not learned any lesson from the failure of its 1973 attempt to pressure FRELIMO and, on the other, that the actions of the government and the party machine were closely coordinated.

The FRG leadership justified its policy of preserving and developing ties with South Africa by its desire to enter into dialogue with the Pretoria regime in order to ensure that one day "participation in the supreme power of the State by the black and mixed part of the population" would be attained. It underscored that the FRG could achieve more as a "political friend" than as a "political opponent" of South Africa.¹⁵² This policy had also been pursued during the first UN General Assembly session following

the FRG's admission to the UN when its delegation had refused to back concrete measures to isolate the racist regimes.

The West German press noted in this connection that the UN General Assembly recommendation would alter nothing in the FRG government's fundamental opposition, and that Bonn had confirmed that, on the one hand, the government condemned apartheid and considered South African domination in Namibia illegal, and, on the other, did not see any possibility of limiting trade with South Africa.

The country's progressives were increasingly outraged by the policy of the SPD-FDP coalition government on southern Africa. On the initiative of a number of public organizations, primarily the Committee of Anti-Imperialist Solidarity with Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Anti-Apartheid Movement, a "Tribunal Against Colonialism and Apartheid" was held in Bonn in February 1975 and, in the words of *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, accused the Federal government of "furthering South Africa's racial policy in spite of statements to the contrary".¹⁵³

The social reformist Israel Labour Party also cooperated actively with the apartheid regime, the ILP-led government elevating its diplomatic relations with South Africa from the consular to embassy level. The volume of trade between the two countries increased from three to 100 million rands from 1966 to 1974. During the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973, the South African authorities allowed 50 million rands collected by Zionists to be transferred to Israel despite strict restrictions on currency export from the country. Military cooperation between the two countries also expanded. A report by a UN Special Committee Against Apartheid stated that "senior Israeli military officers visit South Africa regularly to lecture South African officers on modern warfare and counter-insurgency techniques".¹⁵⁴

In April 1976 South African Prime Minister Balthazar Vorster journeyed to Israel formally to visit holy sites. Following this, a joint ministerial commission was set up to discuss economic cooperation and trade.

The development of many-sided ties with South Africa did not prevent the Labour Party, along with other SI members, from voting at SI congresses and conferences in favour of resolutions condemning apartheid and calling for assistance to its opponents. With respect to practical measures, the leadership of the Israeli Social Democrats made but one—very unsuccessful—attempt to act as "fighters" against colonialism and apartheid. In early 1971 it was announced that Israel would contribute about £1,000 to the OAU Fund. Foreign Minister Abba Eban expressing confidence

that the OAU Ministerial Council session would refrain from condemning Israel, while Israel's general consul in South Africa spoke of "a political credit [in Africa. — V.B.] which is vital to our national interests".¹⁵⁵

However, this step was immediately assessed by the leadership of the OAU and the national liberation movements as a manoeuvre designed to soften criticism against Israel for cooperating with South Africa and for its continued occupation of Arab lands. Three weeks later it was announced that Israel had decided "not to deliver the gift to the OAU, because no reply was received to its offer and no reply was now expected".¹⁵⁶

Even African SI member parties—the Social Democratic Party of Madagascar and the Labour Party of Mauritius—pursued a policy of developing ties with the South African racist regime.

While opposing the colonial racist regimes in words, the Malagasy Social Democrats, led by President Philibert Tsiranana, were indeed actively developing economic and political ties with South Africa. For example, from 1969 there had been a regular exchange of high-level delegations with the racist regime, but this was no obstacle to support from the leadership of the SI, whose representatives regularly visited Madagascar and lauded Tsiranana and his policy in the SI press. It was only after the Tsiranana regime fell in 1972 that the SI organ began to criticize his policy toward South Africa.

The December 1972 SI Bureau session recommended for SI membership, instead of the Social Democratic Party, the Malagasy Socialist Union, which had been founded by former PSD General Secretary Andre Resampa. The new party was called a "great new hope for international socialism", but this "new hope" soon united with the "old", i.e. with Tsiranana's party, to form the so-called Malagasy Socialist Party, which was also recommended for SI membership although Tsiranana, who had discredited himself by his contacts with the racists, became its chairman.

The complete failure of the SI-linked reformists in Madagascar occurred in 1975 when the country's progressive forces, led by Didier Ratsiraka, came to power. They embarked on a firm policy of support for the national liberation movements in southern Africa and began to provide them with practical assistance.

Openly favouring cooperation with the racists was the Mauritian Social Democratic Party, which for a number of years previous to 1967 had had observer status in the Socialist International and later participated in SI-supported meetings of African social reformists. In 1966 the Labour Party of Mauritius, which had been in government since independence, became an SI member.

However, far from limiting the ties, established with South Africa in the years of British colonial domination, it promoted them.

In 1971 ANC Secretary General Alfred Nzo sent Mauritian Prime Minister S. Ramgoolam a letter expressing concern over Mauritius's growing friendship with South Africa and hope that "the government of Mauritius can change its foreign policy which puts it on a collision course not only with the oppressed millions in South Africa but also with the rest of peace and freedom-loving mankind".¹⁵⁷

The response received from the Mauritian Labour leader was published in *Sechaba* under the headline "We Are with You BUT...". It justified Mauritius's position at the UN in support of Britain by a reluctance to discriminate "against Great Britain only" by singling it out from among the countries selling arms to South Africa, while trade with Pretoria was said to be continuing because it had existed for so long.¹⁵⁸

* * *

The collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire and the creation of the People's Republic of Mozambique and the People's Republic of Angola radically changed the alignment of political forces in southern Africa and created favourable prospects for the development of the national liberation movements in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The "buffer zone" of Portuguese colonial possessions, which had fenced off territories controlled by the Pretoria and Salisbury regimes, ceased to exist.

The defeat of the racists' intervention in Angola in late 1975-early 1976 was an enormous moral stimulus for those movements. The myth of South African troops' "invulnerability and absolute superiority" over the Africans was shattered.

With support from the Angolan government, the SWAPO leadership was able to strengthen the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, which began to deliver ever harder blows against the occupationist troops.

The Zimbabwean patriots' armed actions were invigorated following the breakdown of the 1975 Rhodesian settlement talks, sponsored by the British Labour government.

The new political situation in southern Africa forced international social democracy to modify its policy. Although the SI supreme bodies were on the whole passive in the period between the 12th and 13th congresses, it should be noted that the London session (29-30 May 1976) of its Bureau decided to set up a Special

Committee on Southern Africa composed of representatives of the British Labour Party, the Dutch Party of Labour, the SAP, the SPD and the Socialist Party of Austria. The Committee was charged to work in close cooperation with the liberation movements and make specific recommendations to the Bureau, paying primary attention to Namibia and Zimbabwe.

Thus, the SI leadership recognized the need to agree its policy with the organizations heading the struggle of the peoples in southern Africa. The highlighting of Namibia and Zimbabwe reflected the opinion widespread in the West (and among "moderate" politicians in Africa itself) regarding the fundamental difference between the problems of South Africa (where it was supposedly only a matter of removing apartheid and not of the oppressed majority achieving national liberation) and those of other countries of the region. However, events in South Africa soon showed clearly that the situation in that country was very acute.

A manifestation of the broadening movement of South Africa's oppressed masses against the hated apartheid regime was the action by African students against the teaching of some subjects in Afrikaans. In an effort to stem the tide of the anti-apartheid actions, demonstrate to the oppressed masses the strength of the regime and simultaneously enhance the government's declining prestige among the white population and its foreign patrons, the Pretoria authorities opened fire on the peaceful demonstration of schoolchildren in the Johannesburg African township of Soweto on 16 June 1976.

Those events and the ensuing clashes between the police and demonstrators in other African townships caused an outcry among the international community, including Social Democrats.

The leadership of the Socialist International and its individual parties also condemned the actions of the South African authorities, but once again criticism of the Pretoria regime was not accompanied by concrete measures to end cooperation with it on the part of the social democratic leaders. On the contrary, despite public protest, the FRG government agreed to go ahead with a planned meeting between Vorster and US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in West Germany. The FRG authorities took measures to protect Vorster from demonstrators. His plane landed at an air force base in Cologne, from where Vorster was whisked to Bonn to pay a "courtesy call" on Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.

Thus, the Social Democrat-led FRG coalition government facilitated South Africa's diplomatic efforts and welcomed envoys of the apartheid regime in the FRG in the most tragic days of the Soweto events.

This was done in spite of strong protests within the SPD. Thus, the Young Socialists condemned the planned Vorster-Schmidt meeting and urged the Social Democrats in the government not to have contact with the South African premier. The FRG Anti-Apartheid Movement, which included Social Democrats, organized a press conference with the participation of spokesmen from the ANC, SWAPO, and Young Socialists. It is appropriate to add that when progressive forces were demonstrating against Vorster's visit, supporters of the neofascist National Democratic Party tried to organize a counterdemonstration. Thus, the SPD's stance on the Vorster visit was actually backed by the extreme right.

These differences in the SPD ranks might be regarded as an example of the increased dissatisfaction in most SI member parties with the gap between the declarations and real actions of the leadership, and of criticism, in Olof Palme's words, of their "at best dubious position on the liquidation of colonial domination".¹⁵⁹

On the whole, the evolution of international social democracy's policy on South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia in the 60s and the first half of the 70s was in the main completed parallel with the change in their attitude to the independence struggle in Portuguese colonies. At the same time, the pragmatism typical of the social democratic parties and the fact that they, as a rule, lagged behind international events resulted in that their relations with the national liberation movements of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia began to develop later than those with the MPLA, FRELIMO and PAIGC, whose successes in that period were more tangible.

The long transition from the position of actual foes of the national liberation movements, typical of major social democratic parties in the early 1960s, to an understanding of the need to make friends with the organizations heading the national liberation struggle did not lead in the period under review to specific proposals for SI action in southern Africa. This was the task the leaders of international social democracy came to face following the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire. This coincided with an enlivening of the SI's activity connected with preparations for its 13th Congress and with changes in its leadership.

NOTES

¹*Yearbook of the International Socialist Labour Movement 1956-1957*, Publishing Company Limited, London, 1956, p. 44.

²*Socialist International Information (SII)*, Vol. XI, No. 44-45, 1961, p. 683.

³*SII*, Vol. XII, No. 2, 1962, p. 16.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁵*Ibid.*, Vol. XII, No. 28, 1963, p. 413.

⁶*Ibid.*, Vol. XII, No. 24-25, 1962, p. 363.

⁷*Ibid.*, Vol. XIII, No. 39-40, 1963, p. 579.

⁸*Ibid.*, Vol. XIII, No. 9-10, 1966, p. 108.

⁹*Ibid.*, Vol. XI, No. 41, 1961, p. 642.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, Vol. XIII, No. 13, 1963, p. 201.

¹¹*Ibid.*, Vol. XIV, No. 22, 1964, p. 244.

¹²*Mozambican Revolution*, Dar es Salaam, No. 10, September 1964, p. 13.

¹³*Ibid.*, No. 14, January 1965, p. 11.

¹⁴*SII*, Vol. XIII, No. 46-47, 1960, p. 680.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 681.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, Vol. XVIII, No. 5, 1968, p. 17.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, Vol. XVI, No. 5, 1966, p. 62.

¹⁸*Africa Bureau Fact Sheet*, No. 52, November/December 1977.

¹⁹*SII*, Vol. XIX, No. 1, 1969, p. 15.

²⁰*Africa Report*, Vol. 13, No. 7, October 1968, p. 72.

²¹*SII*, Vol. XIX, No. 11, 1969, p. 111.

²²*Socialist Affairs*, No. 1, 1973, p. 5.

²³*SII*, Vol. XIX, No. 15, 1969, p. 165.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 175.

²⁵*Ibid.*, Vol. XIX, No. 14, 1969, p. 141.

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 214.

²⁷*SII*, Vol. XX, No. 6, 1970, p. 78.

²⁸*Ibid.*, Vol. XIX, No. 1, 1969, p. 15; No. 18-19, p. 217.

²⁹*Ibid.*, Vol. XIX, No. 16-17, 1969, p. 198.

³⁰*Socialist Affairs*, No. 5-6, 1971, p. 108.

³¹*Ibid.*, No. 8, 1971, p. 156.

³²*Mozambique Liberation Front Statement. Nato Meeting in Portugal*, Dar es Salaam, May 22, 1971.

³³*Angola in Arms*, Dar es Salaam, Vol. 2, No. 6, 1971, p. 7.

³⁴*PAIGC Rapport bref sur la situation de la lutte (Janvier-Août 1971)*, Conakry, 1971, p. 18.

³⁵*Socialist Affairs*, No. 10-11, 1971, p. 217.

³⁶*Ibid.*, No. 9, 1971, p. 186.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 223.

³⁸*Ibid.*, No. 1, 1972, p. 11.

³⁹*Vienna Congress of the Socialist International, June 1972. Commission on Development, Introductory Address by K.B. Andersen*, pp. 10-11.

⁴⁰*Europe and the Third World*, Speech by Joan Lestor (British Labour Party) to the Congress of the Socialist International, Vienna, 28 June 1972, p. 2.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁴²*The Guardian*, June 30, 1972.

⁴³*Socialist Affairs*, No. 6-8, 1972 p. 116.

⁴⁴*Tribune*, July 7, 1972, p. 12.

⁴⁵*The UN-OAU Conference on Southern Africa, Oslo, 9-14 April 1973*, Vol. 1, *Programme of Action and Conference Proceedings*, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1973, p. 249.

- ⁴⁶*SII*, Vol. XX, No. 6, 1970, p. 78.
⁴⁷*Ibid.*, No. 9-10, 1970, p. 140.
⁴⁸*Mozambique Revolution*, No. 56, 1973, pp. 20-21.
⁴⁹*Revolution Africaine*, May 3, 1973.
⁵⁰*Mozambique Revolution*, No. 50, 1972, p. 13.
⁵¹*Ibid.*, No. 56, 1973, pp. 20-21.
⁵²*Ibid.*, p. 21.
⁵³Quoted in: *German Committee for Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, Circular Letter*, Bonn, August 13, 1973.
⁵⁴*Daily News*, Dar es Salaam, August 20, 1973.
⁵⁵*Africa Bureau Fact Sheet*, No. 52, November/December 1977.
⁵⁶*The UN-OAU Conference on Southern Africa, Oslo, 9-14 April 1973*, Vol. 1, p. 246.
⁵⁷*Ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 212, 213.
⁵⁸*Facts and Reports*, Amsterdam, No. 4, 1974, p. 7.
⁵⁹*Ibid.*, No. 6, 1974, p. 15.
⁶⁰*Ibid.*, No. 23, 1973, p. 16.
⁶¹*Dagens Nyheter*, February 16, 1974.
⁶²*Socialist Affairs*, No. 4, 1974, p. 57.
⁶³*Facts and Reports*, Vol. 4, No. 12, 1974, p. 4.
⁶⁴*The Christian Science Monitor*, February 2, 1976.
⁶⁵*The New York Times*, March 17, 1976.
⁶⁶*The Sunday Telegraph*, February 6, 1977.
⁶⁷*Morning Star*, February 11, 1976.
⁶⁸*The Times*, January 29, 1976.
⁶⁹*Tribune*, December 26, 1975.
⁷⁰*Dagens Nyheter*, February 4, 1976.
⁷¹Olof Palme, *Le rendez-vous suédois. Conversations avec Serge Richard*, Editions Stock, Paris, 1976, p. 190.
⁷²*South African Communists Speak. Documents from the History of the South African Communist Party 1915-1980*, London, Inkululeko Publications, 1981, p. 284.
⁷³*SII*, Vol. X, No. 19-20, 1960, p. 292.
⁷⁴*Ibid.*, Vol. XI, No. 41-45, 1961, p. 682.
⁷⁵*Ibid.*, p. 683.
⁷⁶*Ibid.*, Vol. XI, No. 39-40, 1961, p. 608.
⁷⁷*Ibid.*, Vol. XIII, No. 24-25, 1962, p. 363.
⁷⁸*Ibid.*, Vol. XIII, No. 11, 1963, p. 172.
⁷⁹*Ibid.*, Vol. XIII, No. 39-40, 1963, p. 581.
⁸⁰*Ibid.*, Vol. XIV, No. 18-19, 1964, pp. 113-116.
⁸¹*Ibid.*, Vol. IV, No. 20-21, 1964, p. 221.
⁸²*Ibid.*, Vol. X, No. 46-47, 1960, pp. 676-678.
⁸³*Sechaba*, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1, 1967, p. 9.
⁸⁴Nelson Mandela, *The Struggle Is My Life, International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa*, London, 1978, p. 164.
⁸⁵*SII*, Vol. XII, No. 41-42, 1962, p. 612.
⁸⁶*Ibid.*, Vol. XIII, No. 31-32, 1963, p. 452.
⁸⁷*The African Communist*, Vol. II, No. 3, 1963, pp. 74, 76.
⁸⁸*SII*, Vol. XIII, No. 13, 1963, p. 201.

- ⁸⁹*SII*, Vol. XIII, No. 41, 1963, p. 605.
⁹⁰*Ibid.*, Vol. XIV, No. 14, 1964, p. 166.
⁹¹*The African Communist*, No. 19, 1964, p. 12.
⁹²*Ibid.*, No. 20, 1965, p. 10.
⁹³*SII*, Vol. XIV, No. 24, 1964, p. 270.
⁹⁴*Ibid.*, Vol. XV, No. 21, 1965, p. 225.
⁹⁵*Ibid.*, Vol. XV, No. 23, 1965, p. 252.
⁹⁶*The African Communist*, No. 24, 1966, p. 28.
⁹⁷*Ibid.*, No. 23, 1965, p. 5.
⁹⁸*SII*, Vol. XVI, No. 1, 1966, p. 9.
⁹⁹*The African Communist*, No. 24, 1966, p. 25.
¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, p. 30.
¹⁰¹*SII*, Vol. XV, No. 24, 1965, p. 265.
¹⁰²*Ibid.*, p. 267.
¹⁰³*SII*, Vol. XVI, No. 6-7, 1966, p. 66.
¹⁰⁴*Ibid.*, p. 109.
¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*, p. 110.
¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, Vol. XVI, No. 9-10, 1966, p. 102.
¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 108-109.
¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, Vol. XVI, No. 18, 1966, p. 191.
¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*
¹¹⁰*The African Communist*, No. 33, 1968, p. 8.
¹¹¹*SII*, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, 1968, p. 7.
¹¹²*Ibid.*, Vol. XVIII, No. 23-24, 1968, p. 278.
¹¹³*Ibid.*, No. 19-20, 1968, p. 226.
¹¹⁴*The African Communist*, No. 28, 1967, p. 7.
¹¹⁵*SII*, Vol. XVIII, No. 16-17, 1968, p. 197.
¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 209.
¹¹⁷*SII*, Vol. XIII, No. 43, 1963, p. 626.
¹¹⁸*Ibid.*, Vol. XIV, No. 14, 1964, p. 167.
¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, Vol. XIX, No. 18-19, 1969, p. 224.
¹²⁰*Ibid.*, Vol. XIX, No. 11, 1969, p. 173.
¹²¹See *SII*, Vol. XIX, No. 5, 1969, p. 141.
¹²²*Sechaba*, Vol. 3, No. 5, May 1969, p. 9.
¹²³Kader and Louise Asmal, *Anti-Apartheid Movements in Western Europe. Notes and Documents*, United Nations Unit on Apartheid. Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, No. 4, New York, 1974, p. 5.
¹²⁴*Socialist Affairs*, No. 5-6, 1971, p. 97.
¹²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 108.
¹²⁶*SII*, Vol. XX, No. 9-10, 1970, p. 138.
¹²⁷*Socialist Affairs*, No. 12, 1971, p. 236.
¹²⁸*Sechaba*, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 1971, p. 13.
¹²⁹*Ibid.*
¹³⁰*Socialist Affairs*, No. 3, 1972, p. 72.
¹³¹*Europe and the Third World*, Speech by Joan Lestor to the Congress of the S.I., Vienna, 28 June 1972.
¹³²*The African Communist*, No. 43, 1973, p. 64.
¹³³*Ibid.*, No. 55, p. 67.

- ¹³⁴*The African Communist*, No. 55, p. 62.
¹³⁵*Ibid.*, No. 60, 1975, p. 57.
¹³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 58.
¹³⁷*Sechaba*, Vol. 9, No. 1, January 1975, p. 21.
¹³⁸*The African Communist*, No. 64, 1976, p. 99.
¹³⁹See: *ibid.*, p. 98.
¹⁴⁰Samora Moises Machel, *O Partido e as classes trabalhadoras mocambicanas na edificacao da democracia popular. Relatorio do Comite Central ao III Congresso da FRELIMO*, Departamento do Trabalho Ideologico da FRELIMO, Maputo, 1978, p. 24.
¹⁴¹*The UN-OAU Conference on Southern Africa, Oslo, 9-14 April, 1973*, Vol. I, p. 131.
¹⁴²*Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 305-306.
¹⁴³*Socialist Affairs*, No. 8, 1971, p. 156.
¹⁴⁴*Ibid.*, No. 4, 1975, pp. 72, 79.
¹⁴⁵*Congres doctrinal PSB 74. Bruxelles, 16 et 17 novembre 1974*, pp. 156, 155.
¹⁴⁶*The Times*, May 25, 1973.
¹⁴⁷*The African Communist*, No. 61, 1975, p. 97.
¹⁴⁸*Sechaba*, Vol. 4, No. 6, June 1970, p. 20.
¹⁴⁹*Ibid.*, Vol. 6, No. 5, May 1972, p. 57.
¹⁵⁰*Sechaba*, a special issue, Vol. 9, No. 11-12, November/December 1975.
¹⁵¹*Namibia News*, Vol. 7, No. 3-5, 1974, p. 9.
¹⁵²*Sechaba*, Vol. 10, No. 10, 1975, p. 10.
¹⁵³*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, February 17, 1975.
¹⁵⁴Cited from: *The African Communist*, No. 66, 1976, p. 16.
¹⁵⁵*Sechaba*, Vol. 5, No. 9, 1971, p. 10.
¹⁵⁶*Ibid.*
¹⁵⁷*Ibid.*, No. 6, 1971, p. 7.
¹⁵⁸See: *ibid.*, No. 7, p. 7.
¹⁵⁹*L'Humanité*, November 26, 1976.

CHAPTER TWO

MOVING FORWARD OR MARKING TIME? (1976-1984)

1. The SI Programme of Action on Southern Africa

The achievement of independence by Angola, Mozambique and the other Portuguese colonies, and the coming to power of progressive forces in those countries showed that it was unrealistic of the Western monopolies to expect to continue exploiting the oppressed majority in southern Africa in cooperation with the racist colonial regimes. It became even more obvious to the leadership of international social democracy that their earlier line had no prospects and that it was necessary urgently to alter it and establish and strengthen contacts with the national liberation movements in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe.

This reassessment took place in conditions of international detente, when the influence of old anti-communist dogmas in the Social Democrats' ranks was steadily diminishing. At the same time the aggravated economic and social contradictions in the capitalist countries and especially the oil crisis of the mid-70s showed the masses of Western Europe the direct link between their daily life and the problems of the developing countries.

Pressure on the part of rank-and-file Social Democrats, workers above all, and also the progressive students and intellectuals, played a very important role in the evolution of international social democracy's position on southern Africa. As was said earlier, the anti-apartheid movements, solidarity committees and support groups for the national liberation organizations set up in the West (in most cases with the Communists' active participation) acted as a kind of catalyst of this process.

Pressure from below on the social democratic leaders particularly intensified following the events in Angola at the end of 1975-beginning of 1976. The truth about the intervention carried out by South Africa with the backing of the major Western powers, which hid behind a slogan of "noninterference", helped the West European public to realize the threat to peace posed by South Africa, and intensified the demands to isolate the Pretoria regime.

In the ranks of social democracy, those who had earlier established ties with the national liberation movements were in a more favourable situation. At the party leadership level these were primarily the SAP leaders, headed by Olof Palme. It is therefore not surprising that it was Palme who initiated international social democracy's programme on the problems of southern Africa.

His proposals on SI action in that region were put forward in the article "The Future of Southern Africa" in *Socialist Affairs* soon after the defeat of the South African intervention in Angola and the Soweto events. Referring to the experience of struggle of the peoples of Vietnam and the former Portuguese colonies, Palme wrote: "The liberation struggle can be restrained for a time by superior force, but sooner or later people's longing for freedom will break out... Efforts to stem the tide of this development serve only to intensify conflicts and attitudes and to impede future co-operation between peoples and countries. Instead, we should assist the nations in their efforts to gain independence and social justice".

Palme believed that the Social Democrats should, in the interests of peace, freedom and social justice in southern Africa, press for "...a binding UN resolution prohibiting all exports of arms to South Africa and all military collaboration with South Africa"; support for the liberation movements and independent African states; struggle against the illegal occupation of Namibia and support for SWAPO. Palme expressed concern over the "persistent foreign attempts to sabotage Angola's independence in what is alleged to be a struggle against communism".

The Swedish social democratic leader posed the question of other measures against South Africa, in addition to the arms embargo, in general terms. He urged the use of "every possible opportunity at the United Nations of conducting an effective policy of isolation and sanctions against South Africa," and discussion of companies' representation and their investments in South Africa, but did not directly advocate an end to investment.

Although Palme's proposals went toward meeting the national liberation movements' demands, they were accompanied by an inaccurate assessment of the political situation in southern Africa and possible developments in that region. In his opinion, the alternative to peaceful eradication of colonialism, racism and apartheid was a destructive racial war. In other words, the armed actions of the Zimbabwean, Namibian and South African patriots were equated with participation in racial conflict. The efforts to isolate the racist regimes, including the measures which he himself proposed, were thereby not regarded as an addition to the resolute

struggle of the southern African peoples but rather were opposed to that struggle, as it were.

Declaring that interference in the affairs of Angola under the pretext of combating communism was inadmissible, Palme warned of the "serious risk of Africa becoming a new battlefield between east and west".¹ However, if Africa, particularly the south of the continent, is indeed a battlefield, it is a field of battle between the forces of colonialism and apartheid, backed by the imperialist circles, and the forces of national liberation, supported by socialist countries and progressive forces worldwide, including in Western countries.

Urging Western powers to show restraint with regard to possible involvement "on behalf of the white dictatorship", Palme warned that "such involvement would encourage the other superpower to become more active in the area".² Such an attempt to place Western and Soviet policy in the same category seemed particularly unconvincing in an article which began with recognition of the significance of the victories of the peoples of Vietnam and the Portuguese colonies, scored, it should be recalled, with the assistance of the socialist countries.

The first resolution calling for sanctions against South Africa had been passed by the UN General Assembly on 4 November 1962. Measures proposed by Palme 14 years later were in some points less decisive than those which had long been approved by the international community and implemented by most countries, above all socialist countries and many African and Asian states.

Proposals on a southern Africa policy were elaborated in other social democratic parties as well following the collapse of Portuguese colonialism. The 1976 Labour's Programme for Britain envisaged specific recommendations to the government on southern Africa. It outlined plans to introduce majority rule in Rhodesia over a long transition period (from one and a half to two years) before the holding of general elections. It was recognized that "if there is no ordered progress to majority rule there will be no alternative to guerrilla struggle",³ but no mention was made of the need to support the national liberation movements.

The Labour Party's policy for South Africa included "humanitarian, financial and material aid to the African liberation movements, the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress", a tightening of "the ban on arms sales to include technical knowledge and spares, and equipment to enhance its military capability", an end "of all relationships with South African security forces", prohibition of "all further investment by British companies in South Africa", investigation of "the possibility of nationalized

industries withdrawing their investments from South Africa", withdrawal of "all British banks from South Africa", and "work at the UN towards a mandatory ban on all trade with apartheid South Africa". It was emphasized that a solution to the South African problem lay in the hands of the people themselves, and that Britain was "clearly and unequivocally on the side of those who are seeking liberation".⁴

There were also specific measures in relation to Namibia. The "limited government aid given to SWAPO" was welcomed, but at the same time it was stated: "We do not believe that present government policy places us 'clearly and unequivocally on the side of those who are seeking liberation'."⁵ Recognizing that "the current South African occupation of Namibia poses a threat to peace", the Programme stressed that "the United Kingdom should support action in the Security Council under Chapter VII Article 39 of the United Nations Charter in order to make South Africa end this threat and comply with the decision of the United Nations".⁶

Among the proposed measures to end cooperation with South Africa in exploiting Namibia was a review of the contract to purchase Namibian uranium concluded between the Rio Tinto Zinc company and the South African Atomic Energy Board.

The Labour programme welcomed independence for Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola, claiming, contrary to the facts (some of which were cited in Chapter One), that the Labour Party had long had friendly ties with the ruling parties of those countries—the PAIGC, FRELIMO and MPLA.

On the whole the Labour's proposals were fairly similar to those of Palme. On some questions, for example withdrawal of investments from South Africa, they even went further, while on Rhodesia their position was more moderate.

A new policy on southern Africa was favoured by the SPD as well. In 1975, Erhard Eppler called for "generous economic assistance to independent Mozambique and, as far as possible, to Angola", for close economic and political cooperation with other independent African countries, supporting their efforts to put an "early and bloodless" end to the domination of apartheid, and for a cessation of all steps which the South African government could interpret as approval of apartheid.

Without directly raising the question of ending investment in South Africa, Eppler recommended that it should be explained to investors in South Africa and to West German citizens "wanting to settle" in Namibia that "the aggravation of racial contradictions there was very dangerous".⁷ Egon Bahr, SPD Federal Secretary

from 1976, took a similar position. While advocating financial support for the national liberation forces and assistance in the training of personnel "to run the government", he maintained that investment in South Africa should not be prohibited but merely "not recommended". He justified contacts with Pretoria by the need to protect West German citizens and persons of German origin living in Namibia.⁸ A special resolution on southern Africa was officially approved on 22 November 1976 by the SPD Board on the eve of the 13th SI Congress. Underlying it was the foreign policy resolution unanimously adopted at the 1975 Mannheim Congress, which, among other things, assured the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America of solidarity with "their striving for self-determination and liberation" and demanded "an end to racist minority rule".⁹ The SPD Board recognized the inevitability of change in southern Africa and noted that "passiveness will not halt the just development of history".

The resolution said that the SPD cooperated with the liberation movements and other forces advocating majority rule and was in favour of moral, political and economic support for that struggle and peaceful establishment of majority rule. But in conditions in which all southern African national liberation movements were forced to take up arms to attain their peoples' freedom, mention of support for other forces, with special stress on peaceful settlement, could mean, on the one hand, pressure on the national liberation movements to change their policy, and, on the other, readiness to encourage the reformist elements in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe.

This conclusion is confirmed by the FRG ruling circles' support for the group of renegades led by former SWAPO Executive Committee member Andreas Shipanga (he later headed the group calling itself "SWAPO-Democrats", which the South African authorities used to undermine the national liberation movement, and even became a "minister" in the puppet "provisional government" set up by the racists in Namibia in 1985). In the words of Sam Nujoma, the problem within SWAPO in 1976 "came about as a consequence of a well coordinated, well financed conspiracy by the South African regime and its imperialist allies, especially West Germany".¹⁰

In a very veiled form the SPD Board also expressed concern over the activity of FRG monopolies in South Africa: "The white minorities are asked to make an end to racism and force. Only in this way different forms of reprisal and force will be avoided. From this point of view we have to see German capital in the private economy of the South African Republic."¹¹

Thus, international social democracy's position remained nowhere near a united one. While in Sweden the line of the leader of the social democratic government coincided with the party's official position, in Britain the relatively radical programme approved by the Labour Party's Executive Committee differed substantially from Labour government policy. Finally, in the FRG the proponents of ties with the national liberation forces in the SPD leadership expressed considerably more moderate views than their colleagues in other social democratic parties, which is why in preparing for the 13th Congress the SI leadership faced the task of bringing the various views to a "common denominator".

Shortly before the Congress opened, the September 1976 London session of the SI Bureau decided to prepare a report on the situation in southern Africa and then send a special mission to the region. Agreement was also reached to establish a Solidarity Fund of the Socialist International in Support of Southern African Liberation Movements. However, the SI organ subsequently carried no information about the fund.

The first session of the 13th Congress (Geneva, November 1976) elected Willy Brandt President, and Olof Palme a vice-president, specifically charging the latter to deal with the problems of Africa. Former SAP International Secretary Bernt Carlsson was elected SI General Secretary.

In his opening address Brandt hailed the movements currently fighting for peace, freedom and social justice in various parts of the globe, specifically mentioning southern Africa. He also spoke of plans to expand SI activity outside Europe and establish relations "with parties and movements of similar orientation in regions where conditions differ from our own traditional ones: in both parts of America, in Africa, in Asia."¹²

Olof Palme's entire speech dealt with the Social Democrats' attitude to the southern African liberation struggle. He rejected Vorster's claim that he was defending the interests of the free world, emphasizing that it was precisely the racist regimes that were to blame for the aggravation of the struggle in southern Africa.

At the same time, however, the SI vice-president spoke of the risks of "the wrong kind of foreign intervention", that is, "introduction of Major Powers rivalries in the region", opposing to it "the right kind of foreign intervention ... which will support the liberation struggle and reduce the stubborn resistance of the forces which still cling to the ideas of white supremacy".¹³ In this way doubt was cast on the USSR's support for the national liberation struggle.

Palme proposed that together with the ICFTU the Socialist International should "give support to black trade unions and student movements in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe".¹⁴

In reality, however, ICFTU members, including Sweden, often supported the conciliatory elements and organizations in the South African labour and student movements and undermined the role of the trade unions operating in close contact with the national liberation forces.

Palme declared at the Congress that "the Zimbabwe representatives at the Geneva Conference [which was taking place simultaneously with the Congress. — V.B.] should feel that the Socialist International is firmly on their side".¹⁵

But he did not mention the Patriotic Front, while both Muzorewa and Sithole, who by that time had become accomplices of the racists, were also claiming to represent Zimbabwe at the Geneva Conference.

A comparison of Palme's articles and speeches on southern Africa with the corresponding section of the 13th Congress's political resolution¹⁶ shows that it was they which underlay the SI position. That Congress was the first to point to the need to give assistance to a specific national liberation organization — SWAPO.

With respect to Zimbabwe, it said only that the Socialist International was firmly committed to the principle of majority rule based on universal and equal suffrage, and expressed the hope that this would be achieved in a very short time. There was good reason why Zimbabwe's liberation movements were not mentioned on this occasion: unlike the ANC and SWAPO they had not been invited to the 13th Congress. Although all true friends of the Zimbabwean people welcomed the September 1976 foundation of the Patriotic Front, which united ZANU and ZAPU, the SI leadership was in no hurry to determine its position in relation to the front.

The 13th Congress resolution noted that "neutrality towards the existing and coming struggles in southern Africa is impossible" because "between the exploiters and the exploited there is no middle ground". However, the Social Democrats saw this struggle itself as "a battleground for great-power rivalry"¹⁷ on which "the peoples of Africa must not become the pawns". In a *Pravda* article Yu. Zhilin wrote in this connection: "Telling the people of South Africa that they 'must not become the pawns of great-power confrontation' means not only underestimating the present level of their national consciousness, and moreover forgetting that the pawns had already checkmated almost all the white kings of colonial empires, under whose banner quite a few social democratic

figures were fighting. It also means attempting to disorient them in the real and difficult political struggle — an attempt which, though fruitless, is harmful.”¹⁸

The response of the social democratic press to the Congress laid special emphasis on the attention which had been paid to expanding ties with political forces outside Europe.

However, African parties were in no hurry to join the Socialist International. True, the Progressive Union of Senegal, soon renamed the Socialist Party, was admitted to membership in Geneva, and its leader, President Leopold Senghor, was elected an SI vice-president. But, given his position on the problems of southern Africa, especially his support for UNITA in Angola, this step by no means enhanced international social democracy's prestige in Africa.*

Following the 13th Congress, the social democratic leaders began to speak, as if it had been decided, of holding a broad conference of West European social democratic parties and political parties of independent African countries in Lusaka, the Zambian capital, in summer 1977. This conference was regarded as a continuation of the 1975 Caracas meeting of European and Latin American parties and as an expression of African leaders' readiness to have broad contacts with the SI. However, this initiative was not supported by the Africans, and it was not held either in 1977 or later.

The fact that the problem of southern Africa was a focus of attention at the 13th SI Congress was underscored by Olof Palme at the 23 March 1977 Security Council session. Repeating in the main his Geneva address, this time he took a step toward recognizing armed struggle, calling it the last possible resort of oppressed peoples: “Now, in Namibia and Zimbabwe, continued armed struggle seems to be unavoidable.” In his opinion, the quantity of “armed pressure” was dependent on “how much pressure the western powers apply in the form of sanctions and the like”.¹⁹ Yet he avoided the question of the oppressed South African population employing this form of struggle.

The SI Vice-President again proposed a major review of investment in and export of capital to South Africa and Namibia. He made reference to a resolution approved at the November 1976 Scandinavian Labour Congress (an association of social democratic parties and trade unions) which urged “a ban on all

* It was only four years later, at the 15th SI Congress in 1980, that the Voltese Progressive Front became an SI member, but a coup d'état occurred in the country soon after and political parties were banned.

new investments in South Africa, including the replacement of machinery, repairs and maintenance”.²⁰ Palme stated that a proposal to ban investments had been made by the Swedish government in August 1976, i.e. before the SAP was defeated at the parliamentary elections, and noted that this ban would be effective if it was supported by “those industrialized countries which have the largest economic interests in South African business and industry”.²¹

After his return from New York Palme attended the March 1977 SI Bureau session in London, which decided to send a mission under his leadership to front-line African countries.²² The mission included SI General Secretary Carlsson, and representatives of the socialist parties of Austria, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Portugal and France, the social democratic parties of Denmark and the FRG, and the Dominican Revolutionary Party.

The official aim of the trip was “to express the solidarity of the Socialist International with the liberation movement in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, to further the Socialist International's contacts with the Governments and parties of the front-line states and to study the reality in southern Africa on the spot”.²³

In September 1977 the delegation visited Angola, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania, where it met the leaders of those countries, the national liberation movements, and the OAU Liberation Committee. The report on the trip prepared for the SI Bureau²⁴ largely reflected the positions of Scandinavian social democracy we have looked at earlier. For example, it said that the continued existence of the racist regimes not only doomed millions of Africans to exploitation and oppression but also posed a threat to universal peace; that despite the declarations against the regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia they continued to receive arms, loans, credits, investments and other assistance. This showed that there was a contradiction between the words and the practical policy of Western powers.

Making reference to Zambian President Kaunda's pronouncements, the report recognized the liberation movements' right to receive support from socialist countries. However, like previous SI documents and speeches of SI leaders, it again paid tribute to the “superpower” theory, thereby placing Soviet support for the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle in the same category with US support for the South African authorities.

Unlike Palme's address to the UN Security Council, the report did not contain direct recognition of the southern African peoples' need to resort to armed struggle. It spoke in general terms only of support for the African peoples' struggle “on their own terms” and

said that "there is no reason for people from abroad to moralize about the resort to arms". But while declining to criticize the armed struggle, the SI mission did not take the next step of supporting it. On the contrary, they recommended giving material support to the freedom fighters precisely "for peaceful purposes".²⁵ The report stressed that the liberation movements "are not monolithic organizations". Indeed, they have the backing of various social strata, but the striving for unity has been part and parcel of their struggle. Hence this statement could only be assessed as an attempt to find certain elements in those organizations which would be suitable for the Social Democrats.

The mission's report contained specific proposals which were unanimously approved as the Socialist International's Programme of Action on southern Africa by the October 1977 Bureau session in Madrid (no liberation movements had, however, been invited to attend). Like the political part of the report, these proposals were in the main a repetition of Palme's ideas.

The Programme of Action proposed that the social democratic parties should seek to:

- halt all arms exports to South Africa and all military cooperation with its government; oppose the transfer of strategic technology to South Africa, including nuclear;
- prohibit new investments and export of capital to South Africa and Namibia;
- work for increased support to the front-line states;
- give political support, humanitarian aid and material support "for peaceful purposes" to the ANC, the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe, and SWAPO;
- encourage governments to contribute to helping the victims of apartheid, using, among other channels, the International Defence and Aid Fund, the International University Exchange Fund, and the UN Trust Fund;
- encourage governments to contribute to efforts in southern Africa towards regional cooperation;
- stop the flow of mercenaries to the racist regimes;
- intensify solidarity work for the liberation of southern Africa, each party starting a national solidarity campaign;
- assist popular movements working in support of the liberation struggle in southern Africa.

In themselves these points met demands of the national liberation movements, but by no means all of them. In some points the programme lagged behind resolutions long adopted by the UN General Assembly and other international organizations. Thus, the programme did not include the freedom fighters' demand for

comprehensive sanctions against and diplomatic isolation of the racist regimes. The economic proposals appeared quite limited too: they did not envisage an end to trade with South Africa or at least restrictions on it, nor was there any demand for withdrawal of investments from South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia, unlike, for example, a similar point in the World Council of Churches programme. Also avoided was the question of an oil embargo against South Africa, a move which could substantially weaken the military and punitive machine of the racist state.

It is not surprising therefore that the southern African liberation fighters were sceptical about the SI mission's report. *The African Communist* published an article which spoke in fairly strong terms about the SI's "betrayal" of the African national liberation movements throughout its history. "It is true that some Social Democratic Parties of Western Europe did give some material and moral aid to the liberation movements of the former Portuguese colonies," the article said. "But equally true is the fact that the defeat of Portuguese colonialism in Africa 'shocked' the Socialist International and 'activated' some of its sections, with the result that its Congress held in Geneva ... [proclaimed] a 'new approach'."²⁶

Recognition of the ANC, the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front and SWAPO was described by the magazine as "a shift of position", but the declared intentions were questioned because of the report's attempt to link the "modern scramble for Africa" with so-called "superpower rivalry": "Why do they [the authors of the report. — V.B.] not identify the enemy of the African people clearly as imperialism, colonialism, racism and capitalism? Have the socialist countries ever colonized Africa or attempted to involve themselves in a 'modern scramble for Africa'?... It is this 'new approach', cynical and 'subtle' as it is, that has dangers for Africa. We warn the African people against these 'new friends' and their allies in Africa," concluded the article.²⁷

2. And the Social Democrats' Real Actions

Let us now deal with the measures taken by the social democratic parties to fulfill the Programme of Action. To what extent were they able to influence their governments' policy on southern Africa and mobilize social forces to support the national liberation movements?

It should first of all be said that although the Palme-led delegation included all the leading SI parties and its report was

unanimously approved at a Bureau session, individual member parties did not include all its propositions in their own documents on southern Africa. Immediately after the Madrid session *Jeune Afrique* wrote: "It would be an illusion to bank too much on all the demands being approved by the 'fraternal parties', especially the British Labour Party and the Social Democratic Party of Germany."²⁸ Indeed, a special statement issued by the SPD leadership in connection with the UN-proclaimed Anti-Apartheid Year,²⁹ beginning 21 March 1978, differed substantially from the previously agreed SI document. For example, it did not mention the ANC or SWAPO, and with respect to the Patriotic Front spoke only of the need for it to participate in the Zimbabwe settlement talks. But the real moves of social democratic leaders were even further removed from the Programme of Action.

In November 1977 the UN Security Council passed a resolution on a mandatory embargo on arms deliveries to South Africa. Because the international community was outraged at the Pretoria authorities' banning a number of legal anti-apartheid organizations, the Western powers for the first time did not use their veto in the voting on this measure. However, military cooperation in fact continued between the leading Western powers and transnational monopolies, and the racist regime. The documents of the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid noted that South Africa was continuing to spend at least 25 per cent of its constantly growing military budget on foreign purchases, including in countries with social democratic governments.

In September 1979 the British Anti-Apartheid Movement made public the fact that the Plessey Company was not only supplying South Africa with electronic aircraft guidance equipment but also training its air force personnel on British territory. The Labour government that had been in power until May 1979 did not object to the company's actions, even though the Security Council resolution mentioned above pointed specially to the need to review contracts already concluded with Pretoria. Defending the Labour government, former Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Ted Rowlands declared that there always were grey areas where dual purpose equipment was used. This position assumed that it would be possible to violate the embargo by arguing that the equipment supplied could be used "for peaceful purposes".

Although the Labour government had officially announced in 1975 that the British Navy was no longer using the base in Simonstown, it continued to rent oil reservoirs at the base from South Africa, regularly restocking them from auxiliary vessels of the Royal

Navy. In spite of the Labour Party conference resolution, the government did not end the contract of Rio Tinto Zinc, which made that company the largest foreign shareholder in the Rossing uranium mine on Namibian territory. Britain also helped to organize uranium mining and uranium oxide production in South Africa itself.

Under the Callaghan government, cooperation continued between the intelligence and punitive organs of South Africa and Britain, contrary to the Labour programme. The South African press reported that "British experts ... on terrorism" had attended "security seminars" in South Africa on more than one occasion. The old ties between the South African and British police were not cut: in 1978 Soweto police chief Brigadier General Visser had a meeting with his "colleagues" at Scotland Yard.³⁰

Military strategic cooperation also continued between the FRG and South Africa. True, the demands of the progressive West German public did make the SPD-FDP coalition government try to get rid of the senior South African military attache — Rear Admiral Peter Bitzker — stationed in the FRG, a move which was seen in South Africa as "part of its plan to remove visible signs of military friendship with Pretoria".³¹ As to the invisible or, to be more precise, the carefully concealed "signs of friendship", many were listed during the 11-12 November 1978 Bonn Congress Against the Nuclear Cooperation Between the FRG and South Africa, which was held on the initiative of the Anti-Apartheid Movement and a number of other organizations, including the Young Socialists' working group. The broad preparation for the Congress and the collection of material on such topics as "Nuclear Collaboration FRG-SA", "Conventional-Military Collaboration FRG-SA", "Economic Collaboration FRG-SA", and "Political-Cultural Collaboration FRG-SA"³² forced the government to put out a special booklet three days before the Congress with the pretentious title "Fact v. Fiction", officially presenting it as a "rebuttal of the charges" made against the FRG.³³

However, along with the World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, an organization headed by A. Minty, a well-known specialist on South Africa, the FRG Anti-Apartheid Movement soon published a document entitled "Reply. Answer to a Denial of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning the Military-Nuclear Collaboration between the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa".

In the foreword to this document, Hashim Mbita of Tanzania, Executive Secretary of the OAU Liberation Committee, wrote:

"The apartheid clique and their friends have reduced the wealth and resources of South Africa to a mere instrument of aggression and destruction. One of the latest of such acts of aggression is the nuclear collaboration between the Federal Republic of Germany and apartheid South Africa — for which substantiating evidence is abundant. Simple common sense dictates that this crude deal between the Federal Republic of Germany and free Africa's arch-enemy could not be taken for anything else other than aggression against Africa."³⁴

The Anti-Apartheid Movement cited many new facts of cooperation between the West German government and monopolies, and the racist regime: large arms and ammunition deliveries from FRG army depots to South Africa facilitated by the Federal intelligence service, continuing deliveries of equipment for the uranium enrichment enterprises, financing by government organizations of trips by nuclear scientists from the FRG to South Africa, and so on. More than 120 pages of photocopies of documents were published in a supplement to the book.

The West German magazine *Stern* also confirmed subsequently that secret materiel deliveries from the FRG were continuing, reporting that in 1981 they constituted 20 per cent of total South African materiel imports. This took place with the connivance of the authorities. Thus, during the investigation by the Dusseldorf procurator's office into accusations that Rheinmetall was selling arms to South Africa and other "areas of tension" prohibited by the government, a company representative declared that all arms exports were approved by the Federal government, although the FRG Economics Ministry tried to deny this fact.

There is evidence of military cooperation between South Africa and other West European companies. Sizable lots of arms and materiel were shipped on Danish vessels to South African ports. In 1983 talks were held between the South African Navy and the Spanish state-owned Bazán company on repairing and modernizing in Spain three South African submarines originally bought in France. The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party government prohibited this deal but this did not mean a complete cessation of military ties with South Africa. That same year General Ramon Togere, Chief of Staff of the Spanish armed forces, paid a secret visit to Pretoria.

Further evidence of continuing contacts along military lines is provided by the fact that in 1980 South Africa had military attaches in Belgium, Austria, France, the FRG, Portugal, Britain and a number of other countries, while France, Portugal and Britain were among the seven states which had military attaches in

Pretoria. The Social Democrats who headed the governments in those countries took no measures whatsoever against this obvious violation of UN resolutions.

Social Democrat-led governments actively developed trade with South Africa. In Austria, for example, the Socialist Party government promoted the campaign to increase exports to South Africa started by the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber. The Anti-Apartheid Movement in Austria was especially alarmed at reports of deliveries of nuclear technology to South Africa.

Britain's trade with South Africa also expanded under the past Labour government. Although it officially advocated shifting British trade from South Africa to independent African countries, in 1978, Labour's last year in office, exports to South Africa rose by 14 per cent or twice as much as exports to Nigeria, which is Britain's largest trade partner in independent Africa. The British government itself facilitated this increase by financing the trips of numerous trade delegations to the Johannesburg trade fair. Under the Labour government Britain was always among the first three Western powers in volume of trade with South Africa.

In response to public criticism, for example from the Anti-Apartheid Movement, right-wing Labour politicians, like ex-Foreign Secretary David Owen, declared that business ties could not be liquidated overnight. In fact, however, they were helping to expand them. In late October 1977 when, at the request of African countries, the Security Council was discussing economic sanctions against South Africa, the *Daily Telegraph* wrote: "While the rhetoric flows in public in the UN debate on South Africa, British and American diplomats are co-operating behind the scenes to get a Security Council resolution that will not force either country to cast a veto. They are trying to persuade African members, and their supporters outside the 15 member council, to come up with a resolution that would stop short of opening the way to a total trade embargo at some later date."³⁵

Despite London's declared policy of economic boycott against Rhodesia, a number of British firms continued trade operations with Smith's racist regime, undismayed by a possible exposure. Thus, of the 35 cases of violation of sanctions brought to court, only two persons were given conditional jail sentences, while the rest were merely fined.

The Labour government was directly to blame for the continuing oil deliveries to Rhodesia. An OAU document noted that British Petroleum and Shell, with the unofficial approval of the Wilson government, arranged for a French company to deliver oil to Rhodesia on their behalf in the quantities and on the same

terms which had been directly agreed between them and the Rhodesian state purchasing company GENTA.

Not having favoured the proposal on an oil embargo against South Africa, neither did the Labour government prevent South African monopolies from purchasing shares in North Sea oil companies with a view to securing future oil deliveries from Britain. For that reason, when Labour shadow energy minister Ted Rowlands demanded in Parliament on 14 March 1981 that South African interests in North Sea oil should be liquidated, the Tories reminded him that it had been a prominent Labour left-winger and Energy Minister Anthony Benn who had given permission for shares to be acquired in oil companies. This fact showed yet again that left Labourites had limited possibilities for implementing the party's programme on southern Africa, even when they held ministerial posts.

The FRG continued to maintain most varied economic ties with South Africa. Despite the fact that the SPD had been represented on the SI mission to the front-line African states, that party's leadership essentially distanced itself from the economic measures proposed in the Programme of Action. The above-mentioned party Board statement on UN Anti-Apartheid Year spoke only of possible limitations on credit for exports to South Africa instead of an end to investment in that country. However, far from diminishing, both West German exports and imports continued to grow rapidly. In 1978 South Africa edged out Nigeria as the FRG's largest trading partner in Africa. Trade between West Germany and South Africa continued to increase.

The SPD-FDP coalition that ruled the FRG for 13 years tried to justify the maintenance and expansion of economic ties with the apartheid regime by references to the vital importance of raw material deliveries for the West German economy. Thus, an FRG Foreign Ministry report stated that interruption of supplies of South African industrial raw materials could have a "swift and devastating effect" on West German industry.³⁶

However, West German technical experts themselves admitted that this argument was weak. For example, while in South Africa, Dr. Karl Sames, head of the minerals division in the FRG Economics Ministry, noted in a *Financial Mail* interview that "West Germany's dependence on South African minerals is not as high as it is often regarded", and that interruption of supplies from South Africa would not mean "immediate collapse of our economy". Sames stated that, along with the FRG's large raw material stocks, "there are other sources available if South Africa should not deliver".³⁷

It was the West German industrialists' penetration of the South African market rather than fear of a raw material shortage which was the reason for Federal government policy: in 1980, 6,000 West German firms had representatives in South Africa, many of them servicing the racist military machine by transferring modern technology. Thus, Daimler-Benz offered South Africa an opportunity to begin producing a new type of diesel engines simultaneously with the FRG. Volkswagen and Shell participated with the South African chemical giant AECI Ltd., in developing a car engine run on methanol, a fuel that can be produced from low-quality coal, of which South Africa has huge stocks. Simultaneously, the West German firm Stamer Technik, part of the government-owned Motorenwerke Bremerhaven began to develop new methods of obtaining artificial liquid fuel jointly with South African companies. Combination of the coal processing technology developed in South Africa with the technological achievements of the West German firm was, according to South African press reports, to ensure the production of fuel from local raw material—sugar cane bagasse, sawdust, wood chips and groundnut husks. Thus, a firm controlled by the FRG social democratic government participated in implementing the Pretoria authorities' measures to thwart the oil boycott declared by most oil producing countries. Such actions ran counter to the line of the ANC, whose People's Army—Umkhonto we Sizwe—chose oil producing and processing plants as a very important target of its operations.

Material presented at the International Conference on Sanctions Against South Africa, convened by the UN and the OAU from 20 to 27 May 1981 in Paris, pointed out that the largest West German banks—Dresdener Bank (it acquired the Bank of South-West Africa, SWABANK, in Namibia), Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank—were active guides for their transnational clients that wanted to sell sophisticated technology to and invest capital in strategic sectors of the growing South African military-industrial complex. In a number of cases the coalition government itself, like the "grossbanks", acquired shares in West German firms which were expanding their investment in South Africa.

The FRG's economic ties with South Africa were criticized by the West German public, including SPD members. For example, in 1979 a Young Socialists delegation visited Zimbabwean refugee camps in Zambia raided by the Rhodesian Air Force. Delegation leader Michael Pape declared: "To really change the suffering of thousands of refugees, the Federal Republic should be willing to withdraw the help to terrorist and racist regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa ... through total economic boycott."³⁸ A corre-

spondent of the Johannesburg *Financial Mail* reported that a visit to the FRG Foreign Ministry left him in no doubt that "there has been a buildup of vociferous anti-South Africa [anti-racist. — V.B.] sentiment" and that "pressure from the left-wing of the SPD and in particular from the anti-apartheid movement to sever trade ties with South Africa and to disinvest" was mounting.³⁹ However, in the words of *Die Zeit* editor-in-chief Theo Sommer, "in practice the left is neutralized because of Germany's profound dependence on South Africa's raw materials".⁴⁰

Trade with South Africa was also growing in West European countries whose social democratic governments paid lip service to the desirability of reducing economic ties with that country. Thus, between 1976 and 1979 Denmark's purchases of South African coal grew more than 100-fold! Reporting this fact, the South African press made a point of noting that this was occurring "despite that country's active anti-South African stance". The so-called Danish Economic Fund, which maintained ties with 200 Danish companies, operated in Johannesburg. In 1980 alone, Denmark's exports to South Africa rose by 80 per cent, and imports by 70 per cent.

The condemnation of such actions by Bishop Desmond Tutu, Secretary General of the South African Council of Churches (now Archbishop of Capetown), drew a large response internationally, especially in Scandinavia. Said Tutu: "I find it rather disgraceful that Denmark is buying coal from South Africa and increasing its dependence on South Africa."⁴¹

In early 1980 the left opposition parties introduced in parliament a bill prohibiting oil purchases in countries pursuing an apartheid policy. However, at the very first reading Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen, who, incidentally, was a member of the SI delegation to southern Africa, declared that the government would not agree to unilateral sanctions against South Africa.

While purchasing coal in South Africa, Denmark also supplied it with oil drilled in the Danish part of the North Sea shelf. In this connection, the Danish Communists' newspaper wrote that the company had no intention of letting go the immense profits from oil deliveries. The apartheid regime paid it double tariffs since oil was a principal type of raw material for local industry.

In the late 70s Norway's exports to South Africa rose primarily because of the increased export of rare metals used in military industry. While expressing regret in this connection, a leader of the Norwegian Labour Party-affiliated trade unions stated that no action would be taken against the deliveries since several thousand Norwegian jobs could be affected. This declaration manifested a

desire, typical of many leading Social Democrats, to use workers' interests to justify their countries' cooperation with the racist regimes, even though left Social Democrats, like other progressive forces, believed that those interests could be safeguarded by reorienting economic ties, for example toward independent African countries.

For a number of years Norwegian tankers used false documents to secretly transport oil to South Africa. African countries were outraged when these facts were exposed by West European anti-racist organizations. Nigerian diplomat B. Akporode Clark, Chairman of the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid, stated in Oslo in late May 1980 that "Norwegian ship owners sailing oil to South Africa on ghost tankers, their names obliterated and flying no flag, are earning blood money".⁴² But the Labour Party government took no real measures to halt these shipments. Fresh exposures were made six months later: the Norwegian super-tanker *Havdrott*, which ran a shuttle service to Durban and Capetown, delivered 2.7 million tons of crude oil worth over £300 million, thereby providing for about 10 per cent of South Africa's total annual requirements. Grey tarpaulins over the tanker's side hid its name and port of registration when it entered South African ports, and even the names on the lifeboats were hidden.

According to the British *Observer*, this information caused a "row" in the Norwegian Parliament. "Revelations about the crucial role of Norwegian tankers have proved embarrassing to the Government because of Norway's relatively tough stand against apartheid."⁴³

Following the publication of an ANC report on this question giving the names of the ships involved, Chairman of the Norwegian Shipowners Federation F. Lorentzen tried to justify those actions by saying that there was no economic blockade against South Africa or any Norwegian law against shipments to and from its ports. In an effort to shift the blame to the oil producing countries, he said: "To criticize the shipowners is totally wrong. If anybody should be criticized it is the companies and countries which sell oil to South Africa."⁴⁴

Lorentzen's statement placed the Norwegian authorities in an even more difficult situation since it was revealed that the tankers were shipping not only foreign but also Norwegian oil to South Africa. In January 1981 it was reported in the Norwegian press that the tanker *James Stove* was heading for a South African port with a cargo of oil drilled from the Ekofisk oil deposit in the Norwegian part of the North Sea shelf and sold by the Norwegian subsidiary of the Italian firm FINA. The government was forced to order the

vessel to change its route, and also to propose that the companies drilling oil in the North Sea pledge not to sell it to South Africa.

Coming as it did on the eve of the International Conference on Sanctions Against South Africa, this step by the social democratic government was timely. It allowed Johan J. Holst, Norwegian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs and head of Norway's delegation, to name "no export of Norwegian oil to South Africa" as the first measure taken by Norway. He also declared his government's intention to "seek effective and comprehensive curtailment [but not cessation, — V.B.] of the oil supplies to South Africa through cooperation on a joint programme of action of the oil producing countries which adhere to a policy of not selling oil to South Africa".

However, representatives of the Norwegian public questioned the sincerity of these intentions since the government had not responded to a letter from the Dutch government on a joint declaration of an oil boycott of South Africa. This letter itself resulted from public pressure which especially intensified following the Norwegian tanker scandal. The Dutch coalition bourgeois government took this step as an alternative to the demand for a total end to oil deliveries to South Africa.

The Dutch parliament discussed an oil boycott on more than one occasion in 1980-1981, most members, including those from the Party of Labour, in opposition since 1978, supporting the boycott. An article on this topic written by Joop den Uyl, former Prime Minister and leader of the Dutch Social Democrats, was published in *Socialist Affairs*,⁴⁵ with den Uyl's portrait against the background of a map of South Africa and the caption "No Oil For South Africa" on the magazine cover.

The article began with an admission that "Holland's contribution [to sanctions against South Africa. — V.B.] to date has been extremely modest". The former Prime Minister rather self-critically noted that "the contribution of successive Dutch governments [his included. — V.B.] has been limited". This contribution was expressed in the cancellation of a cultural agreement with South Africa and "other measures of limited scope. But when it comes to the main issue, little has been achieved up to now."

Even after both houses of parliament finally passed the Sanctions Act (following a protracted two-year struggle), which included a provision to the effect that any Dutch subject would be in breach of the law if he cooperated in the export of oil to South Africa, were that country to fall under sanctions imposed by the government, the coalition bourgeois government again refused to apply sanctions, making reference to the EEC, where five out of

ten countries, including the FRG and Britain, were against sanctions.

Having entered the coalition government in 1982, the Party of Labour insisted on unilateral measures against oil deliveries to South Africa, but when it left the government this question was deferred and the Netherlands remained one of Pretoria's main sources of oil. (The wholesale oil market, where South Africa could obtain oil at higher prices, is located in Rotterdam; moreover, the Netherlands is the headquarters for Shell Oil Co.)

Nonetheless, the actions of the party leadership and its readiness to take unilateral measures against South Africa were of great significance, bearing in mind the refusal of many social democratic leaders, including of Scandinavian countries, to take any concrete measures against South Africa on the grounds that unilateral sanctions were useless.

Let us now look at the aspect of economic ties with South Africa which was reflected in the SI Programme of Action — the ban on investment and export of capital to South Africa.

As was stated earlier, the SAP was the pioneer in this regard within international social democracy. In 1976, i.e. many years after the ANC's call for a ban on investment in South Africa and corresponding UN General Assembly resolutions, the Swedish social democratic leader proposed that "serious thought" should be given to investments in South Africa. But the first concrete steps in this direction were taken under the coalition bourgeois government that replaced the Social Democrats in September 1976.

It is noteworthy that between 1976 and 1982, when the SAP was in opposition, the bourgeois governments took an even more "radical" stance on that region than the social democratic government had done in 1976. Thus, during those six years Swedish assistance to the ANC increased more than ten-fold and totalled \$4.1 million in 1982.

What was the reason for this? Although much has been done within the Socialist International to coordinate policy on southern Africa, as evidenced by the adoption of the Programme of Action, differences in the positions of individual parties, for example between the SAP and the SPD, have been very considerable and often more appreciable than those between the social democratic and bourgeois parties of individual West European countries.

An analysis of Sweden's policy prompts the conclusion that the positions of both the SAP and the bourgeois parties were largely determined by the interests of big capital in southern Africa and in Africa as a whole.

That the bourgeois coalition continued the Swedish Social Democrats' policy and even substantially increased aid to the ANC, SWAPO and the Patriotic Front was connected with a fresh upsurge in the southern African peoples' national liberation struggle, a desire to establish in good time ties with the future ruling parties in the newly free countries, and the growing Swedish public movement in support of that struggle. Nevertheless, the proposal to prohibit investment, which was backed by an overwhelming majority of Swedish MPs, with the exception of a group from the Conservative Party, only became law on 19 July 1979, i.e. three years later. An article published in the progovernment South African newspaper *Citizen* shortly before the law was passed in the Swedish parliament sheds light on the reason for the delay.

The article said that Swedish subsidiaries in South Africa "were not unduly concerned" and that "the new law would not curtail operations much in any case". Referring to "unconfirmable rumour" this fairly well-informed organ of racist propaganda reassured its readers that "Swedish firms had anticipated the action" and that "any investment ... to be made has already been made".⁴⁶ For example, one company had made advance investments sufficient to cover its needs for the next decade.

The entrepreneurs also thought up ways to circumvent the law even while it was still being discussed. Although it envisaged a ban on all investment, the law did not apply to financing repairs, replacing equipment, and so on. Another loophole was permission for companies to invest in projects of social value. As Swedish Trade Minister Håkan Cars stated at an international symposium on "Strategies in the Struggle Against Apartheid" held in Stockholm on 13 March 1979, "The legislation will allow a certain flexibility, whereby the Swedish-controlled group will be given time to reorient its activities towards new markets and find other employment for its employees in Sweden".⁴⁷ The result of this "flexibility" was that during the first two years of the new law, six of the seven applications for investment in South Africa were approved. In all, 15 million kronor of investment was allowed, while annual investment previously averaged about seven million kronor. Among the Swedish companies permitted to invest in 1981 was SKF, whose South African subsidiary was part of that country's "total defence system". It not only produces ball bearings and other strategically important products for South Africa but also had a "private" army to fight "labour, civil or terrorist attacks".⁴⁸

Olof Palme expressed concern over the situation in his address to the Swedish parliament one year after the law was passed. The SAP Chairman proposed maintaining "continuous surveillance of

attempts to exploit any loopholes in the present legislation" and an investigation by Sweden "of the possibilities of taking a further step in the same direction". However, he emphasized that in view of Sweden's "international commitments, a general commercial boycott of South Africa is only possible in connection with a resolution by the Security Council", and proposed that the government should confine itself to measures against transfer of technology, sale of licenses and cessation of passenger flights to South Africa by SAS⁴⁹, an airline jointly owned by Sweden, Denmark and Norway.

Palme pointed to the important impact of the Swedish law on international public opinion. Indeed, it had been met with approval, for example in the independent African countries, boosting Sweden's prestige and in the long run creating favourable conditions for ensuring that country's economic interests. Obviously there was good reason why a visit by Swedish Trade Minister Cars to Nigeria was timed to coincide with the passing of the bill. During that visit agreement was reached to increase Nigerian oil deliveries. On behalf of the SAP Palme proposed dissemination of information about the Swedish legislation abroad "for use, for example, by trade union organizations and other mass movements concerned with the formation of international opinion".⁵⁰

However, by no means everyone in Sweden agreed that Swedish experience deserved broad dissemination. At the International Conference on Sanctions Against South Africa in Paris, one of the country's public organizations – Africa Groups of Sweden – called the "much famed Swedish law" "nothing but a scrap of paper", voiced the opinion that it was not a model for others, and called for "a new law, without exception clauses, banning all economic and other contacts with that [the South African] regime".⁵¹

Public opposition to investment in South Africa influenced the government's position to a certain extent: in 1982 the volume of investment permits fell to 4.7 million kroner, and applications from two companies – SKF and Sandvik – were rejected altogether. It was expected that, when the Social Democrats returned to power in October 1982, application of the law would be toughened, but the reverse was the case: up to March 1983 investment permits to the tune of seven million kroner were given, and then the social democratic government, unlike its predecessor, agreed to permit Sandvik to invest, reducing the amount, it is true, by half. This was done despite protests by company employees.

But even Sweden's limited legislative measures were not supported by other West European countries and social democratic parties.

In passing the law, Swedish political figures admitted that their country's investments in South Africa were relatively small but laid stress on the fact that the law would serve as an example for other Western powers. Then Foreign Minister Hans Blix declared: "So long as South Africa has not even felt that its major economic partners will refrain from directly contributing to its repressive system and economy, it is not likely to take their verbal denunciations seriously."⁵²

But up to 1985, i.e. six years after the Swedish law, none of South Africa's "major economic partners" had followed Sweden's example. A similar initiative was put forward in parliament by the Dutch Party of Labour but defeated by the right-wing majority. As to the ruling social democratic parties, they refused under various pretexts to fulfill the point of the SI Programme of Action on ending investments.

For example, the Joint Nordic Programme of Action against South Africa adopted at a Foreign Ministers meeting in Oslo on 10 November 1978 included "prohibition or discouragement of new investment in South Africa" and "negotiations with Nordic enterprises with a view to restricting their production in South Africa,"⁵³ but it proposed that the anti-investment measures should not be implemented until the Security Council introduced mandatory sanctions against South Africa. What is more, they presented the introduction of that proposal at the UN as a very important initiative, although this question had already been raised in the early 60s. In January 1979 Danish Foreign Minister Henning Christophersen declared outright that "Denmark will not introduce a law prohibiting Danish investment in South Africa or South-West Africa" but would rather wait (knowing full well that the Western countries would use their veto right) "for the UN decision on Nordic proposals calling for a complete moratorium of foreign investment in South Africa".⁵⁴

Norway's position on this issue was a special one among West European countries. Although investment was not banned by law, the Norwegian Labour Party government refused to grant licenses for the export of currency to South Africa. This measure had been implemented in 1976, i.e. before the SI Programme of Action on southern Africa was adopted. But this procedure could not prevent Norwegian companies and their subsidiaries from investing profits obtained in South Africa itself.

The SPD leaders completely ignored the proposal to end investment in South Africa. True, they did seek to play down the scale of economic ties between the FRG and South Africa. Thus, Egon Bahr stated that by July 1977 West German investment had

virtually fallen to zero, but he was immediately refuted by the South African embassy in Bonn, which reported that private FRG investment had totalled 38.5 million marks over the previous 12 months.

Total investment by West German monopolies in 1979 was 3.6 billion rands, and this figure continued to grow with the encouragement of the government of Social Democrats and Free Democrats. Expansion of the activity of West German companies was closely linked with the Pretoria regime's neocolonialist plans. Thus, reporting its decision to invest 150 million rands over five years to build its enterprises in South Africa, the large FRG chemical company Hoechst stated that it expected that "with the advent of the Federation of Southern African States [which South Africa planned to create under its own aegis. — V.B.], southern Africa is in for boom conditions".⁵⁵

In their turn, West German banks were not only investing in the South African economy but were also Pretoria's largest creditors, granting loans both on a bilateral basis and through international consortiums. Even when the high gold prices at the turn of the eighties improved South Africa's financial position, it continued to borrow from the FRG. This was "more of political than financial importance"⁵⁶, i.e. it reflected Pretoria's desire to preserve and strengthen ties with the FRG.

In refusing to scale down economic contacts with South Africa, the leadership of the SPD and some other social democratic parties proposed the alternative of controlling the actions of West European firms in that country. In September 1977 an EEC Code of Conduct for companies operating in South Africa was adopted.

At an "EEC and Apartheid" international seminar held in Dublin in January 1979 on the initiative of the Irish Anti-Apartheid Movement, ANC President Oliver Tambo called the Code of Conduct "a meaningless and irrelevant measure whose primary purpose was to preserve and protect Western investment and the status quo" in South Africa, and described the EEC as the life-blood system of apartheid and "South Africa's major trading partner, and its largest supplier of arms and military technology, including nuclear technology".⁵⁷ By advocating concessions to the black workers and employees in the area of remuneration, professional training and promotion to managerial posts, and recognition of their trade union rights, the proponents of the EEC Code of Conduct hoped to diminish criticism on the part of the African countries over the rise in investment and trade between Western Europe and South Africa, stem the growth of the solidarity movement in their countries, and pose themselves as friends of the South Afri-

can liberation fighters. Simultaneously, they intended to pressure the Pretoria regime somewhat to push it toward limited political and economic reforms and to weaken the revolutionary upsurge in southern Africa, preserving the region as a "paradise" for investors.

South African entrepreneurs were well aware of the true aims of the Code. "The EEC's code of conduct," the *Financial Mail* wrote soon after it was introduced, "...is a thoughtful and constructive attempt to improve the state of South Africa's tense labour relations. Contrary to opinions expressed in local and overseas business circles, it does not demand that anyone ignore South African law."⁵⁸

But the Code's declared intention to somewhat improve black workers' position and thereby dampen the strike movement in South Africa clashed with the West European firms' desire to preserve and raise the rate of profit on investment in the country. For that reason even the proposed limited measures to raise black workers' remuneration and qualification were often not implemented. Thus, in the first two years of its operation, only 15 of the 46 West German firms reporting on their observance of the Code began to pay the proposed minimum wages.

Even the EEC governments eventually had to recognize that the Code was ineffective. In April 1983 a declaration by Common Market Foreign Ministers noted that "the results so far achieved do not yet fully meet the guidelines set out by the code."⁵⁹

However, the Code's approach to economic ties with South Africa continued to dominate among the leadership of social democratic parties, for example the Australian Labour Party, which formed the government after the 1983 elections. Foreign Minister William Hayden reported that the cabinet had considered the state of relations with South Africa and decided to preserve economic ties but introduce a code of conduct in relation to employment for the Australian companies operating in that country.

The next point of the SI Programme of Action was the proposal to step up support for the front-line states—the independent African countries bordering on territories ruled by the racists. The SI as a whole and some member parties did indeed seek to expand contacts with those countries following the Palme mission. Thus, the Social Democrat-led Scandinavian governments provided considerable material assistance to them, financing a number of projects there.

In some cases the Scandinavian countries give aid as a gift, hence the new term "Volvo diplomacy" in the political vocabulary of that part of Africa. That was how the southern African freedom fight-

ers described the Swedish authorities' attempts to intensify their influence on the independent African countries (and on the national liberation movements) by gifting them with Volvo cars.

However, the social democratic governments' assistance did not include the most important thing—help in rebuffing the racists' aggressive actions. True, in autumn 1978, when Zambia was the victim of predatory attacks by the Rhodesian militarists, the British Labour government did make a widely publicized statement on providing that country with urgent military aid through deliveries of radar and anti-aircraft equipment. Olof Palme spoke about the significance of this step in his address to the 14th SI Congress, which was taking place at that time.

But, addressing the Congress, R.C. Kamanga, member of the Central Committee of the United National Independence Party of Zambia, revealed the true character of the actions of Labour leadership: "Zambia started negotiations with Britain and other countries ... to purchase equipment several months ago, but this was not in any way connected with the recent aggression of the [Rhodesian] rebels. But Britain was marking time and announced its positive response only now, thus creating an impression that it is defending us against the Smith regime."⁶⁰ We would like to add that the British equipment played virtually no role in rebuffing the racist aggression since the experts needed to operate it were not trained in time.

The question of military aid was also discussed in the House of Commons on 7 and 8 November 1978 during consideration of the situation in Rhodesia and southern Africa as a whole. Some Labour MPs, for example Anti-Apartheid Movement Chairman Robert Hughes, urged substantial assistance for Zambia, Angola and other front-line states, but the Callaghan government merely proposed prolonging the sanctions against Rhodesia. The draft resolution was so soft that it was backed by most Tory MPs, excluding the most hard-line ones like Winston Churchill, the grandson.

Far from promoting support for the front-line states, the social democratic actions sapped their stability. Wessley Nyirenda, member of the Central Committee of the United National Independence Party of Zambia, expressed concern over the role of "Social Democrats in imperialist Britain (advocating the ideas of the Fabian Society) or West Germany", which manipulated Zambian trade unions. According to him, Social Democrats believed "in parliamentary activity where mass participation and revolutionary actions by the workers and peasants are excluded. Thus, social democracy is a real threat to Zambia and Africa as a whole."⁶¹

Some social democratic parties and governments also maintained direct contact with South African puppets in Angola and Mozambique. For example, Jonas Savimbi's autumn 1979 visit to the US was organized with the participation of Social Democrats USA, an SI member organization. In November 1981, when a major base of the so-called Mozambique National Resistance, financed and armed by the South African racists, was destroyed on Mozambican territory, documents exposing its ties with a number of NATO countries, including the FRG and France, were seized.

Let us look at how relations developed between the Socialist International and its leading parties on the one hand, and the national liberation movements—the ANC, Zimbabwe Patriotic Front, and SWAPO—mentioned in the Programme of Action, on the other.

It has already been pointed out that following the victory of the patriots in the Portuguese colonies, those forces that had kept aloof from and even hindered their struggle began to underscore their involvement in the patriots' successes. This happened again after the racists were defeated in Rhodesia. In a telegram to Robert Mugabe following the patriotic forces' election victory, the Socialist International said that it had "long supported the struggle for the true independence of Zimbabwe".⁶² In an editorial, *Socialist Affairs* also called the Patriotic Front "the genuine representative of the people of Zimbabwe".⁶³

But let us recall the facts. It was stated earlier that in the 1960s the British Labourites' policy, which facilitated the creation of "independent Rhodesia" by the racists, impeded the development of the Zimbabwean people's armed liberation struggle, and that the Labourites' position had been supported by the SI leadership, for example at the 10th Congress.

It was only after the Olof Palme mission had toured Africa and it became obvious that the Smith regime was bound to be defeated that the Socialist International first declared its support for the Patriotic Front. But the concrete actions of social democratic governments did not by any means always proceed from this principle.

On the whole, the policy of the past Labour government on the Rhodesian problem aimed to prevent the progressive forces from taking power in the country or, at a minimum, to restrict the freedom of action for Zimbabwe's future government. The progressive international community sharply condemned the March 1978 Salisbury agreement on an "internal settlement" reached between Ian Smith, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, tribal chief Jeremiah Chirau and former ZANU President Ndabaningi Sithole, who had been

excluded from the party. Andrew Young, then US Permanent Representative at the UN, also criticized the agreement. But British Foreign Secretary David Owen, while saying that it was still early to make "a considered judgment", noted that this agreement was "a significant step towards majority rule".⁶⁴ The SI leadership issued a special statement on the issue which noted that "the future of Zimbabwe must be based on majority rule", that "no peaceful and durable solution based on majority rule can be found without the participation of the Patriotic Front", and that "as long as such a solution has not been achieved, sanctions against Rhodesia must be upheld in full solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe".⁶⁵ However, given the broad scale of the Zimbabwean peoples' struggle, the formulation "participation of the Patriotic Front" could not satisfy the freedom fighters, who were demanding transfer of power to the patriotic forces.

This compromise statement hid substantial disagreements in the Socialist International on the Rhodesian problem. Thus, the British Labour government was maintaining contact with the Smith-Muzorewa regime and facilitated the sending of parliamentary observers to the "elections" organized by the racists in April 1979. In giving Mozambique financial assistance as partial compensation for its losses in connection with the closure of the border with Rhodesia, the Labour government stressed that these funds were not to be used to help the guerrillas to fight Smith's armed forces.

The NATO Council discussed the "internal settlement" soon after the creation of the Muzorewa-led "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government", which also included Ian Smith. Of the countries with social democratic governments, Denmark and Norway questioned the legality of this step, the others, including the FRG, did not support their position.

The Rhodesian question again came up at the October 1979 SI Bureau session in Lisbon, where the need to support the Patriotic Front was openly questioned. The SI organ wrote: "That is not to say that government of the day in Zimbabwe, the administration of Bishop Abel Muzorewa, was totally without friends [at the Bureau session.—V.B.]. Some voices from the United States argued that he was worthy of more support and attention than speakers had given him." And then there was a highly significant sentence: "It was difficult to judge whether this point of view was very fully shared by the meeting as a whole."⁶⁶ Thus, the argument was not around the "political support and humanitarian and material assistance" to the Patriotic Front envisaged by the Programme of Action but around whether "the meeting as a

whole" was prepared to give "more support and attention" to the puppet Muzorewa regime.

What were the "voices from the United States" which were arguing for the puppet regime in the SI? In April 1979 Social Democrats USA Chairman Bayard Rustin journeyed to Rhodesia. On his return to the US, at a time when the Muzorewa-Smith government was intensifying repression inside the country and aggression against neighbouring African states, he published an article entitled "Muzorewa Government Offers Hope for Peace" in his organization's journal.

But much more authoritative circles in the Socialist International also maintained contacts with Muzorewa. During the most tense period of the constitutional conference on Zimbabwe, held in London's Lancaster House, the bishop paid a visit to Vienna. And although Austrian government officials stressed that the visit was unofficial, Muzorewa himself said he was pleased at his reception and especially at his meeting with Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, an SI vice-president. This trip to Vienna took place shortly after the July 1979 attempt by Joan Lestor, Labour MP and vice-president of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, along with relatives of a detainee murdered under the puppet regime in Rhodesia, to get warrants for the arrest of Muzorewa "to answer charges of treason, felony and murder".⁶⁷

That international social democracy's policy was inconsistent is also seen in the fact that, simultaneously with Muzorewa's visit to Vienna, representatives of the Patriotic Front were invited to Strasbourg by the socialist group of the European parliament.

The Lancaster House conference resulted in the holding of elections in February 1980, won by the patriotic forces, and the establishment of independent Zimbabwe. This made Western governments adapt to the new political reality: attempts began to pass the defeat off as a victory and opponents of Zimbabwe's true independence as proponents. Thus, Willy Brandt spoke of "the British contribution to the freedom and independence of Zimbabwe" in a speech at Oxford.⁶⁸

The experience of Zimbabwe makes it possible to make a more accurate assessment of the zig-zags characteristic of the SI line in relation to SWAPO and the ANC—the national liberation movements which are continuing the struggle against apartheid and colonialism in southern Africa.

Traditionally, there has been a particular interest in Namibia—a former German colony—in the FRG. We have already mentioned the attempts by the Federal government and the SPD leadership to establish ties with SWAPO while continuing to cooperate

with the colonial authorities in South Africa and Namibia and, in particular, maintaining its consulate in Windhoek.

After an SPD representative had gone to the front-line countries as part of the SI mission, it would seem that the party's attitude to SWAPO would become clear, especially since in that same year, 1977, the FRG government closed its consulate in Windhoek, i.e. fulfilled a persistent SWAPO demand that had been repeatedly backed by UN resolutions.

On his unofficial trip to Tanzania and Zambia in December 1977 Willy Brandt expressed the hope that Western Europe could contribute to early independence for Zimbabwe and Namibia and an end to apartheid in South Africa, but declined to specify the nature of this contribution.

It was only in May 1979 that SPD spokesman Karsten Voigt declared that the party was preparing to establish "official links" with SWAPO and that it was "adamantly refusing to recognize internal governments in Salisbury and Windhoek", despite pressure from the opposition CDU/CSU bloc. Simultaneously, the FRG government was very active within the so-called contact group of five Western powers on Namibia, of which Britain's Labour government was also a member while in office. This group was repeatedly criticized by the SWAPO leadership. Thus, in a memorandum to the presidents of the front-line states, SWAPO said that this group's complicity and double dealing were facilitating Pretoria's efforts to include in the Namibian independence talks the puppet groupings which constituted the "internal government" that the SPD was "adamantly refusing" to recognize.

SWAPO President Sam Nujoma's first official visit to the FRG took place in October 1980. Following a meeting with Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, he stated at a press conference that Genscher had assured him "of support and sympathy for the liberation cause in South-West Africa". However, the SWAPO President added that "it remained to be seen whether this meant that Bonn would back economic sanctions against South Africa".⁶⁹

It can be stated that Nujoma's fears were fully justified. In office until October 1982, the FRG's Social Democrat-led government took no steps whatsoever in this respect. It even refused (along with the US and Britain) to send representatives to the May 1981 International Conference on Sanctions Against South Africa in Paris, although other social democratic governments attended.

Even after the SPD and the government established links with SWAPO, the FRG continued to host leaders of puppet organizations from Namibia and the white racists. Thus, in December 1980

a delegation of the so-called National Assembly of South-West Africa arrived in the FRG despite public protest, a fact which did not mesh with "support and sympathy for the liberation cause in South-West Africa".

Notwithstanding ANC demands and UN General Assembly resolutions, no West European social democratic government took measures to end diplomatic and consular ties with South Africa. What is more, their representatives supported Pretoria's attempts to get its delegation admitted to the UN General Assembly.

The leadership of the Socialist International and member parties repeatedly declared their refusal to recognize the so-called "independent black states" set up by the South African authorities on bantustan territory or, in official South African terminology, the "homelands" (four bantustans—Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei—had been made "independent"). However, some social democratic leaders maintained direct contacts with bantustan authorities. Thus, following a trip to the FRG, Transkei "prime minister" George Mantanzima stated that he had spoken to senior government and opposition MPs about trade links between Transkei and West Germany. The South African newspaper *Daily Dispatch* also wrote about Mantanzima's talks with members of the West German government. Mantanzima, too, described his spring 1984 trip to Austria as very successful.⁷⁰ Bophuthatswana opened an unofficial representation in the FRG.

In London, some Labour MPs met with Ciskei "chief minister" Lennox Sebe, who was about to proclaim that bantustan "independent".

While not prepared to officially recognize the pseudo-independent bantustans, right-wingers of international social democracy expressed willingness to support Pretoria's policy on this question if it was altered in the spirit of the reforms proposed by Harry Oppenheimer and other backers of South Africa's reformist Progressive Federal Party. Expressing the opinion of those forces, an FRG Foreign Ministry official told a Johannesburg *Financial Mail* correspondent in 1979: "If the homeland policy in South Africa is not declared to be aimed at the disenfranchisement of blacks within the State of South Africa, if there was provision for the incorporation of homelands in some sort of federal structure ... the West German Government would find that much easier to take up a more favourable position on South Africa".⁷¹

A position directly contradictory to SI congresses decisions and the Programme of Action was taken by the socialist group of the European Parliament, which in October 1980 invited to Strasbourg Gatsha Buthelezi, "chief minister" of KwaZulu homeland and

leader of the Inkatha organization. This invitation was issued despite the opposition of a number of socialist MPs and at the very time when Buthelezi had come out against the boycott of the racist education system in South Africa and had refused to support the campaign for the release of Nelson Mandela. He also gladly used the tribune of the European Parliament to slander the ANC. The South African *Sunday Times* wrote with relish: "Chief Gatsha Buthelezi rose in Europe's top forum ... and demanded recognition for Inkatha as the biggest political movement in South Africa's history... Buthelezi announced that Inkatha was opening offices in Europe and the US to counter ANC propaganda. He told socialist members of the European Parliament in Strasbourg that sanctions against South Africa and support for the military wing of the ANC would not help to bring about meaningful liberation of the country's blacks."⁷² Buthelezi also visited the FRG, where the SPD-FDP government earmarked substantial funds for projects in KwaZulu homeland.

Other social democratic governments, too, placed no obstacles in the way of economic ties between companies of their countries and the bantustans, although Olof Palme had warned at the 13th SI Congress that "refusal of recognition of the so-called independent Bantustans ... should be followed by opposition to the efforts of international capitalism to give unofficial recognition by massive investments in these areas".⁷³ Thus, the Austrian firm Steyr-Daimler-Puch A.C. sold more than 200 tractors directly to the Transkei "government" and invested in the setting up of a servicing system for them and in the training of specialists.

At the same time, the rise in the authority of the African National Congress both in South Africa itself and internationally encouraged social democratic parties and governments to establish contacts with that organization. The SPD leadership, too, began to understand this, though considerably later than the Social Democrats in Scandinavia. During an ANC delegation visit to the FRG in June 1980, the authorities gave permission for an ANC office to be opened in Bonn, while the social democratic Friedrich Ebert Foundation agreed to provide some material support. But along with these steps SPD officials were still seeking to establish links with the so-called third force in South Africa. They also gave support to exiles from South Africa who opposed ANC policy.

Since the late 1970s, the national liberation movements have been invited not only to SI congresses but also to its regional conferences and sessions of its Bureau, working groups and commissions. However, and special note should be made of this, establishment and expansion of contacts with the national liberation

movements did not by any means always bring the results expected by the social democratic leaders. Their representatives expressed viewpoints on both southern Africa and other international problems which were often quite different from those prevalent in the Socialist International. For example, at the 14th SI Congress ANC representative Neo Mnumzane advocated an immediate and unconditional cessation of multinational corporations' activity in southern Africa, and comprehensive economic sanctions against the apartheid regime, i.e. made demands that went far beyond the SI Programme of Action framework.

At an SI Bureau session in November 1979 in Lisbon, ANC representative Simon Nkwe stressed the need to oppose the arms race and supported the Soviet peace initiatives.

At the time such opinions were not often heard at the conferences of international social democracy. A correct assessment of the socialist countries' peace-promoting policy and assistance to the peoples' national liberation struggle helped strengthen the left forces' positions among Social Democrats and to a certain extent influence the general tone of SI documents.

Concern of certain quarters in international social democracy over this situation was expressed by prominent West German Social Democrat Karl Hübener, who called for a new phase in the Socialist International's activity — "a phase of consolidation, with carefully considered policies towards the opening of contacts and new membership... Without this," he warned, "the Socialist International could risk the danger of seeing its basic concepts diluted and suffering discredit at the hands of unbidden enthusiasts."⁷⁴

Social democrat-affiliated international non-governmental organizations also displayed a dual attitude to the national liberation movements. The International University Exchange Fund, which the Programme of Action described as a channel for aid to apartheid victims, recognized the ANC as "the leader of the National Liberation Movement" in South Africa in August 1978. This step, accompanied by a promise to "work in the closest possible consultation with the ANC ... as far as support for the South African liberation struggle is concerned", was welcomed by the ANC. At the same time, addressing the IUEF Assembly in December 1978, ANC Treasurer-General Thomas Nkobi said that there was a need for "the closest cooperation" between the ANC and the IUEF in actually setting up the assistance programme inside South Africa.⁷⁵ This caution was by no means uncalled for since Craig Williamson, ex-deputy director of the Fund, was soon exposed as a South African spy and very sordid circumstances were brought to light.

In an effort to preserve his agent, the head of the South African security police, General Johan Coetzee, who went to Switzerland specially for that purpose, tried to play on the anti-communist sentiments of some social democratic leaders. "One common enemy. Craig's target all along has been the Communists," he said at a meeting with Fund Director, Swedish Social Democrat Lars-Gunnar Eriksson.⁷⁶ Information that later leaked to the press showed that a part of the Fund's money had been transferred to a secret account in Liechtenstein and sent to South African splinter anti-communist groupings — the Pan-Africanist Congress and a group of renegades expelled from the ANC.*

In a statement on Williamson's exposure, the ANC stressed the need for "closer and honest co-operation" on the part of organizations assisting the national liberation movements.⁷⁷

Amnesty International, in which Social Democrats continued to participate, took an essentially hostile attitude to the ANC, although it still tried to play the role of defender of the victims of racism in southern Africa. Thus, following a 1978 trip to Botswana, Herbert Ruitenbert, editor of the organization's monthly magazine *Amnesty*, spoke of the need to investigate the charges that refugees from Soweto were "being ill-treated and held prisoner in Botswana in a secret ANC camp, surrounded by barbed wire". It is not surprising that this slander against the ANC was immediately seized upon by the South African government's propaganda organs.⁷⁸

A number of actions taken by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and its West European members did not dovetail with the interests of South African workers and their organizations. Let us look at a few of them.

In November 1980 the ICFTU held a special conference on southern Africa in London but did not invite the SACTU. The programme adopted there emphasized "practical training and financial support for black trade unions in South Africa" and "putting more 'bite' into the European Economic Community Code of Conduct". And only if these attempts failed would the ICFTU be prepared to support some sanctions against the regime, for example an oil embargo.⁷⁹ The sum of £140,000 was earmarked to finance ICFTU activity in South Africa in 1980, activity

* After a number of Western governments had refused to continue financing the IUEF, in autumn 1980 an attempt was made to reorganize it into an International Education and Refugee Service, with the social democratic governments of Denmark and Norway agreeing to finance it and SI Secretary General Carlsson among its leaders. However, this attempt to revive the IUEF under a new front was unsuccessful.

conducted without consulting the ANC or SACTU, and this amount was to be increased in future.

The results of such divisive practice are clear from the story of Drake Koka, ex-General Secretary of the Black Allied Workers' Union. He left South Africa for London and opened a BAWU office there, receiving substantial funds from the ICFTU, the AFL-CIO, and Catholic organizations. The South African press wrote that Koka's international support was considerable, obviously because his position up to then had been a moderate one: he opposed both violence and worker action. But when representatives of the organizations financing Koka went to Botswana to familiarize themselves with the "self-help" projects which were supposed to be in progress under his direction for refugees from South Africa, they found little evidence of those projects.

The ICFTU and the international secretariats linked to it also had a negative impact on the leaders of the national trade union associations. *Morning Star* wrote that "not even Lord Carrington, Ted Heath or the EEC have gone so far in their praise of South Africa as the Assistant General Secretary of the International Metalworkers' Federation (IMF)", Werner Thonnesen, who, following a visit to South Africa, reported: "The South African government under Prime Minister P.W. Botha maintains a line of carefully controlled change in favour of the black majority."⁸⁰ Leaders of that federation who had made numerous trips to South Africa always opposed sanctions. Things reached a stage when, in 1978, the IMF leadership even helped the South African state-owned company ESCOM to obtain a large loan in Western Europe.

In an effort to undermine ties between national metalworkers' unions and the SACTU, the IMF General Secretary told the leadership of the British section: "I find it not advisable to have anything to do with this organization,"⁸¹ although, under pressure from progressive British trade unionists, cooperation with the SACTU had become an official TUC position by 1980.

Later, the SACTU leadership had to make a special Statement which spoke of a "growing attempt by the detractors of our struggle to divide the trade union struggle from the struggle for national liberation", and also the desire to disparage the role of SACTU, "committed to a revolutionary change in South Africa".⁸²

"What progress does the ICFTU want to see in our country? The birth of toothless trade unions fighting for industrial peace in the midst of apartheid exploitation? There are determined efforts by the ICFTU affiliated unions like the Swedish LO/TCO, Dutch FNV, Canadian Labour Congress, and others to undermine and divert the revolutionary path of struggle followed by the militant

working class... The stake of foreign investors in our country is high and the capitalist countries live in mortal fear of any revolutionary change in South Africa."⁸³

These actions were out of harmony with the Programme of Action's aim of assisting "popular movements working in support of the liberation struggle in southern Africa", among which the trade unions were mentioned as well.

Instead of "assisting popular movements", some social democratic governments at times raised obstacles to the international public actions against apartheid. Thus, the last Labour government refused visas on more than one occasion to persons from socialist countries invited to attend conferences on southern Africa held in Britain. Such difficulties also faced ANC leaders trying to participate in events arranged by British anti-racist and anti-apartheid organizations.

Left-wing Social Democrats and the most far-sighted SI leaders were concerned at these incongruities between the SI Programme of Action and the real moves of social democratic parties, governments and organizations.

3. Differentiation in International Social Democracy on Southern Africa

The SI Programme of Action provided the supporters of the national liberation movements in the ranks of social democracy with an instrument which, for all its shortcomings, made it possible in practice to test the sincerity and effectiveness of its leaders' actions. The attitude to the programme as a whole and to the fulfilment of this or that point became the criterion of differentiation both between and within social democratic parties on the question of national liberation.

"Peace and development" was the main theme of the Socialist International's 14th Congress, which took place in Vancouver, Canada, in November 1978. The problems of southern Africa were highlighted as one of the four points of the agenda. More parties, organizations and movements from developing countries than ever before were invited to the Vancouver Congress.

The desire to spread SI influence outside Western Europe and to foster the ideas and practices of social democracy in newly free countries was manifested in the studied attention to the problem of establishing a new international economic order and in criticism of racism and colonialism at the Congress.

In his report to the Congress, SI President Willy Brandt condemned the continuing colonial yoke in Namibia and Zimbabwe

and the expansion of the racial discrimination system in South Africa, and strongly recommended "rapid measures for peaceful change" in southern Africa in order to avoid "a powerful conflict with inevitably destructive results for the people of the whole area". It described the Security Council plan for a Namibian settlement as "a model for a more comprehensive solution of existing conflicts".⁸⁴

Carlsson's report on SI activity since the Geneva Congress dealt more concretely with the problems of southern Africa, including the Palme mission to the front-line countries. He informed the delegates that at the Bureau session in Madrid "the Secretariat was asked to remain in contact with the member parties on the implementation of the report" of the Palme mission and that it was decided "to undertake joint action with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (UCFTU) to combat the cancer of apartheid".⁸⁵ Carlsson spoke of the serious question as to what extent SI decisions "are followed by those governments formed by our member parties, and by the member parties themselves". He also said that "in the case of our support for the liberation struggle of Southern Africa, sometimes a river of words is emptied into a desert of inaction".⁸⁶ It was this statement by the SI General Secretary about a "river of words" and a "desert of inaction" which ANC representative Mnumzane quoted in his speech at the 14th Congress.

"The degree to which our parties and governments live up to the programme," Palme stated in his address, "will decide how public opinion in our own countries and the African peoples will judge our political will to contribute to the struggle for peace and against apartheid."⁸⁷ He admitted that in the West there had always been a gap "between our declared condemnation of apartheid and the concrete relations that we still maintain with Pretoria, relations like military co-operation, transfer of technology, loans, capital investments". But the only concrete measures against South Africa he proposed were to consider "seriously cutting down air links" with that country and introducing "entry visas for South Africans".⁸⁸

Palme warned that "there is a point when the credibility of this approach [peaceful evolution and negotiated settlements] will be undermined, when Africans reach the conclusion that much more desperate means are needed" and expressed the hope that "this point has not been reached yet in the case of Namibia".⁸⁹

It is difficult to say what exactly he had in mind when he spoke of "much more desperate means", because the Namibian people's SWAPO-led armed struggle had by then been under way for 12

years and it was that struggle which had forced the racists and their patrons to agree to talks on that country's independence.

Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski's speech was a contradictory one. Deliberately or not, like the SI Programme of Action, his proposals on southern Africa were formulated in nine points, but instead of a ban on investment he merely called for a review of the EEC Code of Conduct in the light of the experiences of the past year and the need to implement it.⁹⁰ A positive element in his speech was recognition of the need to give "political and humanitarian support" to the liberation movements in southern Africa, "particularly to SWAPO, the Patriotic Front, and the ANC".⁹¹

The resolution of the 14th Congress outlined the problem of southern Africa in largely the same terms as had that of the previous Congress, merely adding condemnation of the multinationals in that region and saying that they "must be subjected to appropriate and effective sanctions".⁹² This phrase was also repeated in a special Congress resolution on multinationals, but it did not state what specific sanctions were meant.⁹³

An article by an SPD member Karl Hübener "Vancouver Congress in Perspective" spoke of the definite differentiation in Congress participants' approach to southern Africa. While Olof Palme was "clearly favourably disposed to imposing sanctions," Hübener wrote, the FRG government had not yet considered the question and merely intended "to scrutinize the code of conduct". Underlying this difference in positions were economic interests: "The possibilities for concrete action could be enumerated at length by Olof Palme, leader of the 1977 Socialist International delegation to Southern Africa, but these were not so easily put into practice by countries with capital investments in the Republic."⁹⁴

The SPD also continued to take a negative stance on the use of the armed form of struggle against the racist Pretoria regime. Contrary to the ANC course, Wolfgang Roth, chairman of the party's Development Policy Commission, opposed "any non-peaceful and revolutionary solution" in South Africa, pointing to the inevitable casualties and trying to scare the anti-apartheid fighters and their African allies with the might of the South African army, which, it will be recalled, had been equipped with FRG assistance. He wrote that "a civil war ... or—to put it more accurately—a rising of the underprivileged in South Africa, would be suicidal for a large part of the active population".⁹⁵

However, nowhere near all Social Democrats shared this viewpoint. In a letter to *Socialist Affairs*, a reader from the Netherlands rightly recalled that freedom in Zimbabwe "was not

achieved through the ballot box" but in the course of long struggle, and that in order to help liquidate apartheid "for a start the West will have to make a real sacrifice, namely to sever all ties with the South African government and the South African economy... Then, direct support for the national liberation movement in the form of food, medicine, and indeed arms will have to follow."⁹⁶

In 1980, along with the coming to power of the patriotic forces in Zimbabwe, it became obvious that the armed struggle had intensified not only in Namibia but also in South Africa. The SI reacted to these events by publishing an editorial headlined "The Duty to Struggle", which spoke of "the new course of action chosen by the liberation movement".⁹⁷ For all its inaccuracy (the ANC embarked on armed struggle in 1961 and the new Umkhonto we Sizwe operations only meant intensification of that struggle), this phrase was important as recognition by the SI leadership of the fact that armed struggle was also being waged in South Africa.

However, this recognition was not followed by practical measures. The June 1980 Bureau sessions in Oslo concluded only that "economic sanctions, including an extension of the oil embargo,* should be given serious consideration".⁹⁸ This could be interpreted both as a step toward banning trade with South Africa and as consideration of the possibility of finally implementing the measure that had been approved earlier (ban on investment).

The 15th SI Congress (Madrid, November 1980) did not examine the situation in southern Africa as a separate question and paid less attention to it in general. Possibly, one reason for that was that the social democratic leaders expected positive results from the January 1981 Geneva meeting to discuss the conditions for fulfilling Security Council resolution No. 435 on a Namibian settlement. In any event in late 1980 there was talk among Social Democrats of "not letting anything rock the boat", i.e. not taking any measures that could evoke a negative reaction on the part of the Pretoria regime.

Opening the Congress, Willy Brandt hinted (but only hinted) at the developing struggle in South Africa itself: "If the right lessons are not quickly drawn from the success attained in Zimbabwe, everything can still remain at risk. The issue at stake is no longer merely freedom for Namibia, even though that is now long overdue."⁹⁹

The report presented by SI General Secretary Carlsson reflected the opinion of those who recognized the need to end the West's

* The decision to support the proposal to ban oil deliveries to South Africa was taken at the October 1979 Bureau session.

cooperation with South Africa. Along with reference to Joan Les-tor's demand for economic sanctions, it contained criticism of the Namibia "contact group". Carlsson noted: "There is still a wide gap between what the International and its member parties are currently doing for the liberation of South Africa and what they committed themselves to with the agreement of the Madrid Bureau meeting in 1977."¹⁰⁰

The main report on the international situation was made by Bruno Kreisky. Explaining why he had not said a word about Africa, the Austrian Socialists' leader claimed that he did not have the necessary experience to make "a comprehensive assessment of the situation".¹⁰¹ It was hard to accept this argument, bearing in mind that he himself had facilitated the 1977 Vienna meeting between Vorster and US Vice-President Mondale and then had received Muzorewa there, while the government he led promoted expansion of trade with South Africa. Neither the other SI vice-presidents — Mario Soares and Léopold Senghor — nor most of the other speakers mentioned the problem of southern Africa.

Along with a demand for the release of Nelson Mandela, Andimba Toivo Ja Toivò and the other political prisoners, and condemnation of "the continued aggression by South Africa against independent Angola", the 15th Congress resolution contained a call for member parties "to commit themselves to a systematic programme of economic withdrawal from South Africa, to join the efforts to achieve an oil embargo and to abide by the UN arms embargo". The social democratic parties and governments were also urged to assist "all the African countries fighting racism and apartheid, especially the front-line states".¹⁰²

Thus, for the first time international social democracy's organizational centre was calling not only for no further increase but also a reduction of economic ties with South Africa, for "economic withdrawal from South Africa".

With respect to the political organizations of southern Africa, the Madrid Congress took what was essentially a step backward, rather than just a "sidestep" away from the Programme of Action. Unlike that programme, which envisaged support for specific national liberation movements, the 15th Congress resolution said: "We will continue to work *with all elements* (my italics. — V.B.) of the South African resistance, especially the ANC and SWAPO, in their struggle to defeat apartheid."¹⁰³ Indeed in addition to the national liberation organizations, "other elements" like the SACP and progressive trade union associations, had been involved in the anti-apartheid struggle, but it was clearly not those organizations which the resolution had in mind.

Suggestive of this is the fact that, along with the ANC, the so-called Black Consciousness Movement of Azania was invited to the Madrid Congress, although a black consciousness movement had never existed in South Africa as an organization, and in the late 70s the name came to be used in the West by a group of exiles opposed to the ANC's political line.

The ANC leadership repeatedly warned about the damage such actions did to the unity of South Africa's freedom fighters. In July 1979 its National Executive Committee adopted a special "Statement on Some Questions of the Unity of the Patriotic Forces of South Africa",¹⁰⁴ which emphasized that most members of the black organizations banned by the Pretoria racists had joined the ANC inside and outside the country but some persons outside the country had launched a campaign of lies against the ANC and were seeking to set up "new organizations".

"Our enemy as well as some international forces," the ANC leadership stated, "which wish us to consider them as friends and allies of our struggling people also entertain vain hope that there is still a chance to divide our people and defect their efforts by setting up a so-called 'THIRD FORCE' to oppose the ANC. To those who would be our allies we can only appeal that they should desist from actions which can only serve the interest of our common enemy."¹⁰⁵ There is every ground for applying these words to the invitation to the 15th Congress made to a "third force" in the form of an organization opposed to the ANC and existing only on paper.

The January 1981 breakdown of the Geneva Conference on Namibia, and South Africa's stepped-up aggression against Angola, Mozambique and other independent African states further aggravated the situation in southern Africa.

The international public was especially outraged at South Africa's large-scale aggression against Angola in August and September 1981, an act condemned by many social democratic parties, including the SPD. However, a statement signed by party Deputy Chairman Hans-Jürgen Wischniewski not only criticized South Africa's actions and demanded an immediate withdrawal of South African troops from Angolan territory but also made a veiled reproof of SWAPO, saying, in part, that "tension over Namibia, and especially in the border area of Namibia and Angola, has recently been steadily intensifying because of increasing SWAPO activity and sharp repressive measures by South Africa. In 1980 alone there were well over 100 incidents in the border area."¹⁰⁶ Thus, equal blame for the "tension" and "incidents" was in essence being placed on SWAPO, waging an armed struggle for

the country's independence, and on South Africa, illegally occupying Namibia.

The statement also spoke of the urgent need for a pullout of Cuban troops from Angola and at the same time expressed regret that South Africa's aggressive policy was impeding that. The SPD leadership admitted that "pressure" on South Africa had "made no impression" and that "Western powers involved in this question should not allow themselves to be led by the nose any longer".¹⁰⁷ As before, however, no tangible measures were taken by the SPD-FDP government to reduce the FRG's links with South Africa.

The September 1981 Paris SI Bureau meeting adopted a more outspoken resolution on southern Africa. It not only condemned "the unmasked aggression of the Republic of South Africa against Angola" and demanded "the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all South African troops from Angola", but also expressed "solidarity with SWAPO, the ANC, and the front-line states". In the presence of ANC National Executive Committee member Thabo Mbeki, SWAPO CC member Aaron Shihepo, and representatives of Angola and a number of other independent African states, the Bureau adopted a decision to hold a special conference on southern Africa "to formulate concrete propositions and not just propose abstract resolutions".¹⁰⁸ A preparatory group made up of the representatives of the French and Portuguese Socialist Parties, the SAP, the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland, and Volta's Progressive Front was set up to consult "with all interested parties" and then present its proposals to the President and General Secretary of the Socialist International.

The discussion of the problems of southern Africa in Paris drew attention of the international community to the stance taken by the French Socialist Party (PSF) after it came to power in May 1981.

François Mitterand's inauguration as president coincided with the UN and OAU International Conference on Sanctions Against South Africa, which was held in Paris. Speaking at the opening ceremony, PSF First Secretary Lionel Jospin outlined the future government's programme on southern Africa, which largely concurred with the document entitled "The Socialist Party and Sub-Saharan Africa"¹⁰⁹ and published shortly before the presidential elections.

The PSF's planned measures were more radical than the actions of the last British Labour government or the FRG government, and envisaged cessation of trade with South Africa-occupied Namibia, including importation of uranium from that country, reduced

French raw material purchases from South Africa, an end to government and limitation of private investment in South Africa, a full embargo on arms deliveries, support for the front-line states, and "political and diplomatic support and humanitarian aid to refugees and activists of the liberation movements of South Africa and Namibia".¹¹⁰ Yet these measures did not fully accord with the SI Programme of Action, and French public organizations, those which had Socialists as members, immediately drew attention to their limited character.

Thus, Jospin avoided the question of closing down state-owned French oil monopolies in southern Africa, ending deliveries of equipment for plants which produce liquid fuel from coal and are of strategic significance for the racist state, ending France's importation of uranium ore directly from South Africa, and putting a stop to French companies' participation in developing South Africa's nuclear industry. The international community was particularly concerned about the last-mentioned circumstance. In a September 1981 letter to President Mitterand, Robert Hughes, Chairman of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, urged him to end French assistance to the racist regime in the construction of nuclear reactors near Capetown.¹¹¹

But the French authorities continued to fulfill the contract to build a nuclear power station signed by the previous government. What is more, there were press reports of plans to construct another such station with the participation of French firms. Responding to inquiries from the French Anti-Apartheid Movement, presidential adviser Guy Penne confirmed that official talks on this question had been held between the French company Framatome and the South African state-owned ESCOM. In this connection over 50 international and national organizations attending the April 1983 UN International Conference on Namibia in Paris signed a letter to President Mitterand demanding that he undertake not to permit the signing of a contract with South Africa to build the second nuclear power station.

The French government felt even more ill at ease because it was the construction site of the nuclear power station in Koeberg which was the target of a bold December 1982 attack by Umkhonto we Sizwe fighters that did damage to the tune of tens of millions of rands and long delayed the commissioning of the station. In that situation the government announced that France would not participate in the construction of another nuclear power station in South Africa.

Neither was the PSF promise to end uranium imports from Namibia fulfilled. This was actually admitted by former French

government minister Jean-Pierre Cot, who stated that if Namibian uranium was still coming to France it was not coming in the form of direct import since "France imported uranium only from South Africa".¹¹² Yet in January 1983 the state-owned company SFP-Total, which held half of the shares in Minatome, bought out the rest of the shares of that company, which, in its turn, held 20 per cent of the shares of a company mining uranium in Rossing (Namibia).

Noting the rise in imports of coal from South Africa and of uranium from Namibia, South Africa's ambassador in Paris Robert du Plooy said that 25 per cent of the electricity consumed in France was provided by South African raw material.¹¹³

If the French government did take measures to reduce links with South Africa, they were, as a rule, demonstrative. Thus, under pressure from the public and many African countries, President Mitterand prohibited a French rugby team from going to South Africa in April 1983. A South African newspaper responded to this action with a cartoon showing a French traffic controller banning sportsmen from travelling to South Africa while allowing lorries with French goods to go there. The cartoon reflected the fact that under the new government France's trade with South Africa was continuing, with a sizable part of its export composed of high-tech goods and scientific equipment. In order to expand these links, several French banks signed a 280 million franc loan agreement with South African finance minister in March 1984.

France was also inconsistent in its stance at the UN. On 31 August 1981 it supported a Security Council resolution condemning the South African incursion into Angola (Britain abstained and the US used its veto right). But at the special General Assembly session in September 1981 France and the other contact group members abstained during the voting of a resolution aimed at ending South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and thereby refused to give SWAPO the promised "political and diplomatic support". France's participation in the five-nation Namibia contact group did not bring any real progress in settling the Namibian problem in the interests of the people of that country.

When it took power, the PSF promised that if the contact group was not successful in its work, France, in coordination with the UN, would make a new initiative on the Namibian problem. But this was not done.

At the same time, some statements by French officials were of positive significance. For example, during his October 1982 visit to Tanzania and Kenya, Minister for External Relations Claude Cheysson opposed the US-imposed linkage of a withdrawal of

South African troops from Namibia with the presence of Cuban internationalist fighters in Angola.

Later, in a situation of growing criticism from SWAPO, independent African states and the international and French public, the French authorities took a decision in December 1983 to suspend France's participation in the contact group.

In the period between the 15th and 16th SI congresses the problems of southern Africa were repeatedly discussed at meetings of its leading bodies and in *Socialist Affairs*. In connection with South Africa's fresh aggression against Angola, the Socialist International issued a statement on 26 March 1982 expressing "great disapproval and concern" and urging South Africa "to pursue a resolution of the question of Namibia at the conference table in discussions with representatives of the western contact group and the South West Africa People's Organization".¹¹⁴ Thus, emphasis was still being placed primarily on the contact group even though its failure had by then been apparent. The statement also expressed concern at the repression of trade union leaders in South Africa and said that the SI would seek an end to the South African government's policy of "terrorizing its neighbours ... and terrorizing its citizens".

Socialist Affairs more and more often spoke of the need for practical rather than merely verbal support for the South African and Namibian freedom fighters. The reason for this was revealed in a statement by Willy Brandt carried by the magazine: "We should not be surprised if those fighting for their liberation write to a different address for assistance than the countries providing support to their oppressors. Our moral support alone, in the face of substantial material support from others, cannot contribute to developments we would welcome."¹¹⁵ This concern over the strengthening links between the national liberation forces and socialist countries was ever present in the Social Democrats' discussion of the problems of the developing world.

At the same time, the advent of the Reagan administration brought a more critical attitude in the SI to US policy, including on southern Africa, and condemnation of the USA's alliance with "anti-communist dictatorships in the Third World". It was also admitted that "low-key diplomacy" had "not yet found a Namibian solution, not ended South Africa's attempts to destabilize its neighbours, let alone led to any easing of apartheid".¹¹⁶

These tendencies were manifested, too, at the 16th SI Congress, which took place in April 1983 in the Portuguese town of Albufeira and had as its theme "The World in Crisis—the Socialist Response". Among the guests were an ANC delegation led by Thabo Mbeki and representatives of a number of ruling parties of

front-line states. (SWAPO did not attend the Congress because it coincided with an enlarged plenum of the SWAPO Central Committee.)

In an aggravated international situation, the Congress focused on international security, peace and disarmament, and also on the Middle East and Central America, on which special resolutions were passed. Nevertheless, SI President Willy Brandt's address included, among the immediate political measures to be taken by the Social Democrats, "the struggle against the remnants of colonialism in Southern Africa", help in resolving the Namibian problem and stabilization of the front-line states.¹¹⁷ The report made by Bernt Carlsson on SI activity in the inter-congress period spoke of the support given to "SWAPO and the ANC and the Black Consciousness Movement".¹¹⁸ Although the BCMA had collapsed for all intents and purposes and had not been invited to the 16th Congress (unlike the previous one), the leadership of international social democracy was still willing to support forces ranged against the ANC.

The main Congress document – The Manifesto of Albufeira – criticized "the barbarous oppression" of the people of South Africa and noted that "Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Zambia have all become the objects of military and political subversion by South Africa, which desperately tries to uphold an illegal hegemony in all of southern Africa". It stated that such a development "creates another permanent regional war situation" and that the conditions for South Africa's aggression were formed by "technological, military and economic cooperation with the industrialized world".¹¹⁹

The document contained the following specific proposals addressed to the international community and designed to promote "peace, national sovereignty and social justice in southern Africa": "increased economic assistance to the front-line states and for regional cooperation in order to reduce the dependence of these states on South Africa;

"political and material support to the liberation movements, to independent trade unions, and to the victims of apartheid in South Africa and Namibia; the Socialist International reaffirms that Namibia, a country illegally occupied by South Africa in violation of all international law, has the right to its independence and the Namibian people to their freedom;

"binding UN economic sanctions against South Africa; awaiting such a decision in the UN, each nation should apply policies to stop new investments, close all loopholes of the binding UN arms embargo, and reduce contacts with the apartheid regime in the

areas of culture and sport; all efforts aimed at stimulating peaceful change;

"increased solidarity work with the people of Namibia and South Africa in our own countries."¹²⁰

It is easy to see that the above proposals virtually did not go beyond the framework of the Programme of Action on southern Africa approved almost six years earlier. The vague formulations, typical of SI documents, allowed social democratic parties to interpret them in their own way and to use them to justify their own policy, even if their positions differed substantially. It should also be noted that in place of the commitments to undertake a systematic programme of economic withdrawal from South Africa envisaged in the 15th Congress resolution, the Manifesto merely proposed halting new investment (in the expectation that the Security Council would adopt a resolution).

Speakers at the Congress, Mario Soares among them, again harped on the need to stop using southern Africa as "a platform of rivalries between economic interests and geostrategic disputes between the major powers".¹²¹ Like Bernt Carlsson, Soares also stressed the importance of the upcoming SI conference on southern Africa. However, during the preparations for this conference, the SI leadership encountered many difficulties, the main one being the lack of unity among the Social Democrats on the national liberation struggle. While the common documents approved at congresses managed to bring different positions "to a common denominator", it was much more difficult to do this in preparing for a thorough discussion of a specific problem and in making recommendations on how to solve it.

A special conference on southern Africa was actively supported by Swiss Social Democrat Jean Ziegler, who represents those forces in the Socialist International that have traditionally been called "left", at least with respect to their attitude to the national liberation struggle. A look at the polemic in *Socialist Affairs* between Ziegler and Portuguese Socialist Party Secretary Rui Mateus will illustrate the position of the former, reflect the differentiation in the ranks of international social democracy on this problem, and shed light on the difficulties which arose during the organization of the conference on southern Africa.

In response to Ziegler's "Cuba Yes" article, which positively assessed Cuba's role in Latin America, Mateus published an article captioned "Cuba No". Although Mateus wrote that the "Socialist International does not wish to support any models", he made SI backing conditional on "a firm commitment by new parties and movements to political democracy and freedom. There should be

no room within the Socialist International for parties in power in one-party states or with plans to turn their countries into such regimes. This is a fundamental question."¹²² Mateus said that it was necessary to take this situation into account when drafting the new declaration of SI principles. (The drafting dragged out for a long time because of disagreements between SI members, especially between the West European Social Democrats and "new" forces.)

In his turn, in an article entitled "The New Challenge", Ziegler spoke of the "profusion of misunderstandings, disagreements and irreconcilable positions between the traditional parties of the International and the new formations of the Third World". Criticizing Mateus for not understanding the "exemplary influence which Cuba radiates to the poor masses of the whole of Central and South America and the Caribbean", he simultaneously put forward the task of creating "the organic, patient and critical alliance which the Socialist International must build with the armed liberation movements in the Third World, and the sovereign states born of their struggle".¹²³

As a result of such an alliance with countries with socialist governments or socialist forces, new countries that had embarked on a road of industrialization and reorganization of agriculture could, in Ziegler's opinion, create their own infrastructure and "escape becoming a satellite of one of the two superpowers" and "embark on a rapid development of their national wealth, their own requirements".¹²⁴

Thus, while criticizing the traditional SI parties for an incorrect approach to the developing world, Ziegler himself remained a captive of the superpower concept popular among Social Democrats and of the thesis of equal US and Soviet responsibility for the difficulties experienced by the newly free countries. Furthermore, the Swiss Social Democrat believed that an alliance between sovereign states and armed national liberation movements in the Third World, an organic alliance embracing the political, economic and military areas, was an essential condition for preserving a free Europe since it would otherwise be forced to accept "the patronage of the American empire" or become a "Soviet satellite".

Although they seem innovative in form, these arguments contained very little that was new in comparison with the plans to set up a "EuroAfrica", which were popular among West European politicians 25 years earlier.

Distorting the essence of Soviet policy toward the developing countries, Ziegler advanced as an alternative the policy of the parties of democratic socialism in the West and of European states

like France, which were supposedly "planning to establish an alliance with the armed liberation movements and states born of their armed struggle".¹²⁵ But the facts cited above show that Western social democratic governments, far from being allies of the peoples of Africa in their armed liberation struggle, often impeded that struggle. And the author's reference to France, which maintained links with the Pretoria regime in many areas, is not the best argument by far.

Ziegler took the same positions at the 1983 international symposium dedicated to the memory of Amílcar Cabral, which was held in the town of Praia, Cape Verde. He contrasted the armed struggle in the Third World (which, in his words, currently embodies humanity's revolutionary aspirations) to the degradation of the revolutionary elan in Western Europe and North America. At the same time he also spoke about a threat to Europe and the whole world posed by the USSR. The Swiss Social Democrat needed all this to substantiate his thesis about the need for the developing countries to orient themselves toward the Socialist International.

The difference in the Social Democrats' approach to liquidating the apartheid regime and achieving Namibian independence was also evident when this question was discussed at the UN. Let us take as an example the 17 December 1981 voting on the resolution "Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa" at the 36th General Assembly. Mauritius and Senegal voted along with the other African states for all the 16 sections of the resolution (which fact did not, however, prevent them from breaching them in practice). The Dominican Revolutionary Party government took a position close to theirs. On the other hand, the FRG and France only supported the most "humanitarian" section of the resolution—"Women and Children under Apartheid", on which Britain and the US alone abstained. (Two sections were approved without voting.) At the same time they voted against its most important sections: a general assessment of the situation in South Africa, comprehensive sanctions, an oil embargo, and the demand for an end to military and nuclear cooperation. They did not even support the section confirming the embargo on arms deliveries to South Africa.

A more positive stance was taken by Australia and Denmark, which, incidentally, was very close to that of Norway, where a coalition of bourgeois parties had come to power not long before. However, all West European countries voted against the section "Relations Between Israel and South Africa". The Social Democrats took similar positions at subsequent General Assembly sessions as well.

It is also significant that, while social democratic parties declared their agreement with certain measures against the South African regime within the SI, the governments they led refused to support analogous steps at the UN.

Along with differences in the positions of individual social democratic parties, disagreements of substance were also manifest inside those parties on the problems of southern Africa. Thus, as the left wing in the British Labour Party was growing stronger, it expressed increasingly serious objections to the Labour government's joint actions with the US on Rhodesia, which Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe called a clandestine game aimed at entrenching Smith and his African puppets,¹²⁶ to its active diplomatic contacts with South Africa, and refusal to give any real support to the liberation movements. David Owen, a leader of the party's right wing and Foreign Secretary in the last Labour government, came under constant criticism.

The Labourites' 1979 election manifesto included some of the demands of the anti-apartheid fighters, for example, to discourage investment and give government support to the national liberation movements. While David Owen admitted that British investments in South Africa had totalled £5 billion and spoke of using "our economic influence to apply political pressure for peaceful change",¹²⁷ the Labour members of the Anti-Apartheid Movement were demanding economic sanctions against South Africa.

The anti-racist sentiments among the Labourites were vividly manifested, when the party was no longer in government, at the 78th Annual Conference, at which ANC President Oliver Tambo was a guest of honour. The delegates gave a standing ovation to his address on behalf of all foreign guests.

The ANC President criticized the policy of British governments, which, regardless of the party forming them, had "respectively allied themselves with the apartheid system ... opposing under one pretext or another the political, economic, military and cultural isolation of the racist regime". He said that the change under way in southern Africa was a violent change, for "where there is no peace, where there is only the violence of apartheid and the brutality of repression change cannot be peaceful".¹²⁸

The conference supported a statement by the party's National Executive Committee urging mandatory UN sanctions against South Africa, the use of British legislation to end new investment in South Africa, and in general discourage economic, social, cultural and sport links with South Africa. This was done contrary to the line of the right-wingers like Owen, who, while in South

Africa in September 1979, did not advocate economic sanctions but merely warned the South African authorities that sanctions could not be ruled out in principle "in some circumstances".¹²⁹

The position of the Labour left wing, whose influence increased substantially while the party was in opposition, was expressed by Joan Lestor in a *Socialist Affairs* article.

Along with the greater number of actions by African workers and students, the author noted a step-up in ANC military operations, which "demonstrated quite clearly the vulnerability of the apartheid regime" and the "almost universally acknowledged popularity of the liberation movement SWAPO". Denouncing the incursion by South African troops and support for the puppet organization UNITA, Lestor said that South Africa was aiming not only to provide a "buffer force in southern Angola" but also to undermine "the development of the socialist policies of the Angolan government led by the MPLA".¹³⁰

Mentioning certain measures to limit economic ties with South Africa, for example, the Swedish law banning investment in that country, Lestor said they were not enough and that Social Democrats needed to act in a new and more resolute way. She urged defence of "the right of the Angolan people to call upon their friends and allies to defeat aggression from South Africa" and demanded that military and financial backing be given "to our friends in the region" rather than stopping at an arms embargo against South Africa.¹³¹

A general change in Labour Party policy became especially marked after a right-wing group led by David Owen and Roy Jenkins left to set up the Social Democratic Party, which formed an alliance with the Liberals. Even those Labourites who had long opposed sanctions against South Africa began to advocate them. Thus, shadow foreign secretary Denis Healey declared in parliament in May 1981 that he supported "sanctions against South Africa to bring about a settlement on the independence of Namibia".¹³²

Positive changes also occurred in the policy of the eleven million member British Trades Union Congress. In September 1981 it passed a resolution demanding total isolation of the apartheid regime and mandatory UN economic sanctions against South Africa. Furthermore, the TUC proposed that, in the interim, urgent steps should be taken "to reduce unilaterally Britain's heavy dependence on economic links with South Africa".¹³³ The TUC welcomed the "development of independent black trade unions in South Africa" as "part of the process of national liberation in Southern Africa".

However, the adoption of such a resolution did not mean that all forces in the British labour movement were prepared to fulfill it. Chris Child, a leader of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, noted that influential circles in the TUC still opposed isolation of South Africa and support for the national liberation movements or merely ignored the unanimously passed resolutions. The reason for this lay in the fact that many British trade unionists understood the struggle in South Africa as one for "reforms, rather than national liberation". They believed that "the problem in South Africa for black workers has to do largely with their lack of trade union rights and decent conditions and wages, a problem to be solved not by support for the overthrow of the apartheid system as a whole but by the creation of a strong trade union movement to bargain on behalf of the workers".¹³⁴

The 81st Labour Conference approved its new programme — "Labour's Programme '82" — which envisaged financial and other material aid to the liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia, assistance to the non-racial trade union movement, the tightening of the ban on arms deliveries to South Africa, an end to all NATO cooperation with South Africa and to all links with the South African security forces, and implementation of the programme to cease economic links with that country. Labour Party press officer Martin Plaut explained to journalists that, in line with the party programme, a future Labour government would "give direct financial and military aid to the liberation movements after discussions with the OAU and the UN".¹³⁵ The main planks of the programme were also included in the Labourites' election manifesto, published in May 1983.

The British Labour Party also strongly opposed the Reagan administration's policy of "constructive engagement" with South Africa. In an 8 May 1982 letter to Reagan in connection with his visit to Britain, the party's General Secretary Ronald Hayward said that the party was categorically against all elements of the President's policy which would mean a rapprochement between the US and South Africa, and totally rejected any idea of close relations between the West and the apartheid regime in South Africa.

A new form of struggle against Britain's links with Pretoria was local governments' declaration of "apartheid-free zones" (by way of analogy with the movement for nuclear-free zones). In January 1984 the Labour-controlled Greater London Council declared the British capital an apartheid-free zone. Its special declaration contained commitments to break all contacts with companies cooperating with the Pretoria regime, halt all deliveries from South Africa to London, and receive no South African officials.

Thus, with the southern African liberation struggle in an upsurge and a general leftward shift of the Labour Party, the position of its left wing on southern Africa had gradually become the official position of the party as a whole. However, since the Labourites lost the parliamentary elections in 1983 and 1987, it remains an open question how far their programme on southern Africa would have been implemented had they come to power.

What is more, certain forces in the Labour Party were already preparing the ground for a review of decisions adopted. For example, the Fabian Society published a booklet called *Against All Reason. Britain and South Africa in the Eighties*,¹³⁶ among whose authors was Jenny Little, Labour Party International Secretary. The booklet's proposals for British government action in relation to South Africa were much more moderate than official Labour policy. Thus, instead of an end to and withdrawal of investment it spoke only of reviewing credit guarantees, and instead of renunciation of all cooperation between the two countries' security forces, it merely spoke of limiting ties between the British and South African police.

Simultaneously the booklet's authors sought to present the national liberation organizations as "external organizations" and "exile movements". They made no secret of their hope of seeing a "new black movement" which would be wooed "both by the exile movements and by the government"; in other words, a "third force" which would be receptive to reformist ideas.

An analysis of the Social Democrats' activity over the past 25 years in relation to the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle shows that, however sincere the SD leaders' condemnation of the brutalities of the colonial and racist regimes, it took great pains to transform it into real measures to limit links with those regimes. In social reformism there are two contradictory and at the same time interconnected strivings: to transform social relations and eradicate exploitation of man by man, and preserve and improve the basic mechanisms of the existing social, including political, system of modern capitalism. In the long term, the function of social reformism as the "manager" of capitalist society is undoubtedly increasingly winning out over its function as the "transformer". This contradictory character was also manifest in international social democracy's attitude to the struggle for national liberation and social emancipation in southern Africa.

While carrying out the functions of "managers" seeking to protect the interests of "their" monopolies, the social democratic governments also "safeguard" some day-to-day interests of the workers, interests which, it is true, do not go beyond the existing sys-

tem. The leaders of social democratic parties and trade unions affiliated to them are very reluctant to agree to any measure that could create difficulties, even if temporary ones, for a branch of industry, increase unemployment, and so on. Explaining why more decisive measures had not been taken against South Africa, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Norwegian Labour Party government Thorvald Stoltenberg said: "The power of economic ties is strong... It is not only a question of the interests of the large corporations, but also of jobs of individual women and men... Let us be frank. I have seen no tendency in any country to sacrifice jobs in order to contribute to a possible effective economic boycott of South Africa. And I do not think this attitude will change. Even with a deep and genuine understanding of the tragedy in South Africa and of our own interest in a peaceful solution of the problem, it is not easy to tell any individual that in the interest of all of us, he must sacrifice his work, his job."¹³⁷ Stoltenberg forgot, however, that many countries (primarily socialist countries and most independent African countries) do not have links with South Africa, however economically advantageous they could be. Neither did he mention that for the West, including Scandinavian countries, it is not so much a question of jobs as of interest of the large corporations, which not only maintain but have been developing economic links with South Africa. But even in those cases where non-investment in South Africa could create difficulties, the fear of worker dissatisfaction is often exaggerated.

The workers' reaction is, of course, affected by insufficient explanatory work. The bulletin of the International Committee Against Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in Southern Africa wrote that, according to some trade union officials, "the ordinary worker on the shop floor does not care about 'international solidarity', that the workers do not participate in actions that might put their jobs in danger".¹³⁸ But the specific example of the Swedish firm Sandvik showed that workers responded differently when they obtained information from someone directly involved in a struggle for trade union and political rights. When the Sandvik workers heard that William Khanyile, a SACTU leader who had addressed a solidarity meeting at their enterprise, was murdered in January 1981 by South African commandos in a raid in Mozambique, they passed the following resolution in February 1981: "Ban all new investments and grant no exemptions from the ban. Withdraw all Swedish activities in South Africa. Invest the profits of Sandvik in Sweden."¹³⁹

Fearing resolute actions by West European workers, companies have been seeking, with the help of right-wing trade unionists, to

use reformist elements in the South African labour movement for their purposes. In Sweden, trade union leaders at a plant of the SFK company, which, as stated earlier, had received government permission to invest in South Africa, invited reformist South African trade unionists to defend their policy before the workers.

On the whole, two main trends could be singled out in the Social Democrats' position on the national liberation movement. The first, which had been predominant in the SI and most of its member parties until recently, was typified by verbal condemnation of apartheid and colonialism while maintaining, and more often than not expanding, both political and economic links with the racist regime. Recognition of the need to support the national liberation movements was accompanied by a desire to create a "third force" using legal organizations and the conciliatory elements inside those movements. The danger posed by the racist South African regime was obscured by attempts to represent events in the region as the result of "superpower rivalry". Recognition (belated, it is true) of the peoples' right to "counterviolence" went hand in hand with a desire, under the pretext of "peaceful settlement", to get the patriots to make concessions which would guarantee the interests of the imperialist circles even after the liquidation of the colonial and racist regimes.

There is another increasingly marked trend in the ranks of the Social Democrats, although it has not yet become predominant. This trend advocates support for the political programme of the national liberation movements, including the demand for total isolation of the racist Pretoria regime, all-round political and practical aid to the ANC and SWAPO, recognition of the right of the national liberation movements and the independent African states to receive assistance (including military) from socialist countries, aid for the struggle of the South African and Namibian patriots in whatever forms they choose – from diplomatic to armed.

The singling out of the two principal trends naturally does not mean that there always is a clear boundary between them. In real life social democratic parties and individual political groupings within them often take intermediate positions, inclining to one or the other trend on different aspects of the problems of southern Africa.

4. The Socialist Inter-African and Southern Africa

In deciding to hold a conference on southern Africa in a front-line state, the leadership of international social democracy made

no secret of its intention to use that conference as a forum for expanding and strengthening the Socialist International's contacts and influence in Africa.¹⁴⁰ Account was obviously also taken of the fact that none of those countries' political parties had tried to join the so-called Socialist Inter-African (SIA).

The formal organization of the Socialist Inter-African at a February 1981 Tunis conference was largely the result of the 20 years of efforts by the SI and its few backers in Africa to create a social reformist association on that continent. It will be recalled that a number of African countries had been invited to the Seventh SI Congress in 1961 and that the document "African Roads to Socialism", written by West European rather than African Social Democrats, was published in 1971.

The establishment of a permanent organization of African political parties was one aim of the July 1975 Tunis colloquium, which was directly supported by West European social democracy and to which Holden Roberto, Angolan traitor, was invited. However, most of the colloquium participants rejected this idea.

Yet another attempt was made during a meeting of African political parties held in Dakar in December 1977 immediately following the Ninth Congress of Senegalese Socialists. But, to the disappointment of its organizers, among them SI Vice-President Léopold Senghor, the Charter of the Confederation of African Socialist Parties, prepared by a coordinating committee made up of the representatives of the ruling parties of Tunisia, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco and Senegal, was not approved.

It was only in February 1981 that the Constitutive Congress of the SIA was held in Tunis. But this "baby", which had been nurtured for so long, was, if not exactly stillborn, quite puny. Only 10 parties from nine African countries became members, no front-line state party among them.

The SI leadership has repeatedly stressed that the SIA is not its regional organization. Some West European social democratic parties, especially Scandinavian ones, were fairly critical of the new association. However, SI Vice-President Léopold Senghor became president of the SIA.

Progressive African forces, including those in southern Africa, took a negative attitude to the SIA. For example, *Journal de Angola* described it as another link in the imperialist plot to check the revolutionary movement in Africa.

Most of the SIA parties do not meet the requirements of SI membership. There is good reason why only two of the ten SIA founder parties (the Socialist Party of Senegal and the Labour Party of Mauritius) were SI members. The programmes and policies of

the parties that signed the SIA Charter and thereby officially confirmed their adherence to "democratic socialism" to this day represent the same "mosaic" which had made "African socialism" such a great disappointment to the leaders of international social democracy back in the 60s.

Although the documents of the SIA Constitutive Congress spoke of the "fight against imperialism, colonialism, racism, Zionism, and all the other forms of hegemony",¹⁴¹ SIA member parties were far from active participants in that struggle. On the contrary, before its defeat in the June 1982 elections, the Labour Party of Mauritius continued to expand the country's economic ties with South Africa. Senegal was among the last OAU member states to recognize the People's Republic of Angola but even after that it maintained contacts with the UNITA puppets. Some Senegalese Social Democrats actually aided and abetted South Africa's attempts to undermine SWAPO's international authority and that organization's status as the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people. Thus, in May 1984 leaders of the puppet "internal" parties for whom Pretoria had organized a foreign tour following the breakdown of the South Africa-SWAPO talks in Lusaka, were welcomed in Dakar. The Mauritian Social Democratic Party openly advocated broader links with South Africa. After that party again became a member of government in August 1983, its minister of labour Herve Duval journeyed to South Africa for talks with government leaders and businessmen.¹⁴²

Even though, speaking in October 1985 at the Commonwealth Conference, Gaetan Duval, leader of the Social Democrats of Mauritius and Deputy Prime Minister of that country, declared that "Mauritius will not isolate itself from the rest of the world by failing to adopt sanctions",¹⁴³ its economic ties with South Africa not only remained, but continued to expand.

The SIA members, ruling parties of Sudan and Somalia, allowed the US armed forces to use their countries' territory, that is, essentially agreed to turn those territories into a section of the imperialists' strategic bridgehead, which included the Simonstown military base in South Africa.

The resolutions of the Second SIA Congress, held in Dakar in December 1983, and of the General Council meeting were purely declarative in character. General words of condemnation of the apartheid regime and the South African occupation of Namibia were accompanied by positive assessments of the contact group activity and calls for support of the Socialist International's plans to convene a "North-South" conference on the problem of racism in southern Africa.¹⁴⁴

However, this "support" was not duly appreciated by the conference organizers, who have been among the SI leadership. Having enlisted the help of a number of parties, among them the French Socialist Party, the SIA was invited to attend the 16th SI Congress as an observer.¹⁴⁵ But neither the SIA nor its parties (with the exception of the SI members) were invited to the conference on southern Africa. Moreover, its members were not listed among the participants of the 16th SI Congress.

The cooling of interest in the SIA on the part of many influential forces in the Socialist International was a manifestation of the inability of the African social reformists' association to gain any notable place in the life of the continent. SIA membership has been decreasing despite repeated appeals to expand it and the amendments made to its charter for that purpose. Thus, only seven member parties attended the Second Congress, and the Third Congress, scheduled for 1985 in Khartoum, was postponed following the fall of the pro-imperialist regime of President Nimeiri, who headed an SIA member organization—the Sudanese Socialist Union.

The Congress could be held only in April 1986 in Rabat, Morocco. Its participants confirmed their stance on southern Africa by calling on "Western industrialized countries to end, by economic sanctions, the indirect support they give to apartheid".¹⁴⁶

Reporting on the Third SIA Congress, the *Socialist Affairs* noted that the SIA sought close cooperation with the Socialist International, for one thing "with a view to improving understanding between African and European democratic socialist parties".¹⁴⁷ However, judging by the available information, this desire was not backed by the Socialist International. In any case, the SIA delegation did not attend the 17th SI Congress, though Léopold Senghor was re-elected as an SI vice-president.

The Fourth SIA Congress was held in Tunis in January 1988. Under a Congress decision the SIA was renamed the Democratic and Socialist Inter-African. The leader of Senegalese Socialists, Abdou Diouf, was elected its President, and Sadok Fayala of Tunisia, General Secretary. The new leadership stepped up contacts with national liberation organizations and political parties of southern Africa, having sent a special envoy to the region.

5. Cooperation Between Communists and Social Democrats on Southern Africa: Experience and Prospects

The evolution of international social democracy's policy on southern Africa, reflected in the Programme of Action and sub-

sequent SI documents, resulted in the emergence of "points of contact" with the Communists' position on the national liberation struggle. It created new, more favourable conditions for understanding between Communists and Social Democrats on the problems of the region, and in some cases for joint actions, for example, within the framework of national and international public organizations.

It is only natural that *nationally* realization of the possibilities for cooperation between Communists and Social Democrats depends to a decisive extent on relations between the parties in general, and that the forms of such cooperation may vary greatly. There have already been some, though not many, examples of joint participation by communist and socialist parties in government (France and Finland). Some time later the Communists in both countries have critically reassessed their experiences. It should be noted that in both cases their coalition partners had many more seats in parliament and much stronger positions in the government and therefore the Communists' possibilities to influence foreign policy, including on southern Africa, were relatively limited, though progressive mass organizations actively supported them.

Another form is that of cooperation between Communists and Socialists under inter-party agreements or in preparing and holding national events in solidarity with the struggle of the peoples of southern Africa.

The third and most widespread form is participation by Communists and Social Democrats in anti-colonial and anti-apartheid actions held by trade union, youth and other public organizations, especially those which make those actions their principal task. There are examples of this kind in almost all Western countries. Thus, Communists were among the leaders of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement along with Labourites, Liberals and representatives of the Church. Local organizations of the Communist and Labour parties are collective members of the movement. There have also been instances when people, who had been active on the problem of southern Africa because of humanitarian reasons and dislike of racism rather than their class positions, acquired a deeper understanding of the social processes under way in the region and the world and joined the communist ranks through participation in the solidarity movement with the peoples of southern Africa.

Internationally, too, the forms of contact between Communists and Social Democrats on the problems of southern Africa are diverse. True to Lenin's precepts, the CPSU has always taken the

initiative in developing links with Social Democrats in the interest of peace, democracy, and economic and social progress. Fresh evidence of this was the CPSU CC message of greeting to the 17th Congress of the Socialist International.¹⁴⁸

At the UN, other inter-government organizations, and at bilateral talks the governments of socialist countries and Western social democratic governments regularly discuss the problems of southern Africa. These questions are also discussed within the framework of the substantially increased links between ruling parties of socialist countries and social democratic parties, a fact which also exerts a positive impact on talks at the inter-government level. For example, support for national liberation movements in southern Africa and condemnation of South Africa's policy of apartheid, its aggressive actions against neighbouring states, and the demand for the immediate granting of independence to Namibia were contained in a communique on the results of a visit by a CPSU delegation to Finland in November 1986 at the invitation of the Finnish Social Democratic Party.¹⁴⁹

The most favourable conditions for contact and possible cooperation between Social Democrats and Communists have emerged in the international movement of solidarity with the peoples of southern Africa. Participating in it are, as a rule, the most consistent opponents of colonialism and apartheid in the ranks of international social democracy. The Socialist International was directly represented only at some conferences on Namibia; most forums were attended by individual social democratic parties.

In a number of cases delegates of social democratic parties and, even more frequently, individual prominent Social Democrats, active participants in international and national public organizations, discussed southern Africa with Communists and national liberation forces at major peace forums: the World Congress of Peace Forces (Moscow, 1973), the World Parliament of the Peoples for Peace (Sofia, 1980), and the World Assembly for Peace and Life, Against Nuclear War (Prague, 1983). Social Democrats also took an active part in a number of conferences on southern Africa held on the initiative of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, the World Peace Council and other international non-governmental organizations. Special mention should be made of the International Conference in Support of the peoples of Portuguese Colonies and Southern Africa (Khartoum, 1969), the International Conference in Support of the Peoples of Portuguese Colonies (Rome, 1970), and extraordinary conferences of solidarity with the people of Angola (Luanda, 1976) and with the people of South Africa (Addis Ababa, 1976).

In the course of preparing and holding such meetings, international and national organizations with varying political views gradually established and developed contacts with each other, making possible the successful World Conference Against Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in Southern Africa, held in Lisbon from 16 to 19 June 1977, the anniversary of the Soweto events. This conference differed from other similar forums primarily in the especially broad and authoritative composition of those attending: leaders and members of national liberation movements, public figures from socialist countries, members of political parties and anti-apartheid movements of Western countries, and statesmen and politicians from Afro-Asian countries. Among them were many Social Democrats, chiefly representatives of the left wing.

Although the Soares-led government of Portugal declined at the last moment to participate in the conference in any form even refusing to meet delegations of the national liberation movements, PSP figure José Mendes Godinho headed the conference presidium. Vassos Lyssarides, Chairman of the United Democratic Union of Cyprus (EDEK), which has a left-socialist orientation and has been a consultative SI member since 1976, was elected General Secretary. Among the chairmen of the five conference commissions were Labour MP and Chairman of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement Robert Hughes, Portuguese Socialist Party MP Carlos Candal, and eminent Swedish lawyer and Social Democrat Hans Göran Frank.

Participating in the international movement of solidarity with the peoples of southern Africa, Communists favoured democratic methods of preparing for and carrying out united action with all progressive patriotic and peace-loving forces on a national, regional and international scale so as to bring about greater mutual understanding between diverse anti-imperialist trends and movements, taking into consideration their specific features and showing respect for their independence.

These methods made it possible to bring together different political forces at the above-mentioned conference on the basis of a common platform of recognition of national liberation movements—the ANC, SWAPO and Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe—and, through broad and democratic exchange of opinions, to elaborate documents which included both a political assessment of the situation in southern Africa and concrete proposals for aiding the fighters against apartheid, racism and colonialism.

The racists were particularly worried by the broad composition of the Lisbon meeting and simultaneously by the participants' fair-

ly accurate definition of the forces waging struggle in the region. The South African press wrote about the start of a mass anti-South African campaign planned by the Communists, the Third World and the Socialists, and said that these actions were opposed to the peace initiative of the big five [the contact group. — V.B.] on southern Africa.

The Programme of Action adopted at the Lisbon Conference called for strengthening "full political, moral and material support to the legitimate representatives of the peoples of South Africa—the African National Congress of South Africa, Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe and South West African People's Organization of Namibia."¹⁵⁰ The Conference denounced the imperialists' manoeuvres who used appeals for a "peaceful settlement" to disguise the growing aggressiveness of the racists and their accomplices and their desire "to maintain the illegal regimes in power or to create puppet forces and establish neocolonialist regimes".¹⁵¹

It is possible that the clear and principled position of the international community's authoritative forum also influenced the drafting of the SI Programme of Action, in particular its recognition (for the first time in the documents of international social democracy) of the need to support the African National Congress and the Patriotic Front as well as SWAPO. In any event, a report at the Madrid SI Bureau meeting was presented by E. Menéndez del Valle, who had helped to organize the Lisbon conference as a delegate of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party.

A direct result of that conference was the creation of the International Committee Against Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in Southern Africa (ICSA), headquartered in London. The committee's objective was "to promote, internationally, support for and solidarity with the national liberation struggles being waged in Southern Africa under the sole and authentic leadership of ANC of South Africa and SWAPO of Namibia".¹⁵² In the late 70s and early 80s the committee did a great deal to attain this objective. Its leadership was made up of public figures from socialist, Western (both Communists and Social Democrats), Asian and African countries.

Together they participated in campaigns and conferences held on the committee's initiative in various countries. Thus, at a suggestion made by ICSA and backed by US public organizations, a Conference of Solidarity with the Liberation Struggle of the Peoples of Southern Africa, the largest in US history, was held in New York from 9 to 11 October 1981. The chairman of the preparatory committee was Congressman Ronald Dellums,

member of the organizing committee of the Democratic Socialists of America.*

In November 1981 Social Democrats, Communists, and representatives of a number of Christian organizations jointly participated in ICSA's international seminar on material aid to the national liberation movements, held in Frankfurt on the Main.

Dissemination of truthful information in the West was facilitated by the International Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes of Racism and Apartheid in Southern Africa, set up on the initiative of a group of lawyers attending the 1976 Addis Ababa Conference. Eminent lawyer and Belgian Socialist Paulette Pierson-Mathy was elected General Secretary of the Brussels-based Commission.

International conferences of solidarity with the struggle of the peoples of southern Africa invigorated anti-racist and anti-apartheid activity in the ranks of social democracy not only as a result of Social Democrats' direct participation in their work. Conference resolutions, which provide a clear programme of action (for example, that elaborated at the Lisbon Conference), also helped expand the movement in support of the peoples of southern Africa nationally and enhanced its authority, which, in its turn, served to attract both rank-and-file Social Democrats and some social democratic leaders to its ranks.

The development of contacts between Communists and Social Democrats on the problems of southern Africa facilitates settlement of questions which are important not only for that region.

First, this is the effort to eliminate the threat to peace in Africa and throughout the world posed by the racist regime. This threat is increased by South Africa's nuclear armament programme and armed attacks by the racists against neighbouring African states.

Second, this is the effort to eliminate the seat of fascism represented by the South African regime and establish democratic systems in Namibia and South Africa in conditions of genuine independence.

Third, this is promotion of the independent African countries' socio-economic development, which is hindered by the policy of the racist Pretoria regime that forces them to divert substantial forces and funds to combat aggression and support the national liberation movements in the region.

* This SI member organization has been known as Democratic Socialists USA since 1983. Its positions are more to the left than those of the Social Democrats USA which is also an SI member party.

Fourth, this is the establishment of just international economic relations between all southern African countries and other states, which is impossible without eradicating the racist orders. The coming to power of the national liberation forces in Namibia and South Africa, and liquidation of the multinationals' dominance there will ensure the use of those countries' rich resources in the interests of their peoples and of the peoples of the entire world on a mutually advantageous basis.

Fifth, Social Democrats' participation, together with representatives of socialist countries and Communists from the West, in the international movement of solidarity with the peoples of southern Africa helps to overcome anti-communist prejudices and to a certain extent creates favourable conditions for cooperation on other questions as well.

However, some leaders of social democracy often took a negative attitude to this cooperation. For example, the British Labour authorities refused to issue visas to the Soviet delegation to attend the January 1978 ICSA founding meeting. The leadership of the Portuguese Socialist Party launched a vigorous campaign against holding another international conference on southern Africa in Lisbon, claiming that the conference, which aimed to expand support to the front-line states and national liberation movements, served the interests of the Soviet Union and its strategy in southern Africa. It insisted that West European Social Democrats refuse to attend the forum.

Nevertheless, an international conference of solidarity with the front-line states for national liberation and peace in southern Africa did take place in Lisbon on 25-27 March 1983, and Communists and Social Democrats, including PSP members, were again in attendance. The composition of the conference participants might have been even broader were it not for the pressure brought to bear by PSP leader Soares on his SI colleagues. But the attempts to wreck the conference, in which the front-line African states were primarily interested, did nothing to boost the Social Democrats' prestige in Africa. On the contrary, such actions boomeranged on the SI itself and put a brake on the preparations of its "own" conference on southern Africa.

The PSP leadership continued to pursue an inconsistent policy after the party returned to power in Portugal in 1983. While taking measures to expand links with former colonies, Mozambique and Angola in particular, and declaring readiness to give them economic and even military assistance, the PSP government allowed representatives of UNITA and the counterrevolutionary Mozambique National Resistance to operate on Portuguese terri-

tory. In words it opposed apartheid but at the same time did not support a UN General assembly resolution denouncing the so-called "constitutional reform" in South Africa designed to strengthen the racists' power.

The possibilities for establishing and developing ties between Communists and Social Democrats have also been greatly narrowed down by the attempts of certain circles of international social democracy to discredit the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, which are spreading on the African continent, and to impose social reformist ideology on the national liberation forces. It was hoped that "African society, on the road toward modernization, will acquire many new strata, that in the process of industrialization and democratization linked with it classes and political ideologies will arise independently, and against the wishful thinking of today's African leaders. Then African socialism will also change, as European socialism did before it."¹⁵³

Indeed, industrialization or, to be more precise, the development of capitalism, is leading to the gradual formation in a number of African states of those strata which, under certain conditions, could become a social base for social democracy. But on the continent there is a country where capitalist development is not far behind what it is in Western Europe, yet the social reformists have no significant positions there. That country is South Africa.

It is important to analyze the reasons for the situation and relations between the revolutionary and reformist sections in the South African labour movement in order to ascertain the prospects of social reformism in southern Africa. This subject certainly deserves special study but it seems appropriate to deal with it even briefly in this work as well.

In the early decades of the 20th century the Labour Party of South Africa was prominent in the country's political life. After the left wing pulled out of the party because of its opposition to the Union of South Africa participation in the First World War, the social reformists took over the leadership in 1915, and subsequently embarked on active cooperation with the National Party in defence of the interests of the white workers, maintaining a "colour bar" in industry and not allowing African, coloured or Indian workers to do skilled jobs. This caused a major change in official policy toward the workers and institutionalized white worker privileges so as to broaden the social base of the racist regime. As a result, social reformism in South Africa gradually but steadily weakened. The Labour Party lost influence among the white workers, who mainly supported the National Party, which

was dealing with the problem of "poor whites" by the bourgeois reformist method of reserving for them the jobs of foremen, supervisors, and the like. At the same time the Labourites' policy was isolating them from the growing African working class and from the coloured and Indian workers.

"To pander to racialism," *The African Communist* correctly wrote, "spells death for the labour movement, and is diametrically opposed to its very existence. The South African Labour Party was once a quite strong organization, with a number of members of parliament and even cabinet ministers, members in provincial councils and even a majority and a Labour mayor in the city council of Johannesburg, by far the biggest city in the country. But because it admitted and appeased racialism and colour prejudice the Labour Party today is as dead as the dodo."¹⁵⁴

For its part, international social democracy repeatedly tried to support various social democratic organizations in South Africa. For example, in 1958 the British Labour leadership sent some of the money raised for the accused in the so-called "treason trial" in South Africa via the Labour Party. The International University Exchange Fund reprinted and distributed several issues of *Z* magazine, which was published by Students for Social Democracy, an organization at the University of Cape Town. One such issue carried material of a discussion between big South African industrialist Harry Oppenheimer and advocates of social reformism in South Africa on the country's further development.

It should be noted that, in an effort to prevent the further growth of the revolutionary movement in the country, the South African authorities have been increasingly resorting to bourgeois reformism while maintaining the old authoritarian methods and using direct violence against the African, coloured and Indian workers. No secret is made of the aim of creating a black middle class, which Pieter Botha called "one of his key policy priorities."¹⁵⁵ Studies by South African sociologists show a rapid rise in "the black petty bourgeoisie" due to the upward movement of blacks into clerical and technical positions previously reserved for the whites, and to "the emergence of black bureaucrats in the public sector,"¹⁵⁶ primarily in the bantustans. This evidences a broadening of those social forces among the black population who can become a base for social reformism and are receptive to its ideology, especially in a country where the majority associate capitalism with the apartheid regime.

Aware of this, the leaders of international social democracy and the West European trade unions linked with it have been trying to establish direct contacts with the reformist elements in the black

trade unions and other legal organizations. Great hopes are placed on them as disseminators of the ideology of social democratic reformism in the South African labour movement, and they receive substantial financial assistance. This assistance goes both to the old reformist trade union centres and to the new trade union associations emerging in a situation of great upsurge of the labour movement in South Africa. For example, the ICFTU and US labour unions gave assistance to the Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA)*, which was set up in 1954 and included both white and "parallel" black trade unions. In an *African Communist* article R.E. Matajo wrote that TUCSA, which wanted reforms "within the existing social structure", took "a typically social democrat stance".¹⁵⁷

In the opinion of the South African Communists, it was interference on the part of the ICFTU and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, among others, along with the apartheid regime's repression, which promoted divisions in the South African labour movement by "financing different union centres and splitter groups", backing the ones which practice economism and avoid political action.¹⁵⁸

The Social Democrats often portrayed the trade unions as the most powerful instrument for democratic change in South Africa, i.e. essentially opposed them to the national liberation movement, and this was welcomed by some black trade union leaders. The attempt to belittle the ANC's possibilities and ignore the role of the SACP in the movement for national liberation and social emancipation was evident, for example, in the speech by Federation of South African Trade Unions General Secretary John Vorster at the April 1982 FOSATU Congress.

On the whole, however, the insistent desire of reformist trade unions in the West to impose their own line on the labour movement in South Africa evokes an opposite reaction increasingly often. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the largest trade union centre in South African history, was organized on 1 December 1985, and by 1988 its membership has reached the one million mark. The COSATU leadership refused to accept material aid from the ICFTU, even though it was prepared to cooperate with national trade unions in Western Europe. This decision was motivated by the fact that the ICFTU and some of its members did not wage an active struggle against the apartheid regime, fearing that this would be detrimental to the interests of Western countries and monopolies. COSATU's cold atti-

tude toward the ICFTU was probably caused by yet another factor. The Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA), which pursued quite a moderate course in the political spectrum of South Africa's labour movement, became its member. In fact, CUSA's ties with the ICFTU was one of the reasons why CUSA had left the talks on organizing a single trade union federation in South Africa and why it had refused to join COSATU.

In the early 80s, groups appeared in South Africa (especially among university intellectuals) which sought "to use the trade union movement to create a workers' political party".¹⁵⁹ On the whole, these people, often called "legal Marxists" by analogy with late 19th century Russia, adhere to social reformist positions.

The extent to which social reformism will be able (or will have time) to develop in South Africa is going to depend above all on the duration of the struggle to topple the apartheid regime and set up a democratic system, and on the social effects of the Botha government's reforms, which the politicians closely linked with South African big business, want to be continued and deepened.

One cannot exclude the possibility that social reformism will develop in South Africa even after the apartheid system is eradicated. Much will depend on the depth of the transformations carried out during the national democratic revolution.

The South African Communists assume that that revolution can open the way for progress toward socialism. Yusuf Dadoo, a prominent figure in the communist and national liberation movements of South Africa, wrote in this connection: "The characteristic thing about our revolution is that it is developing in conditions of extreme national oppression, expressed in the system of racism and apartheid, which deprives the oppressed majority of the people, the creator of the wealth of the nation, of even the very minimum economic and political rights. Thus, the main content of our struggle is the national liberation of the African people from the yoke of racist and colonialist rule. As monopoly capitalism is closely linked with the racist system of oppression, the tasks of national liberation are closely linked with those of social liberation. Furthermore, the country has attained a social and economic level that provides objective material preconditions (the developed capitalist state sector, large-scale and mechanized farming) for transition to an advanced social system. When free, the people of South Africa will be able to proceed towards socialism fairly rapidly."¹⁶⁰

It is therefore clear that opposition to reformist ideology, which is currently a brake on the revolutionary process, will continue to be of paramount importance in South Africa.

* Having lost the bulk of its membership, TUCSA disbanded in 1986.

The years since the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire have seen a considerable step-up of the struggle to rid the African continent of colonialism and racism. International social democracy has also taken a move forward; it paid greater attention to the south of the continent: e.g. visits to front-line countries by both a special SI mission and individual SI personages. The SI Programme of Action and subsequent discussion of the region's problems at SI congresses, other meetings of its leading bodies, and in the social democratic press have been a reflection of the evolution toward recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle against colonialism and apartheid in all its forms and toward giving some concrete assistance to that struggle.

Yet there has also been a definite inconsistency manifested: many social democratic parties have been marking time and taking no concrete steps to implement their own Programme of Action. Moreover, attempts were made to review some of its points, especially that on recognition of the national liberation movements.

Differentiation in the ranks of social democracy has been more apparent in this period: the left forces have stepped up their demands for total isolation of the Pretoria regime and active support of the struggle of the southern African peoples. In its turn, this created favourable conditions for a broader participation by Social Democrats in national and international public organizations opposed to apartheid and colonialism, and for contacts and eventually cooperation between Communists and Social Democrats on questions involved in supporting this struggle.

NOTES

- ¹*Socialist Affairs*, Vol. 26, No. 4-5, July-October 1976, p. 110.
- ²*Ibid.*
- ³*Labour's Programme for Britain. Annual Conference 1976*, London, 1976, p. 124.
- ⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 125-126.
- ⁵*Ibid.*, p. 126.
- ⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 126-127.
- ⁷Erhard Eppler, *Ende oder Wende. Von der Machbarkeit der Notwendigen*, Stuttgart, Berlin, 1975, p. 109.
- ⁸*Der Spiegel*, No. 26, June 21, 1976, pp. 45-46.
- ⁹Press Release of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), November 23, 1976. Resolution Adopted by the SPD Executive on the SPD Policy Regarding Southern Africa.

- ¹⁰*Namibia News*, Vol. 9, Nos. 6-8, June-August 1976, p. 3.
- ¹¹Press Release of the Social Democratic Party of Germany...
- ¹²*Socialist Affairs*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1977, p. 6.
- ¹³Olof Palme, *Social Democracy and the Liberation Struggle in South Africa*, Socialist International Congress, Geneva, November 26-28, 1976, p. 3.
- ¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 7.
- ¹⁵*Ibid.*
- ¹⁶*Socialist Affairs*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1977, pp. 32-35.
- ¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 33.
- ¹⁸*Pravda*, December 25, 1976.
- ¹⁹*Socialist Affairs*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1977, p. 49.
- ²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 50.
- ²¹*Ibid.*
- ²²*Ibid.*, p. 46.
- ²³*Ibid.*, No. 6, 1977, p. 143.
- ²⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 143-147.
- ²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 146.
- ²⁶*The African Communist*, No. 73, 1978, p. 97.
- ²⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 97-98.
- ²⁸*Jeune Afrique*, No. 876, October 21, 1977, p. 84.
- ²⁹*Socialist Affairs*, No. 3, 1978, p. 74.
- ³⁰*The Citizen*, Johannesburg, March 7, 1979.
- ³¹*The Star*, Johannesburg, November 6, 1979.
- ³²*Documentation. Congress Against the Nuclear Cooperation Between FRG and SA, Bonn, 11-12 November 1978*, Bonn, 1979, p. 29.
- ³³*Fact v. Fiction. Rebuttal of the Charges of Alleged Cooperation Between the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa in the Nuclear and Military Fields*, Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Bonn, 1977.
- ³⁴*Reply. Answer to a Denial of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning the Military-Nuclear Collaboration Between the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa.*
- ³⁵*Daily Telegraph*, October 26, 1977.
- ³⁶*Star*, Johannesburg, January 10, 1979.
- ³⁷*Financial Mail*, Johannesburg, January 2, 1981.
- ³⁸*Facts and Reports*, Vol. 9, No. 13, January 11, 1979, p. 16.
- ³⁹*Financial Mail*, Johannesburg, October 26, 1979.
- ⁴⁰*The Sunday Times*, Johannesburg, June 9, 1980.
- ⁴¹*Ibid.*, September 9, 1979.
- ⁴²*The Guardian*, London, June 2, 1980.
- ⁴³*The Observer*, December 14, 1980.
- ⁴⁴*The Guardian*, January 19, 1981.
- ⁴⁵*Socialist Affairs*, No. 4, 1980, p. 104.
- ⁴⁶*The Citizen*, Johannesburg, June 7, 1979.
- ⁴⁷Statement by H.E. Mr. Hadas Cars, Minister of Trade, United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, *Department of Political and Security Council Affairs. Notes and Documents*, No. 3/1979, March, p. 6.
- ⁴⁸*Africa Groups of Sweden*. Press Release, Paris, 1981.
- ⁴⁹*Socialist Affairs*, No. 4, 1980, pp. 104-105.
- ⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. 107.

- ⁵¹*Africa Groups of Sweden.*
- ⁵²*The Observer*, March 18, 1979.
- ⁵³Statement by Johan J. Holst, Norwegian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to the International Conference on Sanctions Against South Africa, Paris, May 22, 1981.
- ⁵⁴*The Star*, Johannesburg, January 23, 1979.
- ⁵⁵*The Sunday Times*, Johannesburg, December 30, 1979.
- ⁵⁶*The Daily News*, Durban, June 5, 1980.
- ⁵⁷*The Irish Times*, January 29, 1979.
- ⁵⁸*Financial Mail*, Johannesburg, October 7, 1977.
- ⁵⁹*Daily News*, April 27, 1983.
- ⁶⁰*Asia and Africa Today*, No. 5, 1981, p. 11.
- ⁶¹*World Marxist Review*, No. 2, 1981, p. 84.
- ⁶²*Socialist Affairs*, No. 3, 1980, p. 87.
- ⁶³*Ibid.*, No. 2, 1980, p. 31.
- ⁶⁴*The Guardian*, February 17, 1978.
- ⁶⁵*Socialist Affairs*, No. 2, 1978, p. 55.
- ⁶⁶*Ibid.*, No. 6, 1979, p. 167.
- ⁶⁷*The Financial Times*, July 12, 1979, p. 7.
- ⁶⁸*Socialist Affairs*, No. 5, 1980, p. 169.
- ⁶⁹*Rand Daily Mail*, October 25, 1980.
- ⁷⁰*The Citizen*, Johannesburg, April 7, 1984.
- ⁷¹*Financial Mail*, Johannesburg, October 26, 1979.
- ⁷²*The Sunday Times*, Johannesburg, October 19, 1980.
- ⁷³Olof Palme, *Social Democracy and Liberation Struggle...*, p. 6.
- ⁷⁴*Socialist Affairs*, No. 1, 1979, p. 22.
- ⁷⁵*Sechaba*, February 1979, pp. 27-29.
- ⁷⁶*The Guardian*, January 23, 1980.
- ⁷⁷*Weekly News Briefing*, No. 4, 1980, p. 3.
- ⁷⁸*South Africa Digest*, May 26, 1978.
- ⁷⁹*The Cape Times*, November 10, 1980.
- ⁸⁰*Morning Star*, October 23, 1981.
- ⁸¹*Ibid.*
- ⁸²SACTU Statement on Interference by International Trade Union Centres in the Democratic Labour Movement of South Africa, p. 3.
- ⁸³*Ibid.*, p. 4.
- ⁸⁴*Socialist Affairs*, No. 1, 1979, p. 8. Drawn up in 1978 with the participation of a "contact group" of five Western powers, this plan did not meet a number of SWAPO demands and was a compromise by nature. But it was thwarted by South Africa even in that form.
- ⁸⁵*Ibid.*, p. 14.
- ⁸⁶*Ibid.*, p. 19.
- ⁸⁷*Socialist International Congress. Vancouver, November 3-5, 1978.* Speech by Olof Palme, Swedish Social Democratic Party, p. 5.
- ⁸⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.
- ⁸⁹*Ibid.*, p. 9.
- ⁹⁰See *Socialist International Congress. Vancouver, November 3-5, 1978.* Speech by Hans-Jürgen Wischniewski, SPD, November 4, 1978, pp. 1-2.
- ⁹¹*Ibid.*, p. 3.

- ⁹²*Socialist Affairs*, No. 1, 1979, p. 27.
- ⁹³*Ibid.*, p. 28.
- ⁹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 22.
- ⁹⁵*Ibid.*, No. 6, 1979, pp. 138-139.
- ⁹⁶*Ibid.*, No. 2, 1980, p. 52.
- ⁹⁷*Ibid.*, No. 4, 1980, p. 91.
- ⁹⁸*Ibid.*, No. 5, 1980, p. 154.
- ⁹⁹*Ibid.*, No. 1, 1981, p. 9.
- ¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, p. 14.
- ¹⁰¹*Socialist International Congress, Madrid, 13-16 November 1980.* Speech by Bruno Kreisky, November 13, 1980, p. 13.
- ¹⁰²*Socialist Affairs*, No. 1, 1981, p. 23.
- ¹⁰³*Ibid.*
- ¹⁰⁴*Sechaba*, July 4, 1979, p. 10.
- ¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*
- ¹⁰⁶*Socialist Affairs*, No. 6, 1981, p. 238.
- ¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*
- ¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, p. 208.
- ¹⁰⁹"Le parti socialiste et l'Afrique sub-saharienne", *Le Continent*, May 21, 1981.
- ¹¹⁰*Ibid.*
- ¹¹¹*Anti-Apartheid News*, October 1981, p. 5.
- ¹¹²*Quarterly Economic Review of Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland*, London, No. 1, 1983, p. 38.
- ¹¹³See *New Times*, No. 22, May 1983, p. 12.
- ¹¹⁴*Socialist Affairs*, No. 3, 1982, p. 102.
- ¹¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 95.
- ¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, No. 6, 1982, p. 235.
- ¹¹⁷*Ibid.*, No. 3, 1983, p. 114.
- ¹¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 119.
- ¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 106.
- ¹²⁰*Ibid.*
- ¹²¹*Ibid.*, p. 117.
- ¹²²*Ibid.*, No. 1, 1982, pp. 24, 26.
- ¹²³*Ibid.*, No. 2, 1982, p. 76.
- ¹²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 72.
- ¹²⁵See *ibid.*, pp. 76-77.
- ¹²⁶*Morning Star*, August 29, 1978.
- ¹²⁷*The Financial Times*, April 3, 1979.
- ¹²⁸*Report of the 78th Annual Conference of the Labour Party, Brighton, October 1-5, 1979*, London, 1979, pp. 320-321.
- ¹²⁹*Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg, September 13, 1979.
- ¹³⁰*Socialist Affairs*, No. 6, 1980, pp. 188, 189.
- ¹³¹*Ibid.*, p. 189.
- ¹³²*The Guardian*, May 8, 1981.
- ¹³³*Anti-Apartheid News*, June 1982, p. 8.
- ¹³⁴*Sechaba*, February 1982, p. 16.
- ¹³⁵*The Sunday Times*, Johannesburg, May 22, 1983.

¹³⁶ *Against All Reason. Britain and South Africa in the Eighties*, A Fabian Group, London, 1981.

¹³⁷ *United Nations Centre Against Apartheid. Notes and Documents*, New York, No. 5, 1978, p. 2.

¹³⁸ *ICSA Bulletin*, London, No. 15, 1981, p. 28.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ *Socialist Affairs*, No. 1, 1982, p. 9.

¹⁴¹ *Constitutive Congress of the Socialist Inter-African. Tunis, February 26th, 28th, 1981*, p. 31.

¹⁴² *Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg, November 12, 1983.

¹⁴³ *Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Comoros*, No. 4, 1985, p. 20.

¹⁴⁴ *Socialist Affairs*, No. 5, 1984, p. 227.

¹⁴⁵ See Report of Mr Mongi Kool, Secretary General, on the Activities of the SIA since the Constitutive Congress in Tunis (February 1981), p. 7.

¹⁴⁶ *Socialist Affairs*, No. 2, 1986, p. 57.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸ See *Pravda*, June 23, 1986.

¹⁴⁹ See *ibid.*, November 16, 1986.

¹⁵⁰ *World Conference Against Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in Southern Africa, Lisbon, June 16-19, 1977*, p. 149.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

¹⁵² *ICSA Bulletin*, No. 12, April 1981, p. 2.

¹⁵³ *SII*, Vol. XX, No. 6, 1970, p. 82.

¹⁵⁴ *The African Communist*, No. 29, 1967, p. 59.

¹⁵⁵ *Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg*, March 14, 1980.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ *The African Communist*, No. 89, 1982, p. 26.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 95, 1983, p. 84.

¹⁶⁰ *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1977, p. 60.

CHAPTER THREE

A New Departure?

1. The Arusha Conference

During the preparations for the SI conference on southern Africa, *Socialist Affairs* reprinted an article from the French newspaper *Le Monde* which gave as one reason for SI support of the liberation movements "its belief that such support should not be allowed to be a monopoly of the Soviet Union and its Castroist allies".¹ A special SI mission was charged to decide where the conference should be held. During a tour of the front-line countries, mission head Joseph Ki-Zerbo, General Secretary of Volta's Progressive Union, candidly expressed his concern at the increased "communist influence" in southern Africa.

The conference was initially planned for Maputo but was moved to Arusha (Tanzania) because the Mozambican leadership did not give its consent. The forum was repeatedly postponed: from spring to autumn 1982, then to June 1983, April 1984, and finally September 1984.

Following the November 1982 Bureau meeting in Basel it was announced that the conference would take place in June 1983 and would be preceded by a preparatory meeting in the Zimbabwean capital, Harare, in January 1983, which would be attended by delegations from the SI, the front-line states, the ANC and SWAPO.² That meeting was to draw up the conference agenda and consider proposals on a concrete programme of action. However, to the surprise of the organizers, the Zimbabwean government opposed the meeting, and although the 16th SI Congress still spoke of the upcoming June 1983 conference, it again had to be postponed.

The difficulties which the SI leadership encountered were of a political rather than an organizational nature. The differences in the positions of the Social Democrats and the national liberation movements made themselves strongly felt. The stumbling block in this instance was the intention of the leadership of international social democracy to have Israel attend the Arusha Conference, a plan to which the ANC and SWAPO vehemently objected. The SI leaders eventually had to give in, and after yet another postponement a March 1984 meeting in Dar es Salaam between an SI delegation headed by new General Secretary Pentti Väänänen and representatives of the front-line states and the national liberation

movements decided to hold the conference on 4 and 5 September 1984.

The leaders of social democracy continued their efforts to present themselves as all but the sole force "correctly" supporting the peoples of southern Africa. For example, they opposed inviting representatives of progressive international organizations to the conference.

That many problems emerged during the conference preparations was confirmed by the fact that the official name – Conference on Southern Africa of the Socialist International Committee and the Socialist Group of the European Parliament with the Front-line States, ANC and SWAPO – was only decided upon on the eve of the opening.

According to this version of the name, formally the conference was being convened not by the SI itself but by its Committee on Southern Africa jointly with the Socialist Group of the European Parliament, although prior to the conference, this special SI committee, whose co-chairmen were Dutch Party of Labour leader and SI Vice-President Joop den Uyl and Joseph Ki-Zerbo, had not been very active, indeed. This procedural device allowed the conference organizers to avoid inviting the Israeli Social Democrats, to whose attendance the Africans had strongly objected. Conference chairman was den Uyl, while Ki-Zerbo officially represented the Committee but not the party which he led, thereby surmounting yet another difficulty: although Volta's Progressive Union, which was in opposition to the government of Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta), was not invited to the conference, the leader of that party was nevertheless in attendance. The Socialist Party of Senegal did not attend the Arusha Conference although it was on the draft list of participants. As was stated earlier, the Socialist Inter-African and those of its parties which were not SI members were not invited to Arusha at all. Thus, African social reformists were only represented by the Mauritian Labour Party, a fact which again showed the weakness of SI positions on the African continent.

Western Europe was represented in Arusha by 12 parties and the Socialist Group of the European Parliament, including five SI vice-presidents: Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, Portuguese Prime Minister Mario Soares, former Prime Ministers of the Netherlands and Denmark Joop den Uyl and Anker Jorgensen, and First Secretary of the French Socialist Party Lionel Jospin.

The delegations of the front-line countries were headed by Presidents Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Quett Masire, and Samora Machel, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, and MPLA-Party of Labour CC Political Bureau member Pascual Luvualu, and the

ANC and SWAPO delegations by Oliver Tambo and Sam Nujoma respectively.

The Arusha Conference convened at a time when the situation in southern Africa was again aggravated. Backed by the US administration, the South African government had stepped up its aggression and economic pressure against neighbouring African states in an effort to destabilize them and force them to renounce support for the ANC and SWAPO.

During Pieter Botha's May-June 1984 tour of Western Europe, a number of international social democratic figures also gave political support to South Africa's efforts to break the isolation of the racist regime. This tour evoked an outcry in Western Europe (including among Social Democrats) and especially in Africa. For example, the Angolan news agency ANGOP declared that the invitation to Botha extended by a number of West European countries was an affront to the whole of Africa and open support for the racist regime, contrary to resolutions of the UN, the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement. SI member parties were leading the governments in four (Portugal, Austria, Italy and France) of the eight countries (not counting West Berlin and the Vatican) which Botha visited. True, it should be pointed out that it was only in Lisbon that he was received officially. Furthermore, it was reported that Portuguese Prime Minister and SI Vice-President Soares accepted the racist premier's invitation to visit South Africa, although in a meeting with journalists in Arusha he said that he did not intend to go there. A Portuguese Communist Party statement noted that Botha's visit was a direct violation of the Constitution and an insult to the Portuguese people, and ran counter to the country's national interests. In Austria and Italy Botha's visit was considered unofficial but that did not prevent Austrian Chancellor Fred Sinowatz and Italian government head Benitto Craxi (also an SI Vice-President) from receiving him.

Botha was also permitted to visit France, formally to attend the opening of a monument to South Africans who had died in France. The French Socialist Party leadership kept Botha at a distance and he was only able to meet with the Secretary of State for Armed Forces Veterans. The London *Times* reported that President Mitterand "made it clear that he was not prepared to receive Mr. Botha", while the offer of talks between French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson and Pik Botha, his South African counterpart, was rejected by the South Africans.³ However, the very fact that, contrary to UN resolutions, the PSF government agreed to the racist premier's visit to France evoked wide protest, including among Socialists. The French Communist Party and a number of

other democratic organizations held a mass protest meeting outside the South African embassy in Paris.

This visit drew attention to France's continuing cooperation with South Africa in a number of areas. For example, *Le Monde* wrote that the South African army was having no difficulty in obtaining spare parts for French military equipment previously supplied to South Africa. Following the Botha visit, in an obvious effort to remedy somewhat the unfavourable impression left by its position, the French government invited ANC President Oliver Tambo to Paris and accorded him a studiously warm reception.

It is only natural that the main topics at the Arusha Conference were isolation of the racist South African regime and stepped-up support for the national liberation movements. New signs of the crisis of the apartheid regime became apparent on the eve of and during the conference. The mass protests against the new South African Constitution, which was designed to perpetuate apartheid, and the successful boycott of elections to the parliamentary chambers for coloureds and Indians (they were boycotted by over 80 per cent of the electorate) could not but affect the positions of the delegations assembled in Arusha. They again demonstrated that the racist regime had no right to speak on behalf of South Africa, as Botha tried to do during his tour of Western Europe. The conference was undoubtedly also positively affected by the fact that it took place in Tanzania, a country with a firm and consistent stance on the liberation struggle in southern Africa.

The opening address by Tanzanian President and Chairman of the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania (CCM) Julius Nyerere set the tone of the conference. He voiced the opinion that the aim of the West European delegations should be "to understand the problem as we in Southern Africa see it and ... to consider how, on that basis, they can most effectively continue and extend their support for the struggle for Namibian independence and the abolition of apartheid".⁴

For their part, the front-line states and liberation movements at the Arusha Conference wanted to help Social Democrats better understand the kind of support which West European socialist parties could give the southern African fighters. The Tanzanian leader saw in this a coincidence of the concerns and objectives of both groups.⁵

Nyerere denounced South Africa's attempts to block Namibian independence, repression against the oppressed majority in South Africa itself, destabilization of neighbouring African states, and plans to involve them in a "constellation of states" in whose economy South Africa would dominate.⁶

He called for isolation of South Africa from the world community, drawing special attention to the need strictly to observe the ban on military cooperation with that country. "In an endeavour to increase exports, [West] European governments of many hues have supplied goods which are directly relevant to the South African capacity to hold down its own population and attack its neighbours." He urged the Social Democrats to ensure, at least, that their countries "do not make profits from apartheid's military operations".⁷

Nyerere underscored that in its actions, in particular the delay in granting independence to Namibia, Pretoria had the complete support of the USA.⁸

Robert Mugabe was sharp in his criticism of Washington's co-operation with Pretoria. Recalling that Botha had demanded that South Africa's neighbours "normalize ties with Pretoria", otherwise "their people stand to suffer most in the end", Mugabe said that Botha started to speak very arrogantly "soon after his meeting with Dr. Chester Crocker, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs".⁹ "What, really, is the Reagan administration now up to in this region?" Mugabe went on to ask. "Are we left to judge that the so-called policy of 'constructive engagement' has now turned into a policy of constructive instigation of the Botha regime to resort to a policy of blackmailing South Africa's neighbours into succumbing to apartheid so it can gain respectability?... We cannot avoid the feeling that we have all along been cheated. But may I state, emphatically, that although cheated, yes, we have been, blackmailed we shall not be!"¹⁰

Urging the Socialist International and its member parties to promote the liberation process in southern Africa, Mugabe stated that it was time to move "beyond rhetoric and ... put our hands to the plough".¹¹

The leaders of the national liberation movements made a similar assessment of the USA's connivance at the Pretoria regime. Speaking at an SI-sponsored conference, they naturally expressed gratitude for the support, including material aid, which the Social Democrats were giving to their movements. However, they did not confine themselves to words of gratitude. For example, ANC President Oliver Tambo hailed the social democratic parties which had proposed measures to isolate South Africa, but added: "In honesty we should, however, also say that these actions have been small relative to the enormity of the problem we face in Southern Africa and in terms of the extensive backing that the apartheid regime receives from the countries of western Europe."¹²

In his turn, SWAPO President Sam Nujoma criticized the attempts by the ideological friends of the Pretoria regime to take it out of international isolation and economic difficulties, and recalled that some SI members were involved in these efforts. "We," he said, "regret to point out ... our dismay at the fact that even some of the western social democracies gave in to some of the manoeuvring efforts of the US administration for the de-isolation of the international racist criminals by inviting them or receiving the chief of the oppressive apartheid state in their countries. We appeal to those states which did so, to desist from this policy."¹³

The representatives of a number of social democratic parties also criticized US policy in southern Africa and Western links with South Africa.

Thus, Joop den Uyl condemned the US administration's attempts to present the agreements concluded between South Africa and some independent African countries as "the beginning of a new era of respectability for the South African regime."¹⁴ He voiced opposition to the US and South African "linkage" of Namibian independence to the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. Olof Palme took a similar stance.

In their speeches, leaders of social democratic parties often promised to step up support for the liberation movements and front-line states, and to take measures to reduce ties with the racist regime.

Den Uyl and Palme made the most concrete proposals but hardly any of the measures suggested went beyond the SI Programme of Action on southern Africa adopted seven years before the Arusha Conference (some points of that programme, if not exactly forgotten, had not been implemented by social democratic parties and governments).

SI leaders also admitted that there was still a gap between words and deeds. For example, den Uyl, who represented Western social democracy in the leadership of the SI Committee on Southern Africa, noted that although many parties "have long-standing ties with the liberation movements, the Socialist International has not been active enough to be present in Southern Africa to implement the policies we adopted."¹⁵ With the self-critical attitude typical of him (this was mentioned earlier in connection with the oil embargo against South Africa), the Dutch Party of Labour leader said further: "I am enough of a realist to admit that implementation is far from perfect. We will have to strengthen our policies." He urged all social democratic parties — ruling and in opposition — to elaborate with the African delegates "a more adequate policy for Southern Africa".¹⁶

Making his appeal more specific, den Uyl made reference to the Communiqué of the Socialist International and the Socialist Group of the European Parliament, which had been circulated prior to the conference (obviously so as to influence its decisions). This communiqué proposed, for example, an end to new investments in South Africa, no government guarantees for credit on exports to South Africa, strict observance of the arms embargo against South Africa, reduced trade contacts with that country, and strict observance of the EEC Code of Conduct.¹⁷

Den Uyl also mentioned the support of some social democratic parties (including his own) for the oil embargo against South Africa, although this demand was not part of the communiqué.

Thus, the measures offered to the conference participants in that SI document were hardly in accord with the concept of the "systematic programme of economic withdrawal from South Africa", spoken of in 16th Congress resolutions. What is more, there was even a retreat from earlier decisions, for example, on an oil embargo, for, judging by den Uyl's words, only "some" social democratic parties favoured the embargo. This line of the leadership of international social democracy differed substantially from that of the liberation movement leaders, who had always (and the Arusha Conference was no exception) demanded comprehensive sanctions against South Africa, including cessation of trade. In their communiqué the Social Democrats spoke, as they had done before, of the need for the UN Security Council to introduce mandatory sanctions. But the extent of the sanctions was not specified (the word "comprehensive" was omitted from the communiqué). In the interim (and the introduction of sanctions was doubtful, given the US and British veto right), the SI urged that "the countries of Europe and the European Community should concentrate on direct selective actions".¹⁸

The Social Democrats' communiqué linked the growth in "opposition to minority rule" not with greater activity on the part of the freedom fighters and their use of resolute methods of struggle but primarily with demographic changes in South Africa, where the African population was growing more rapidly than the white. The SI again avoided the question of supporting the armed resistance to the racist regime. "Change will come," the communiqué said. "The question is whether it will be through peaceful or other means. The South African regime has a choice."¹⁹ The armed struggle waged by the ANC and SWAPO for many years was totally ignored in this document.

The positions on the most important problems of southern Africa were outlined in the Joint Communiqué of the Socialist Inter-

national, the Socialist Group of the European Parliament, the Front-Line States, ANC and SWAPO. (Thus, while the official name of the conference mentioned the SI Committee on Southern Africa rather than the organization itself, the final document was adopted on behalf of the Socialist International.) This final document of the Arusha Conference was clearly a compromise acceptable to all participants.

During the conference, Arusha was decorated with numerous panels made in the green colour, traditional for the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania (CCM), and bearing slogans in support of the ANC and SWAPO and appeals to international social democracy. For example, a placard near the African Conference Centre, the site of the meeting, said: "We argue the Socialist International to support the liberation struggle in South Africa and Namibia". True, as later became clear, this strong language resulted from an error in the English text, and the word "argue" was soon replaced by the word "urge".

Accidental though it must have been, this placard became a kind of symbol of the serious differences between participants in the Arusha Conference. These differences were indirectly reflected in the final document, which becomes clear when it is compared with the Social Democrats' communique. For example, the document passed jointly with the African leaders spoke only of the armed struggle which Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe had waged for their independence, while most African leaders stressed that the ANC and SWAPO had been forced to use this form of struggle when, in the words of Julius Nyerere, "it was clear that other forms of opposition were having no impact on the South African government".²⁰

However, there is sufficient ground for assuming that the very possibility of supporting the armed liberation struggle in southern Africa was still unacceptable for many social democratic leaders. Typical in this respect was the interview given by Lionel Jospin to *L'Unité* on the results of the Arusha Conference. Asked what French Socialists and the SI in general could do about South Africa, which "seems to understand no language other than that of force", Jospin replied that because of its essence and historical calling, the PSF could not use force against force.

One gets the impression that this "essence" of the PSF manifested itself only in southern Africa since it certainly did not prevent the government formed by that party from using force: for example, to interfere in Chad's internal affairs.

In assessing the results of the Arusha Conference, it should be noted that it did adopt a number of important decisions. For

example, the joint communique rejected the USA's policy of "constructive engagement" with South Africa, demanded that "until real change takes place, that is, the destruction of the system of apartheid and separate development", South Africa should not have "a place in the family of nations"²¹ and urged the Security Council to introduce mandatory comprehensive international sanctions as a means of intensifying pressure on South Africa (it will be recalled that the Social Democrats' communique did not include the word "comprehensive").

The final joint communique was adopted unanimously but this did not mean that the participants held identical positions. For example, a note of discord was struck by Mario Soares. While many delegates emphasized that the forced contacts between some independent African states and South Africa did not in any way justify the West's cooperation with Pretoria, the Prime Minister of Portugal tried to justify his government's links with the racist regime, saying that they offered an opportunity "to express to the authorities of that country our moral condemnation and deep concern at the system of apartheid".²²

Furthermore, while condemning apartheid, Soares actually contrasted it to Portuguese colonial rule, which he delicately termed "Portugal's presence" in Africa. "As the 700,000 Portuguese who live in that country [South Africa.—V.B.] can witness," he stated, "that system does not have any relation to Portuguese culture or with the history of Portugal's presence in the African continent in the five centuries that preceded decolonization."²³ Soares claimed that he himself had "stimulated the process of decolonization that created five new countries in Africa".²⁴ But, as we have already said, the Portuguese colonies, especially Angola, achieved independence earlier than he had planned.

The SI leaders and the final document of the Arusha Conference also spoke of the need to continue cooperation of the conference participants "to achieve the common aim of freedom and independence in Southern Africa".²⁵

From the very outset the conference organizers proposed the setting up of a special mechanism to strengthen links between the SI, on the one hand, and the political parties and movements in southern Africa, on the other. For example, in his opening address SI General Secretary Pentti Väänänen* said it was "one of the

* In 1983, Pentti Väänänen replaced Bernt Carlsson as General Secretary of the Socialist International. In 1987, Carlsson took the post of UN Commissioner for Namibia in the rank of UN Assistant Secretary-General.

central tasks during our deliberations" to "set up the mechanism... to permit this work to go on after we leave Arusha".²⁶

However, none of the African speakers dealt with this question, and at the closing session, when the SI General Secretary proposed establishing a special joint committee, the Africans did not support him, and even the West European delegates were nowhere near unanimous on this matter.

Nevertheless, in the introductory article to the material of the Arusha Conference published by the SI in early 1985, Assistant General Secretary Robin Sears wrote of the creation of a "contact group" as a *fait accompli* although he spoke of its composition only in the future: it "will be composed of a small number of members of the SISAC (Socialist International Southern Africa Committee) and from the Front-Line States and national liberation movements".²⁷ But contrary to the expectations of the SI leadership, African parties and movements never did nominate their representatives to that group, which began acting only as a body of the SI itself.

The final document of the Arusha Conference spoke of a new departure, a new stage in relations between the SI and the freedom fighters of southern Africa.

What does this new departure signify? What is the essence of the new stage in international social democracy's policy in southern Africa?

2. ...And After

On the whole, the results of the Arusha Conference and the Social Democrats' promises of increased support for the freedom fighters were positively assessed in Africa. However, even while the conference was still in progress, the African press expressed misgivings about the gap between the Social Democrats' declarations and the practical deeds of their governments. Thus, in September 1984 the Tanzanian newspaper *Daily News* wrote: "It is usual that when the social democrats meet they make pledges of isolating South Africa. The extent of military, nuclear, cultural, economic and political cooperation between the states of Western Europe and South Africa is well known... On the question of independence for Namibia it is not enough for Socialist parties and governments to vote for UN resolutions but to allow companies and corporations to continue to participate with the South Africans in the plunder of the natural resources of Namibia."²⁸

While welcoming the conference, the newspaper noted that oral expressions of solidarity "must be accompanied by concrete

measures in the relevant parties and governments to enforce the United Nations resolutions on Southern Africa".²⁹

The SI expressed solidarity with the peoples of southern Africa on more than one occasion after the conference as well. The report on that conference was heard and approved at the 1-2 October 1984 Bureau meeting in Rio de Janeiro.³⁰ An ANC observer attended the meeting but was not given a chance to speak. Following the Bureau meeting, SI President Willy Brandt toured a number of Latin American countries, including Cuba. His talks with Fidel Castro focused not only on Central America but also on the situation in southern Africa.

In conditions of a build-up of the liberation movement in southern Africa and primarily in South Africa, the problems of the region were discussed at the 17-18 June 1985 Bureau meeting in Bommersvik, near Stockholm. The meeting condemned South Africa's incursion into Botswana a few days earlier, rejected the puppet "interim government", installed by South Africa in Namibia, and demanded that the so-called treason trials in South Africa be stopped and that those accused be set free.

The SI leadership saluted the ANC Conference that was under way at that time and welcomed the moves "in different countries in Europe and ... in the United States towards applying economic sanctions against South Africa, such as banning new investments".

The question of peaceful or non-peaceful eradication of apartheid was dealt with perhaps more precisely than it had been before: "Only if those representing the majority of South Africans are allowed to organize freely can there be a hope for a peaceful change".³¹

It was proposed that "in the spirit of the Arusha Conference", SI member parties should expand links with the front-line states and the national liberation movements of southern Africa.

The situation in southern Africa was one of the main items on the agenda of the October 1985 Bureau meeting in Vienna, held on the eve of the SI Disarmament Conference, to which the ANC and SWAPO were also invited.

In Vienna the Bureau declared the Social Democrats' resolve "to be in the forefront of the struggle against apartheid", and stated that "no compromise with apartheid is possible". In connection with President Reagan's Executive Directive on very limited measures to reduce Washington's ties with Pretoria, the Bureau urged the US Congress "not to give up on its drive for more comprehensive sanctions". The Bureau said it was "deeply disappointed" that the European community was not able "to define a

policy towards South Africa with real sanctions", and proposed instead that different countries should "coordinate actions outside the framework of the EC". A positive step forward in the Socialist International's position was the call for measures to reduce links with South Africa, measures which were broader than any the Social Democrats had ever proposed, including at the Arusha Conference: for example, a drying up of credit to South Africa, an end to air and sea links, and a ban on oil deliveries. But even this resolution still did not provide for complete economic and political isolation of Pretoria internationally, appealing only for refraining from trade with South Africa.³²

This position of the leadership of international social democracy was attributable, as before, mainly to the continuing policy of partnership with the monopolies of their countries, which prevented the social democratic leaders, even when in power, from taking strong measures against those who obtain enormous profits from exploiting the natural resources and cheap labour in South Africa and occupied Namibia.

The broader measures to weaken links with Pretoria subsequently proposed by the SI leadership were prompted above all by the aggravation of the situation in southern Africa.

The new wave of mass actions by the oppressed majority in South Africa, which started in August 1984 on the eve of the Arusha Conference, was not abating.

Neither increased repression, nor the use of troops to "restore order", nor the state of emergency introduced on 21 July 1985 in important areas of the country could suppress this wave.

Along with the intensified political actions, which were coordinated by the United Democratic Front (a broad coalition of legal anti-racist organizations set up in August 1983), the military operations of the ANC's People's Army — Umkhonto we Sizwe — continued and expanded. The black working class became more militant and organized, as evidenced by the Congress of South African Trade Unions, which immediately put forward not only economic but also political demands, contrary to the expectations of Western reformist circles.

These events made the international public, including Social Democrats, much more interested in and sympathetic to the freedom struggle in southern Africa. On the other hand, even those social democratic figures whose policy in southern Africa was in the interests of their countries' monopolies had to understand that defence of those interests through cooperation with the racist regime was no longer possible; hence the efforts by more and more Social Democrats to expand ties with the national liberation move-

ments and the front-line states, and realization of the need to reduce links with the Pretoria regime.

But even at this new stage in SI relations with the national liberation forces in southern Africa Social Democrat-led governments were taking practical measures to a far lesser extent than that called for by those who were really "in the forefront" of the anti-racist struggle.

As before, the Social Democrats of Nordic countries were very active on the problems of southern Africa.

For example, reduction of economic ties with South Africa was repeatedly discussed in the Swedish parliament. In February 1985, on a proposal of the social democratic government, it passed a law banning loans and credits for the South African government and limiting exchange of technical information, sale of patents, and deliveries of dual-purpose equipment to South Africa which could be used by the army and police. Swedish companies operating in South Africa were prohibited not only from purchasing but also from leasing new equipment there; furthermore, loans to South Africa were prohibited and the requirements for reports to the Swedish government by companies operating in South Africa were tightened. The SAP government also recommended limiting (but not prohibiting) sport, cultural and scientific contacts with South Africa.³³ Also envisaged was a total ban on investment in South Africa, thereby toughening the 1979 law, but this measure was postponed until 1990. Yet 12 major Swedish companies continued to operate in South Africa, and firms like Atlas Copco, Sandvik and Fagersta were the leading ones in South Africa's mining industry.

At the same time, the SAP government again rejected the public demand for comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa, claiming, as before, that Sweden would implement such sanctions if they were adopted as mandatory by the UN Security Council.

The new restrictions did not in any way affect trade between Sweden and South Africa, which not only continued but grew rapidly under the social democratic government. For example, in the first half of 1984 Swedish exports to South Africa almost doubled as compared with the same period in 1983, and continued to grow. According to the Johannesburg newspaper *Business Day*, in 1984 it rose by 59 per cent to a total of 1.48 billion Swedish kroner.³⁴

These and other negative aspects of Sweden's policy in southern Africa prompted a public organization, the Africa Groups of Sweden, to publish a special brochure,³⁵ which noted the contradictory nature of Sweden's relations with South Africa. It also said that apart from the internationally recognized role of Sweden in

the anti-apartheid movement, its policy also had "another face, represented by the strong business interests of Sweden's major export industries".³⁶

"On the one hand the large assistance to the liberation movements, on the other hand the investments in the *apartheid* economy. On the one hand a ban against new investments, on the other an increasing trade. On the one hand various initiatives in United Nations bodies, on the other hand an unwillingness from the government to take unilateral actions (the investment ban was an exception). On the one hand large campaigns, for example, among school students to collect funds for the Freedom College for South African refugees in Tanzania [ANC schools. — *V.B.*], on the other hand advertising in South African papers ... the products of Swedish companies."³⁷

The authors of the brochure were right in saying that these contradictions did not reflect hypocrisy, but various controversial interests exerting pressure on the government, be it social democratic or bourgeois. They noted that, despite the broad anti-apartheid movement in Sweden, it was not easy for the Swedish government to go against the interests of big companies that "represent major power centres" and are regarded as "important factors shaping the economic basis of society".

Moreover, they noted that controversial interests also affected Swedish trade unions, e.g. the metalworkers union, which include workers of companies with subsidiaries in South Africa. Their "careful stand" on adopting sanctions against South Africa reflected fears of the possible impact on employment opportunities in Sweden.

It should also be noted that the adoption of new measures in Sweden was preceded by a sharp discussion in which the right-wing parties declared that tougher sanctions against South Africa would increase unemployment in Sweden and South Africa and deprive Sweden of the opportunity to influence Pretoria's policy.

However, there were no substantial differences between the positions of Sweden's social democratic government, Finland's coalition government led by the Social Democrats, and the bourgeois governments of other Nordic countries during discussion of southern Africa at their Foreign Ministers meetings. Thus, a meeting of foreign ministers of Nordic countries was held on 17-18 October 1985 in Oslo to adopt "an extended and strengthened Programme of Actions Against South Africa" envisaging a reduction of "their economic and other relations" with Pretoria. Significantly this time the adoption by individual countries or groups of countries of their own measures against South Africa was not made contingent on the existence of a relevant UN Security Council Resolution".³⁸

Undoubtedly this decision was adopted due to pressure exerted by the trade unions and other mass organizations of these countries, and that pressure intensified in connection with fresh revelations of secret Norwegian oil deliveries to South Africa and the use of Danish vessels to ship arms to that country (incidentally, Swedish entrepreneurs were also involved in these arrangements).

Swedish legislation passed in 1971 prohibits the sale of weapons to any state engaged in armed conflict with another state located in a region of international tension which could lead to armed conflict, and also to states that could use those weapons to suppress national liberation movements and human rights. It is these propositions to which the Swedish authorities refer so as to explain why Sweden's material aid to the national liberation movements is confined to "humanitarian" purposes.

But when it is a question of supporting reactionary forces, Swedish arms manufacturers circumvent this legislation. According to the *Svensk Export* magazine, Swedish-made weapons had been used in 63 armed conflicts from the Second World War until 1985, and in 39 cases the deliveries were not halted even after the start of military operations, including arms deliveries to the US during the American aggression in Vietnam and Grenada.

In violation of a Security Council resolution and Swedish law, weapons made at Swedish arms factories were still reaching the South African Army and Navy even in 1985.

This was obviously the reason why, in early November 1985, the social democratic government introduced a bill stiffening punishment for arms deliveries to the Pretoria regime. Other new measures were planned to limit links with South Africa: agricultural imports from South Africa were banned, as were imports of South African krugerrands, and the Swedish local authorities were permitted to boycott South African goods.

Yet another concrete measure by the government of Swedish Social Democrats was the decision, readily supported by the governments of Norway and Denmark, to end air links with South Africa, which was finally taken in early August 1985 (it will be recalled that Palme had proposed consideration of the feasibility of this measure at the 14th SI Congress in 1978). The stimulus on this occasion, too, was the public outcry in connection with the exposures about the criminal actions of the SAS airline, which is jointly owned by these Scandinavian countries. It was revealed that for a long time SAS had been taking passengers to South Africa for a "black fare": those wishing to fly to South Africa on SAS were given a 20 per cent discount, the amount usually being paid at the airport in South Africa to avoid publicity.³⁹ The airline thereby man-

aged not only to squeeze out the competition but also to promote tourism to South Africa.

Measures broader than those of the Swedes were taken by the Finnish government, which in October 1985 favoured ending imports from South Africa and had already taken concrete steps to reduce purchases by Finnish government organizations and private firms and enterprises in that country. SSP General Secretary and Chairman of the parliamentary foreign policy commission Erkki Liikanen expressed hope that this step would draw a large political response.

In late November 1985 the Finnish government again returned to the question of sanctions against South Africa, proposing a ban on loans and the sale of licenses to that country. However, contrary to public demands, these measures, too, were not comprehensive for they did not provide, among other things, for an end to exports from Finland to South Africa.

The limited character of the Nordic governments' measures did not satisfy the trade unions, most of whose members are supporters of the social democratic parties. Therefore they launched independent efforts. Transport workers of Finland, and then of Norway, Denmark and Sweden declared a boycott on cargos from South Africa in October-November 1985. Then on 10 November 1985 the Danish trade unions also began to boycott cargos bound for South Africa. They were joined by post office workers in Finland.

Though inconsistent on the question of isolating the racist regime, the social democratic government of Sweden made an important contribution to the national liberation movements by increasing its material aid to them. For example, in connection with the increased flow of refugees from South Africa to neighbouring countries resulting from intensified repression following introduction of a state of emergency in South Africa, Sweden raised material aid to the ANC from 43 to 48 million kronor in the 1985/1986 fiscal year. Finland also stepped up its material aid to national liberation movements.

The British Labour Party also began to take clearer positions on ending economic ties with South Africa. Of great interest in this regard is an article published by the UN Centre Against Apartheid and written by Chris Child, who later joined Neil Kinnock's staff when the latter became Labour leader.⁴⁰ Child wrote that sanctions against the racist regime, like any action to isolate South Africa, "must be seen not as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the existing regime but as contribution to the success of the liberation struggle, whose objective is the removal of the existing regime".⁴¹

He used good arguments to prove that selective sanctions (advocated by SI leaders) and an "economic withdrawal", that is, a gradual reduction of links with South Africa, were not effective enough and could not replace comprehensive mandatory sanctions in accordance with Article 7 of the UN Charter.

It is precisely the prospect of comprehensive mandatory sanctions which frightens not only the government but also "liberal" big business in South Africa. Expressing their opinion, the *Rand Daily Mail* commented in April 1985 that the chances of persuading or even forcing Western governments and Western businesses to implement the sanctions Child advocated were zero. "If the sanctions as he envisages them were to be successful, South Africa would be reduced to a wasteland, and who would go this whole way with him? Certainly not the people—governments and traders—who maintain the actual links with South Africa. They are not going to be coerced into taking part in what, in effect, would be a total onslaught against South Africa."⁴²

But less than six months later, practically all Western governments, both bourgeois and social democratic, "had been coerced", though to varying degrees, to take sanctions against South Africa.

Following the July 1985 introduction of a state of emergency, EEC member countries decided to take some measures to reduce economic links with South Africa and to recall their ambassadors from that country. The refusal of Britain—the only EEC member—to back these measures was sharply criticized by the Labourites. ANC President Oliver Tambo again attended the October 1985 Labour Party Conference as a guest of honour and then, along with Neil Kinnock, the unveiling of a monument to Nelson Mandela in London. Speaking at the ceremony the Labour leader declared that racial tyranny in South Africa was "moving towards twilight" and that "the need for the imposition of sanctions is stronger than ever".⁴³

British trade unions were active in the campaign against links with South Africa. At its October 1985 meeting, the General Council of the British TUC called for the following "minimum steps": an end to British investment in South Africa; the fining of ship owners transporting oil to South Africa and of oil companies breaking the oil embargo; a ban on importation of South African coal to Britain. In response to the Tory government's reluctance to halt cooperation with South Africa, the British anti-racist organizations supported Tambo's call for "people's sanctions" against apartheid, that is, direct actions by trade unions, cooperatives and other organizations to end Britain's ties with South Africa.⁴⁴

Oliver Tambo gave as an example of such sanctions the decisions of the conference of dockers' and seafarers' unions of 30 countries, which was held in London in late October 1985 with the co-sponsorship of the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid. The conference was convened on the initiative of the National Union of Seamen and the Union of Transport and General Workers of Great Britain, and maritime unions of Denmark and Australia.

Labour leader Kinnock also addressed the conference. It adopted a joint declaration and plan of action that envisaged a boycott of vessels taking oil to South Africa, which constitutes about 80 per cent of the fuel consumed in that country. A special coordinating committee made up of trade union representatives from major maritime powers was set up to implement the planned measures.

On the whole, the leadership of the British Labourites and of the trade unions closely linked with the Labour Party took one more step toward the position of the national liberation movements demanding a boycott of South Africa. But it should again be noted that this was done in a situation of general change in Western public opinion when even friends of the apartheid regime were forced to criticize that regime publicly. It was in this situation that there was a "radicalization" of the views on the anti-apartheid struggle held not only by the present Labour leadership but also by the former right-wingers of that party who, as was mentioned earlier, created the Social Democratic Party in Britain. For example, even David Owen, who had been against sanctions, said, having become the party's leader, that Britain's cooperation with the Pretoria regime was criminal and rejected the Tory view that sanctions could hurt the black population of South Africa.

Let us now look at the extent to which the actions of the government of the French Socialist Party, which was very active in the preparations for the Arusha Conference, accorded with the decisions of that conference.

In Arusha, Lionel Jospin spoke of a 25 per cent reduction in trade with South Africa over two years as if it were a big achievement of the Socialist-led government.⁴⁵ But if such a reduction did in fact take place it was primarily because of difficulties in the French economy and not because of deliberate government policy. Immediately after that, France's trade with South Africa began to increase, and fairly substantially at that. By 1984 it had been in excess of ten billion francs, showing an increase by 25 per cent. An important role in this was played by the greater number of French trade and industry delegations visiting South Africa.

In the same speech, Jospin said that France had not sent any weapons or spare parts to South Africa since 1981, that is, since the Socialists had come to power. However, during the January 1985 revelations about the aforementioned weapons shipments on Danish vessels, it became known that many of those shipments were made from the French port of Bordeaux. Tom Rosenber, the former captain of the *Kaj Narup*, told correspondents of the Paris magazine *Afrique-Asie* that he made his first voyage to South Africa with French weapons on board in July 1981, that is, two months after the Socialists came to power. And a representative of a freight company in Bordeaux told him that at first the new government had annulled the South African order but then restored it. The journalists were unable to obtain more details on this in the secretariat of the French Defence Ministry. Then Defence Minister Charles Hernu denied reports of arms deliveries to South Africa direct from France, saying: "All that has happened is completely beyond the competence of the French government... It is for the countries that have uncovered all this to take international action." In this connection, *Afrique-Asie* rightly noted that this position meant that the French authorities were not only distancing themselves from the affair but were also refusing to carry out any investigation, though, to all appearances, it was competent services of the French Defence Ministry which had granted licenses for the export of the cargo, which was known to be weapons destined for South Africa.

The French government's political contacts with South Africa were also developing. "It is symbolic," Jospin said in Arusha, "that, having refused to receive Mr. Botha officially, the French foreign minister and I received Oliver Tambo, the leader of the ANC, in Paris."⁴⁶ But five months after this statement French Minister for External Relations Roland Dumas received none other than Botha, though not President Pieter Botha but Foreign Minister Roelof Botha. Although considered unofficial, this visit was a French initiative and was followed by Quai d'Orsay's communique, which stated that the talks had dealt with the problems of southern Africa. And though the communique repeated France's official position (demands for Namibian independence and Mandela's release and condemnation of apartheid), the French press had sufficient cause to write of a "new stage" and a "change" in French policy.

⁴⁵ In 1985 he was forced to resign over revelations of another secret operation — the blowing up of a Greenpeace vessel in a New Zealand port.

Another five months later one more minister appeared in Paris—South African Minister of Finance du Plessis, who met with directors of French banks, including nationalized ones, although the French foreign department maintained that the visit was “private” and that the South African embassy had not even advised the French authorities of it.⁴⁷

In a France Press interview, du Plessis was pleased to note that trade relations between Paris and Pretoria had expanded, especially South African exports to France.⁴⁸

It is not only South African rulers who visit Paris: their puppets come as well. For example, “president” of the Bophuthatswana bantustan Lucas Mangope visited France in June 1985.

But in mid-1985 French-South African relations were again affected by a feature typical of French foreign policy: an ability to sense a change in the situation and rapidly alter course, thus leaving the rivals behind and gaining maximum political capital. As was stated earlier, France, for example, was the first West European country to recognize the People’s Republic of Angola in February 1976. Something of the kind occurred in late July 1985 when, without waiting for the end of the EEC discussion of the situation in South Africa following the introduction of the state of emergency, France took a number of unilateral steps, including the recall of its ambassador from Pretoria and introduction of limited economic sanctions against South Africa.

Simultaneously France initiated a UN Security Council discussion of the situation in South Africa, leaving the African countries behind on this occasion. These actions were accompanied by steps clearly designed to draw world attention, for example, a demonstration held by Prime Minister Laurent Fabius himself before the South African embassy in Paris. But if the PSF government had been observing UN resolutions, such a demonstration would not have been possible since they called for breaking diplomatic relations with South Africa. However, neither the French nor the other social democratic governments have observed this resolution, the only exception being the Labour Party government of New Zealand, which took a decision to close the South African consulate in 1984. But this initiative was not backed by other SI member parties either during or after the Arusha Conference. When it came to voting in the UN Security Council, France did not support the African countries’ demand and abstained on the question of compulsory sanctions against South Africa (the US and Britain used their veto). Thus, on this occasion, too, the position of the PSF government ran counter to the decision in the adoption of which the PSF had participated.

Addressing the International Emergency Meeting of Solidarity with the Militant People of South Africa, held on AAPSO’s initiative in Addis Ababa from 11 to 13 October 1985, National Secretary of the French Association of Friendship with the Peoples of Africa (AFASPA) Maurice Cukierman said that notwithstanding French government statements about sanctions, they were “nothing but formal measures”. For example, the French government had announced an end to new investments in South Africa, but this actually affected only 4 per cent of the movement of French capital to South Africa⁴⁹ since the ban did not apply to bank loans, the principal channel for transfer of funds to South Africa from France. It should also be borne in mind that most French banks had been nationalized, that is, were under the government’s direct control. Export of coal and other raw materials from South Africa to France also continued.

It is no wonder that despite the French government’s demonstrative steps, the leadership of the South African national liberation movement still called France, Italy and other leading Western countries major allies of Pretoria. Speaking in Addis Ababa, ANC President Oliver Tambo hailed “the heroic efforts of the Movement Against Apartheid in the United States, Britain, France, West Germany and Italy—the major allies of the South African regime”.⁵⁰

There are also many examples of direct and indirect cooperation with Pretoria by the PSP government that was in power in Portugal until the October 1985 elections.

Speaking on a special Portuguese radio programme on South Africa’s “national day”, Pretoria’s ambassador in Lisbon W. Pretorius described relations between the two countries as “excellent”. Portuguese journalists and authors of *Operation Africa. Anti-African Conspiracy in Portugal*, Fernando Semedo and Joao Paulo Guerra, proved conclusively that leaders of anti-Angolan and anti-Mozambican groupings on South Africa’s payroll operated freely in Portugal under the Socialists. These leaders openly rented buildings for their offices and headquarters, kept accounts in state banks, distributed their publications, established close ties with ultra-right organizations, and held press conferences. In one of his statements in December 1985, Samora Machel called Lisbon the “capital of bandits” from the so-called Mozambique National Resistance.

Connivance by the Portuguese authorities at such racist puppets as UNITA and the MNR essentially contradicted the Portuguese Constitution, which “recognizes the right of all peoples to struggle ... against colonialism and imperialism” and declares the country’s

desire to "maintain special bonds of friendship and cooperation" with Portuguese-speaking states.⁵¹

The book's authors believe that the reason for this policy was not only the reluctance of the PSP leadership to come to terms with the victorious national liberation movements, which had chosen a path of social progress, but primarily the subordination of the then government's foreign policy to the imperialist course of Washington.

That government, they noted, wanted to be a "Trojan horse" in Africa, above all in Angola and Mozambique, using Portugal's traditional links with its former colonies to defend imperialism's political, economic and military interests in southern Africa.⁵² One example of such actions was the special seminar in Portugal attended by US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Frank Wisner and other high-ranking American officials, who discussed coordination of Portuguese and US policies in Africa.

The year 1986 was probably the most tumultuous year South Africa has experienced in recent history. The Pretoria regime continued its repressive policy against liberation forces but also made certain, generally forced, concessions primarily to the "urban blacks". Addressing Parliament on 31 January, President Botha announced his new "reforms" (the quotation marks are applicable because Botha's proposed measures were mostly cosmetic). On 1 July 1986 the racial pass laws affecting only Africans were formally revoked and unified South African papers were issued. But the restrictions on living not only in "white" areas but also in "black" townships beyond bantustans remained in effect. The promise of restoring citizenship to people assigned to pseudo-independent bantustans applied only to those of them who lived in the rest of the country. President Botha proposed creating a so-called National Statutory Council that would include blacks for the purpose of discussing the country's future constitutional form of government. But this "initiative" far from answered the demands of the oppressed majority in South Africa. Even the more conciliatory black leaders, like Gatsha Buthelezi, decided against joining the Council.

After lifting the state of emergency on 7 March 1986, the authorities imposed it once again on 12 June that same year on the eve of the tenth anniversary of the Soweto events. This time it was declared throughout the country. A new wave of arrests ensued: from mid-1985 until the end of 1986, approximately 30,000 people were arrested and 3,000 killed.

South Africa continued its aggressive actions against the independent African states. These actions were accompanied by tougher

restrictions placed on both foreign and South African information media.

In this period South Africa became one of the "hottest" spots in world politics. In Stockholm in February 1986, the Swedish Isolate South Africa Committee and the Swedish UN Association organized a People's Parliament Against Apartheid, which reflected the public's increased activity concerning southern Africa. Representatives from many different organizations took part, including many members of the Social Democratic Labour Party of Sweden and its youth wing. Oliver Tambo, President of the African National Congress, and a SWAPO spokesman spoke at a parliament session. Participants at the forum approved of the actions taken by the Swedish government to curtail ties with South Africa and support the liberation struggle waged by the peoples of South Africa and Namibia. It was also noted, however, that in a number of areas contacts and even cooperation with Pretoria were still continuing, primarily on the part of Swedish monopolists.

It was pointed out that the trade restrictions approved by the Riksdag in late 1985 were clearly insufficient, and the law against investment in South Africa and Namibia needed to be strengthened. A number of examples were mentioned of Swedish companies either directly or through their affiliates participating in the development of strategically important spheres of the South African economy.

The Final Document of the People's Parliament unambiguously called on the Swedish government and parliament to "adopt legislation authorizing a total boycott of South Africa now".⁵³

During the discussion of the situation in Namibia, it was noted that the puppet government set up there by South Africa in July 1985 "is led by a person who still holds Swedish citizenship".⁵⁴ (Evidently, the reference was to Moses Katjiuongua — a defector from the national liberation movement who had lived for a number of years in Sweden and still retained his Swedish citizenship even after his return to occupied Namibia.)

The delegates to the People's Parliament called on the Swedish government "to make it impossible for a Swedish citizen to lead a puppet government in Namibia".⁵⁵

Some critical remarks were also made concerning Swedish government restrictions on material aid to the national liberation movements. It was noted, for example, that due to these restrictions "medical aid can only go to SWAPO's civilian sector which, in some cases, seriously limits the capability to give medical treatment".⁵⁶

The decisions reached at the forum clearly determined the procedure for providing assistance from public organizations in the course of the Swedish popular fund-raising campaign against apartheid: "Contributions shall be collected into a fund, 2/3 of which should be reserved for the ANC and SWAPO while the remainder can be assigned to other resistance organizations in South Africa and Namibia, after consultation with the liberation movements."⁵⁷

It is important to mention the delegates' political evaluation of the situation in South Africa and Namibia and the methods of the liberation struggle. It was noted that "the armed struggle conducted by the ANC liberation movement for over twenty years enjoys broad and growing support among black South Africans and their organizations". While expressing their desire to avoid a further escalation of armed conflict, which would entail large-scale bloodshed, and stressing that Sweden's support should help here (including the support of those groups which advocated civil disobedience and other non-violent methods), the delegates also maintained that it was necessary for Sweden to "stress its respect for the difficult decision of the liberation movements to extend the armed struggle. The People's Parliament Against Apartheid emphasizes the right of the South African people to decide which forms of struggle they shall pursue in order to liberate themselves from the oppression of apartheid."⁵⁸

The forum was especially significant due to the participation of Olof Palme. Speaking at the opening session on 21 February 1986, he underscored the need for uniting forces against the Pretoria regime: "It is by taking joint responsibility that we can contribute to abolishing the apartheid system. This system can live on because it gets support from outside. If the support is pulled away and turned into resistance, apartheid cannot endure. If the world decides to abolish apartheid, apartheid will disappear.

"Fundamentally this is a profoundly emotional question and one which goes to the depth of our feelings because it is such an uncommonly repugnant system. Simply because, on account of people's colour, it abandons them to poverty. This system will be a disgrace to the world for as long as it persists."⁵⁹

It so happened that this speech at the People's Parliament was the prime minister's last public appearance. A week later, on 28 February 1986, he was assassinated. Olof Palme's death shook the progressive world community. His services on behalf of peace and security among nations, and especially his activities as chairman of the international commission on these problems (which was renamed the Palme Commission after his death) cannot be forgot-

ten. But for the liberation fighters in southern Africa his death represented the loss of the individual who had done more for them than probably any other Western statesman. In his message of condolence, ANC President Oliver Tambo wrote that Palme was "one of us, a fellow combatant who has made an inestimable contribution to the struggle for the liberation of South Africa".⁶⁰ Although his murderer has not been found, leaders of national liberation movements widely believe that Pretoria was responsible.

According to Tambo, "The murderer's gun that fired the fatal shot was aimed directly against the ANC and our people as well, because none can benefit from this enormously horrendous crime except the oppressors and exploiters, and first and foremost among them the Pretoria regime".⁶¹ Symbolically, Olof Palme's funeral was attended by Tambo as well as leading figures in the anti-racist movement—Bishop Desmond Tutu and Alan Boesak, patron of the United Democratic Front. *Socialist Affairs* wondered if this was "A sign of things to come?"⁶²

Unquestionably Olof Palme, the rational politician and government leader, was, in his own words, emotional when it came to dealing with southern Africa. His widow related how almost 40 years ago Palme "met young people from South Africa who had been thrown out from education because of the colour of their skin. He decided then, together with his comrades, to collect money for those young people's studies. They gave blood to raise money."⁶³

The SAP leader's address to the 1984 Arusha Conference was equally emotional. Palme recalled how 20 years ago he had welcomed Tambo at his home, and after that, having become prime minister, he often received the ANC President in Stockholm as a dignitary, "because he is a dignitary". Palme's warmth towards the leaders of liberation movements plus the sincere respect he showed them made him especially popular among the fighters against colonialism and racism.

"As we march forward towards the accomplishment of Olof Palme's dream of a lifetime, the liberation of South Africa, his name will be on our banners, his memory in our hearts and minds and his example a driving impulse to us who must be prepared to give our lives as he did his own," Tambo's message read.⁶⁴

If as head of the Swedish government and leader of the Social Democratic Labour Party Olof Palme could not always answer the appeal of the liberation movements or fully implement the UN decisions against Pretoria, it was not due to any lack of desire on his part but because of the severe limitations that Swedish reality places on the head of government, even when he is a Social Democrat.

Many of the participants and guests at the Special SI Meeting on Southern Africa held on 18-19 April 1986 in Gaborone, the capital of Botswana, spoke of Olof Palme's contribution. The meeting not only reiterated the Socialist International's support for the struggle against apartheid, the illegal occupation of Namibia and the destabilization of the front-line states, but also called on the spot "for direct practical actions that can be instrumental in ending apartheid".⁶⁵ SI leaders rightly noted that holding the meeting in the capital of Botswana, located only 10 kilometres from the South African border, should be seen as a demonstration of solidarity with the peoples of the region opposed to apartheid.

Speaking at the opening session, President Kaunda recalled the decisions jointly adopted by participants in the Arusha Conference in 1984 and expressed his disappointment that "absolutely no progress" had been made since then to eradicate apartheid, achieve the independence of Namibia and halt South Africa's aggression against independent African states. He stressed that the front-line states demanded "the imposition of comprehensive and mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa".⁶⁶

The meeting in Gaborone was preceded by important personal initiatives made by Willy Brandt. First, he met with Tambo in the FRG and then flew to South Africa (as SPD Chairman) to engage in talks with Alan Boesak, Desmond Tutu, Winnie Mandela and other prominent fighters against apartheid. He also met with the leaders of black trade unions and the Progressive Federal Party, and representatives of business circles, and visited the black township of Alexandra. His trip convinced him that "many [in South Africa. — V.B.] expect pressure from abroad, and they are willing to pay the temporary price for it",⁶⁷ i.e., they were willing to endure the hardships sanctions against Pretoria could create for the oppressed majority of the population as well.

Willy Brandt's speech in Gaborone deserves special attention inasmuch as for the first time the President of the Socialist International himself detailed the position of international social democracy on problems of southern Africa.

Brandt indirectly acknowledged the responsibility of Western countries for cooperating with the apartheid regime: "Many people abroad are but little justified to point a finger at white South Africans. For what have they done, what have we done in all these years during which in South Africa the system of oppression became ever more perfect and ever more brutal? Were not South African markets to many people more important than millions of its citizens?"⁶⁸

It is important that SI President not only admitted past mistakes but adopted a firm position against apartheid: "But in full recognition of our own failures, let us make one thing perfectly clear: we refuse to support or to implement any policy in our own countries which would even in the slightest way help to hold up the system of apartheid."⁶⁹

Brandt distanced himself from the South African policy of the US administration, explaining that "the ruling circles in South Africa must not refer to us when they speak of their friends throughout the world who would not let them down".⁷⁰ Though the US was not specifically mentioned, Reagan's words that America would not let South Africa down were fresh in the minds of many.

The SI President denounced the "current fashion ... of 'reforming' apartheid". "Apartheid cannot and must not be reformed. It must be abolished — totally and at once."⁷¹ Brandt said that abolishing apartheid was a necessary condition before a "dialogue between the groups" could take place. This position was close to the ANC demand that the goal of possible future talks with Pretoria — the dismantling of apartheid — be determined beforehand.

Brandt made it clear who was responsible for the violence in South Africa: "Time and again, one must repeat: the source of violence is not those who resist, but those who have built their rule on injustice and oppression."⁷²

In many respects new was the Social Democrats' acknowledgement of the ANC not only as "the oldest liberation movement of this continent" but also the "most important liberation movement representing all of South Africa".⁷³ SI President also stressed the role of the ANC in deciding South Africa's future: "With whom if not with the ANC is one to discuss the transition to a South Africa of equal rights where people of every colour can live together in peace?"⁷⁴ At the same time he noted that "many groups and civil rights movements ... deserve as great respect as the liberation movement".⁷⁵ Indeed, the anti-racist forces of South Africa are active in many legal organizations, the majority of which belong to the United Democratic Front. But, as the ANC leaders have observed, the fight in this country is first of all for national liberation, not just for civil rights.

Brandt expressed his concern that "the opportunity for peaceful change may already have been lost", mentioning in this connection above all not only "the self-destructive stubbornness of those in power" but also "the radicalization of young blacks in their urban as well as rural settlements".⁷⁶

Speaking about the situation in Namibia, the SI President advocated achieving the country's independence through free elec-

tions with the unrestricted participation of SWAPO, and condemned Pretoria's efforts to give Namibia fake independence that would exclude this party.

Still, Brandt merely characterized SWAPO as "the most important strongest political force in that country"⁷⁷ and not as the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people.

Although, as has already been noted, his interlocutors in South Africa expressed their willingness to pay the price for sanctions against Pretoria, Brandt declared in his speech: "We do not want to punish the citizens of South Africa by boycotts."⁷⁸ He did not support the demand of the liberation forces in South Africa and Namibia, and shared by the world public, including many Social Democrats, to impose comprehensive sanctions against Pretoria. Specifically, he only proposed stopping "new credits and investments, new export guarantees", and supported "selective and effective import and export restrictions and continued embargoes on cultural and sports relations".⁷⁹

In proposing these measures (limited as they were) to diminish ties with South Africa, he mentioned three arguments that had been used in the West to justify their preservation. On two of the arguments his views are quite objective.

First, he said: "The commodity dependence of the West from South Africa is a preferred and intentionally cultivated legend. In reality, South Africa depends on the West."⁸⁰

Second, he sharply disagreed with the idea about South Africa's great strategic importance, stressing that the country should not be drawn into the East-West controversy, and that the best guarantee for strategic stability in that part of the world would be a non-aligned South Africa.⁸¹

As for the third argument—the West needs South Africa as a bulwark against communism—Brandt refuted it as well, saying "The white regime should not take it for granted that its strong anti-communism justifies brutal violations of human rights".⁸²

Then, however, Brandt proposed his own measures for defence against communism, "assuming that such a defence was really needed". Observing that democratic socialists "understand a bit better how to deal with communism", he characterized the methods used in South Africa as the wrong ones and said the only danger of South Africa going communist would be "if white minority rule continues".⁸³

Noting the necessity of supporting the economies of the front-line states, Brandt expressed great concern over the position of the United States, which had gone from its linkage policy—which prevented Namibian independence—to discussing support for

UNITA (in fact, it was already supporting UNITA. — V.B.), which strongly resembled the support of the Contras in Nicaragua. "Behind all this lies the idea of a 'roll-back'. The real concern seems to be not the fate of African peoples but rather the elimination of possible Soviet influence in Southern Africa."⁸⁴

Still, the SI President noted that the US position "was understandable from a narrow point of superpower competition", adding that the "real problem is how to prevent the superpowers from exporting their controversies into more and more regions of the world".⁸⁵

Brandt's criticism of Pretoria and its US patron was supported and even intensified by many of those who spoke at the Gaborone meeting, particularly the Scandinavian Social Democrats. Brigitta Dahl, a representative of the Social Democratic Labour Party of Sweden, reported that aid to the countries and liberation movements of southern Africa comprised over 40 per cent of the entire amount of Swedish bilateral aid, and recalled the agreement reached in Harare on 29 January 1986 concerning extended economic cooperation between the five Nordic countries and the nine SADCC countries.⁸⁶ She sharply criticized US support for UNITA, noting: "We are all under an obligation to influence the USA in this respect, particularly those who, as the USA's allies, have special opportunities to do so."⁸⁷ Along with the energetic efforts at the UN and other international organizations, she proposed taking "every opportunity afforded us as individual nations to escalate our sanctions against the South African government".⁸⁸

Gro Harlem Brundtland, leader of the Norwegian Labour Party, criticized her country's conservative government for being too passive or reluctant to take measures against Pretoria. She noted that Norway's lack of action was because the government had been under "stronger influence by US and other big economic Western powers",⁸⁹ and called on Social Democrats to "dissociate ourselves, in all our countries, from any sign of lack of determination for domestic or other reasons, in exerting sanctions against South Africa".⁹⁰

Acknowledging that Norwegian tankers were being used to transport oil to South Africa, she at least raised the issue of halting the practice: "Now, we must ask ourselves if we should support a law prohibiting oil transports."⁹¹

Anker Jorgensen, Chairman of the Danish Social Democratic Party, drew a comparison between events in northern Africa, where the US at the time committed an act of aggression against Libya, and the situation in southern Africa. Condemning US

policy with respect to both Libya and South Africa, Jorgensen blamed the failure to impose mandatory international sanctions against Pretoria on politicians in the White House in Washington and Downing Street No. 10 who were unmoved by the plight of the people in South Africa. He then called upon the smaller nations to take the initiative, noting that in the Danish Parliament the Social Democratic Party had introduced a bill that would cut off all exports and imports to and from South Africa, and expressed his confidence that "Denmark will soon be the first Western country to end all trade with South Africa".⁹²

However, other voices were heard at the Socialist International meeting in Gaborone. The approach to the problems of South Africa reflected in the remarks of Kerry Sibraa, a well-known figure in the Australian Labour Party, diverged considerably from the position of the SI President and even more so from that of the Nordic Social Democrats. Although Kerry Sibraa condemned racial discrimination, he equally blamed the Pretoria regime and the opposition for escalating confrontation and conflict in the country: "While we understand the frustrations that result in people seeking recourse to violence, we do not condone violence as a means of changing the South African political system just as much as we remain opposed to the use by the South African authorities of violence as a means of resisting and preventing change".⁹³ He advocated maintaining "correct diplomatic relations" with South Africa (it should be recalled that neighbouring New Zealand severed these relations back in 1984).

The measures implemented by the Australian government were extremely limited: closing the trade representative office in Johannesburg, but at the same time, with few exceptions, preserving "normal trade relations with South Africa", and reducing the number of flights of the South African airline from twice to once a week.

The spokesman of the Australian Labour Party was more subdued than other members of the Socialist International with respect to SWAPO, referring to the organization only as "one of the major nationalist groups in Namibia".⁹⁴ And here, too, he refused to endorse "armed struggle as a means of achieving independence for Namibia".⁹⁵

No final document was adopted by the SI meeting in Gaborone, but Willy Brandt's press statement summed up the results and reflected the major topics of his speech. Noting that at the South African prime minister's request he would fly to that country for a meeting on 21 April 1986, Brandt said that his message to Botha would be: "There can be no compromise with apartheid."⁹⁶ On be-

half of the Socialist International he called for imposing sanctions against South Africa, but these would by no means be comprehensive. For example, the call for a ban on imports and exports applied only to a limited number of South African goods, it was merely recommended to refrain from trade with South Africa.⁹⁷

It was believed that, maintaining diplomatic relations with South Africa would help implement the measures proposed at Gaborone. But such relations were hardly needed, for example, to halt the export of gold coins from South Africa or reduce air and sea links with the country.

Without belittling the political importance of the Socialist International's solidarity meeting "at South Africa's doorstep", it must be acknowledged that its practical recommendations were not comprehensive and even appeared to be a step backward when compared with the joint document adopted in Arusha in 1984. And this was despite the fact that the situation in southern Africa had sharply deteriorated and decisive measures were urgently needed to isolate the racists.

Unlike the conference in Arusha, no representatives of national liberation movements were present in Gaborone, and this, perhaps, tangibly affected the decisions reached at the SI meeting.

As the *Socialist Affairs* magazine reported, the Socialist International decided not to invite representatives of liberation movements to Gaborone "because of the risk of South African retaliation against Botswana" and "this position was fully understood by both ANC and SWAPO".⁹⁸ The Socialist International had good reason to believe this: South Africa had made frequent attacks against Botswana before and after the meeting of Social Democrats in Gaborone. But this fact should be noted: a few months later, an "Afro-American dialogue" was held in Gaborone, and representatives of liberation forces were invited and attended.

During his second visit to South Africa after the Gaborone meeting, Willy Brandt had talks with Prime Minister Botha and hoped to meet with Nelson Mandela. Unlike some other Western dignitaries, Brandt's request was refused. Upon returning to the FRG, Brandt issued a special statement in which he appraised his talks with the South African prime minister and his visits to the country in general.⁹⁹ Judging by his statement, the SI leader was disappointed with his meeting with Botha. "I was dismayed to find that President Botha dismisses the worldwide concern over South Africa's future and the willingness of many people to help bring about a reconciliation as gross interference in South Africa's domestic affairs."¹⁰⁰ In Brandt's mind, this made it necessary to exert greater political pressure and economic measures, which

"were adamantly demanded by all spokesmen of the majority of the population".¹⁰¹

Brandt also expressed his serious concern over how the South African fighters against apartheid evaluated the role of the FRG, and also the damage this could do to FRG interests. "I was shocked to discover that Germany, with the United States and the United Kingdom, is among those countries whom the spokesmen of the majority feel have let them down. This will be a heavy burden on relations in times to come."¹⁰² He noted that "the obstructive attitude" of the FRG was the reason that "convincing international action" had not materialized.¹⁰³

Brandt was just as critical of Pretoria in an article published in *Socialist Affairs* about the results of his trips to South Africa and Botswana. Recalling the proverb that seeing something just once is worth more than hearing about it a hundred times, Brandt observed: "What had been a strong feeling has turned into a firm belief; apartheid is doomed, it cannot be reformed, it will have to disappear."¹⁰⁴ In his article, Brandt soberly appraised the situation in South Africa, saying that apartheid "will not go without much violence", and he accurately pointed to the reason for this: "The fact is that the true origin of violence lies not among those who resist; violence rather is the logical and often inescapable reaction caused by those who base their rule on injustice and oppression."¹⁰⁵

Brandt stressed the world importance of events in South Africa, noting that "the coming revolution in South Africa is much more than just another regional affair".¹⁰⁶

The SI President stated once again the concern of the Social Democrats regarding the spread of progressive ideas in South Africa: "Misery of the masses, injustice of the economic and political regime and oppression as a method of government — these are the conditions under which people turn towards communism where they have not yet experienced it."¹⁰⁷

Brandt's conclusion that the South African authorities were unwilling to engage in serious talks with the opponents of apartheid was confirmed in the report¹⁰⁸ of a special group of Commonwealth dignitaries, the formation of which the heads of social democratic governments had supported at a Commonwealth conference in 1985.

After months of intensive consultations, including a series of trips to South Africa and the front-line states, this group, which was working to begin "a process of dialogue leading to the establishment of a non-racial and representative government" [in South Africa],¹⁰⁹ reached the conclusion that "at present there is no genuine intention on the part of the South African government to

dismantle apartheid".¹¹⁰ It was Pretoria's 19 May 1986 attacks against Harare, Gaborone and Lusaka, the capitals of three Commonwealth countries, under the pretext of raiding ANC bases, that prompted the group to arrive at this conclusion.

This criminal action of the racists drew sharp condemnation from the leadership of the Socialist International, which in its statement called for isolating the apartheid regime "both politically and economically by means of boycotts and sanctions".¹¹¹ This appeal was said to be a confirmation of the appeal made in Gaborone, but the language was more decisive.

In comparing the documents of the Socialist International meeting in Gaborone with those of the Commonwealth group of eminent persons, we see that the position of the Socialist International with respect to southern Africa was not, strictly speaking, social democratic, rather, it reflected the general views of political forces in the West, which stepped up their criticism of apartheid when the crisis of the South African regime worsened. It should be noted that the Commonwealth group included some rather moderate figures, for example, Lord Baber of Wentbridge, an English conservative, and the former prime minister of Australia, Malcolm Frazer.

In recent years the documents and papers of international social democracy have invariably contained material on southern Africa and the struggle against the Pretoria regime. Moreover, attitude to South Africa has often been viewed as a kind of indicator of the position of the Socialist International on the problems of the Third World in general. For example, in the report of the Socialist International Committee on Economic Policy, "Global Challenge. From Crisis to Cooperation: Breaking the North-South Stalemate", it was noted that there had been "a significant change in the policies adopted by European and other industrialized countries concerning the abomination of apartheid".¹¹² This was considered to be an early indicator of the realignment of ties between West European countries and the Third World. However, it was also rightly noted that certain governments were "unhappily pushed by events".¹¹³

At the 17th Congress of the Socialist International held on 20-23 June 1986 in Lima, Peru — the first congress held in a Third World country — global problems and, of course, the situation in Latin America were discussed at length. The problems of southern Africa were discussed as part of the agenda item: "Peace, Democracy and Human Rights in Africa".¹¹⁴ It was the Socialist Party of Senegal that insisted that this topic be discussed (some delegates suggested postponing the discussion until the meeting

of the SI Bureau). No special resolution was adopted on this question, and there was insufficient representation of the political forces from Southern Africa — only the delegations of the CCM (Tanzania) and SWAPO attended. But the Socialist International leaders spoke at length on the problems of southern Africa. In his opening speech, Willy Brandt, referring to his trip to South Africa, said that the picture he saw there was “much bleaker than I had anticipated from earlier descriptions”, and characterized the situation in the country as “prerevolutionary”. “We will have to prove our solidarity by action”, he said, in order to prevent “the fate of a large number of people who are threatened with being crushed”.¹¹⁵

Pentti Väänänen, General Secretary of the Socialist International, observed in his report that it was possible for that organization to play a positive role in regional crises, including the crisis in southern Africa, and stressed that the Socialist International had “intensified work against apartheid, for independence of Namibia, and for more support and cooperation with the front-line states”.¹¹⁶ As for the direct role of the Socialist International Southern Africa Committee (SISAC), its “main contribution was the preparation of the Arusha Conference and the drafting of the SI statements on Southern Africa”.¹¹⁷ It was also noted that Joop den Uyl coordinated the work on southern Africa and that “it is perhaps there that the SI had lately made its most important political openings”.¹¹⁸

The main document of the Congress, according to tradition called a “manifesto”, in this case the Manifesto of Lima, tersely stated the SI position on southern Africa. The ANC, UDF, “emergent trade unions and all progressive forces of whatever racial origin” were called the “hope of South Africa and indeed of humanity itself”.¹¹⁹ At the same time, SWAPO was characterized as the most representative force in Namibia. The Manifesto declared that “linkage between the question of Namibian independence and the possible withdrawal of Cuban troops is unjustified”,¹²⁰ and stated that support for UNITA in Angola was the same as supporting South African domination of Namibia.¹²¹

Together with an appeal for partial sanctions against South Africa, which was somewhat broadened, compared with the documents of the 16th Congress, and included “cutting air and shipping links with South Africa”, the Manifesto stated that if neither the UN nor the EEC could impose real mandatory sanctions against South Africa, then “countries alone and in concert should pursue these actions”.¹²²

The South African problem was also touched upon in the Lima Mandate — the fundamental provisions which were adopted by the

Congress in order to draft a new Declaration of Principles (the draft had failed to materialize by the time of the 17th Congress). These provisions drew a parallel between the idea promulgated in the 19th century that workers and peasants were not yet capable of democracy and the idea being spread today, and not only by white racists in South Africa, “that the people of the Third World cannot successfully rule themselves. We will help to explode that lie in theory and in struggle.”¹²³

The Gaborone Declaration was used as a guideline for specially discussing the situation in southern Africa at a session of the Socialist International Council (which replaced the organization's Bureau in accordance with new rules approved in Lima) in Bonn on 16-17 October 1986. Noting that the “struggle against apartheid has entered a new phase”, the SI Council welcomed the sanctions approved by the US Congress and urged other countries to follow America's lead to bring “united pressure from the Western world, including Japan”, on South Africa in order “to prevent Southern Africa being drawn into the East-West controversy”.¹²⁴ However, as before there was no appeal for comprehensive sanctions.

Without exaggeration it may be said that in 1986-1987 the progressive people of Western Europe engaged in a “battle for sanctions”. They were helped in their cause by another World Conference on Sanctions Against South Africa that was held by the UN and OAU in Paris in June 1986. An increasing role in this “battle” was played by Social Democrat activists, often party leaders.

It should be noted, however, that by this time the opportunity for direct government action by West European Social Democrats had considerably shrunk. Immediately following the defeat of the SPD in 1986, the socialist parties of France and Portugal also failed to win re-election. But even as opposition parties in a number of instances the Social Democrats, working together or in parallel with other left forces and sometimes with centrist parties, were able to push through measures against South Africa or at least make it more difficult for their conservative bourgeois governments to openly cooperate with Pretoria.

For example, on 30 May 1986, despite the opposition of Denmark's centre-right government, a Social Democrat-sponsored bill prohibiting trade with South Africa was passed.¹²⁵ Clearly, the passing of the bill reflected the Danish people's growing concern regarding Pretoria's actions, for even in late 1985 only the left socialist parties advocated an immediate break-off of trade with South Africa.

Sweden presented a more complicated, even paradoxical, situation. In summer 1986 growing demands to impose an economic

and trade boycott against South Africa were actively supported by many Social Democrats, including the youth and women's organizations in the party and a number of Social Democrat Riksdag deputies. But the government put off adopting this measure. At the same time, Centrists and Liberals in the country were strongly supporting a boycott. Criticizing the position of the social democratic leadership, the bourgeois parties' leaders tried to win voters from the Social Democratic Labour Party, since demands for stronger sanctions against South Africa had become very popular in Sweden.

At a meeting of foreign ministers of the Nordic countries, held in Copenhagen on 11-14 August 1986, the decision (clearly a compromise) was made to "intensify ... work to achieve decisions as soon as possible on effective sanctions by the UN Security Council". Only if this was delayed were "further measures" to be considered, including, perhaps, a joint trade boycott.¹²⁶ This decision pleased the Swedish government, for it somewhat abated criticism of its actions.

How are we to explain the fact that the leaders of the Swedish Social Democrats, who openly laid claims to a leading role in the international struggle against apartheid, stepped into the background on the issue of effective sanctions? Some people, including in southern Africa, believed that the position of the social democratic government was affected most of all by Olof Palme's death, who, in the eyes of many, was a symbol of Sweden's anti-racist stand. But there was probably another reason: as the party in power, the Social Democrats had to protect the interests of the Swedish monopolies with economic ties with South Africa and were trying to make it possible for these monopolies to adjust to the unfolding situation. Thus, they were avoiding the adoption of swift and decisive measures that would cut off economic ties with South Africa.

Still, having won the election, the leadership of Norway's Labour Party acted differently. In June 1986 the government announced its intention to cease trade with South Africa and in November that same year introduced a corresponding bill into parliament.¹²⁷ It was especially significant that this time the demand was taken into account to halt the shipment of supplies to South Africa aboard Norwegian vessels, since 40 per cent¹²⁸ of the oil Pretoria desperately needed was transported in this way.

The appeals for cutting ties with South Africa made by international social democracy (though not always consistently) had a positive influence on the general position of Western countries concerning this problem. But during the period of increasing anti-racist demonstrations in South Africa, a kind of "feed-back" took

place — after the US Congress successfully overrode President Reagan's veto and imposed sanctions, limited as they were, against South Africa, as did also the EEC member countries headed by conservative governments, it became easier for the social democratic governments to take a more radical position. The change in the US position, which continues to serve as a standard for many in Western Europe, enabled the Social Democrats to strengthen their pressure on conservative governments. For example, in criticizing in Bundestag the position of the FRG government, the Social Democrats proposed imposing at least the same sanctions as the US against South Africa so that West Germany would not appear to be the last ally of the apartheid regime.

The question of sanctions became a focal point of extremely heated debate in Britain. Here Margaret Thatcher's conservative government was forced to fight on two fronts — against pressure from other member countries of the Commonwealth (especially after the publication of the report of the "group of eminent persons") and at the same time against all the major opposition parties — Labour, Liberal and Social Democratic. Also, the Conservatives themselves were not of one mind. For example, former prime minister Edward Heath joined in the criticism of Margaret Thatcher. Nonetheless, the government was against the introduction of EEC sanctions and the implementation of the decision of the Commonwealth Conference. But even the Thatcher government was finally forced to establish contact with the ANC (in September 1986 Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, met with Oliver Tambo) and introduce a few, essentially symbolic, restrictions against South Africa: there was too much pressure, both external (the unity of the Commonwealth was threatened) and internal, to resist.

It is interesting to note that in sharply criticizing the Tories' actions or, to be more precise, lack of action, concerning sanctions, the leadership of the British Labour Party tried to use its position to attract new members. This was how strongly the British people opposed patronizing the racists. A leaflet published by the Labour Party leadership entitled, "Labour Says Yes to Sanctions", stated that the "next Labour Government will:

"Give assistance to the liberation movements in Southern Africa, to the ANC and to SWAPO in South Africa occupied Namibia.

"Support the front-line states — victims of destabilization by South African aggression.

"Support UN, Commonwealth and EEC action against Apartheid."

Immediately following was this appeal: "Join the Labour Party today. Fill in the coupon below and send to: Membership Department, Labour Party, 150 Walwarth Road, London."

British trade unions continued to press for sanctions. In answer to an appeal made by the National Union of Seamen, dockers and other workers at a number of ports refused to unload coal that had been imported from South Africa.¹²⁹ When Norman Wilson, General Secretary of the TUC returned from a trip to South Africa, a special programme of action against South Africa was drafted. But certain members of the organization, including some of its leaders, called for "the working people to go beyond what the TUC can legally call for". For example, the idea of staging a symbolic one-hour general strike throughout the UK was discussed.¹³⁰

The positive evolution of the British Labour Party's southern African policy is evident from a comparison of two interviews given by Denis Healey: one to *Sechaba* in 1971 (see page 69) and the other to *Socialist Affairs* in 1986.¹³¹ In both cases the interviews were conducted after this leading figure in the British Labour Party travelled to South Africa, but the difference between them is remarkable. In 1986 there was, of course, no talk of supplying South Africa with British arms, nor was there any question concerning the role of the national liberation movements. On the contrary, Healey demanded that Britain's conservative government establish high-level contact with the ANC.

"I think we in the British Labour Party and the trade union movement have a big responsibility to maximize pressure in every way we can for a shift in policy by the British government."¹³² Healey also changed his position regarding sanctions: "Before I went I thought that a progressive tightening of the screw might be the best way. But I came back persuaded that comprehensive mandatory sanctions would be most effective." And he explained the urgency of the measures: "The present moderate and experienced leadership of the black majority will be replaced by a less experienced and maybe less moderate one."¹³³

The positions of other SI parties evolved as well. This evolution is clearly evident in a comparison of a resolution on South Africa adopted by a SPD Congress held in Nuremberg on 25-29 August 1986 and the party's earlier documents. The resolution echoes the recent speeches made by Willy Brandt: an affirmation of support for "non-violence in seeking to solve political and economic problems" and refusal to accept "all attempts to blame the victims for the escalation of violence in South Africa... For the SPD, the resistance of SWAPO and the ANC are clearly acts of self-defence

against the brutal and systematic use of violence by the apartheid government in Pretoria over many years."¹³⁴

Noting that, "the South African Government shows no willingness whatsoever fundamentally to change its policy",¹³⁵ the Congress proposed a broad, though not comprehensive, programme of action in restricting ties with South Africa and supporting the ANC and SWAPO.

The Social Democrats strongly criticized Chancellor Helmut Kohl for preventing the adoption of "radical measures" by the EEC. They pointed out that "in the eyes of the international community, the Federal Republic now appears to be the most reliable advocate and ally of the apartheid regime", and that this situation was "damaging the reputation of the Federal Republic in the Third World and harming national interests, also in the economic field".¹³⁶

But not all the parties belonging to the Socialist International modified their positions in this way. The actions of Joao Soares, the son of the Portuguese President, were nothing less than scandalous. He not only published a book in Lisbon by Jonas Savimbi, head of UNITA, but also took personal part in the so-called Sixth Congress of this puppet group. A communique issued by the presidential chancellery stated that the President of Portugal had no relation with "citizen Joao Soares",¹³⁷ but the fact remained that this citizen was the head of Lisbon's organization of Socialists and had been elected to parliament on their ticket. The Lisbon newspaper *O Jornal* reported that he had been given the nickname "Jonas Soares". And although it was stressed that his visit to the bandits in Angolan territory occupied by South Africa was strictly private, it is hard to imagine that a trip by such a leading figure in the party could have been made without a high-level approval.

There is yet another example of differences among international Social Democracy. Joao Soares' visit to Angola almost coincided with the UNITA leader's visit to Brussels, where he met with such a strong show of protest (in which the Socialist Group of the European Parliament participated) that even the extreme right deputies were compelled to meet with him outside the parliament building.

Nonetheless, there were forces in the Socialist International that continued to openly cooperate with Pretoria. Despite the prevailing mood in the Socialist International, the Israel Labour Party (headed by Shimon Peres, vice-president of the Socialist International and from 1984 to 1986 head of Israel's coalition government) continued to develop ties with South Africa, including in the nu-

clear and military spheres. True, in July 1986 this government also sharply condemned the actions of the South African authorities, but went on supplying them weapons and modern technology which it frequently obtained from America. Hundreds of South African military personnel were being trained in Israel while Israeli officers were attached to all South African arms of the service.¹³⁸

It was not until March 1987, when Itzhak Shamir, leader of the rightist Likud bloc, became head of the Israeli government, that it was announced that Israel would "not renew existing military contracts with SA" and would end arms sales by 1991.¹³⁹ But this was by no means done out of high motives but rather out of fear that the US would cut its financial aid, since the US Congress adopted a resolution to halt aid to the states continuing to cooperate with South Africa militarily.

The year 1987 saw increased struggle in southern Africa. Cruel repressive measures taken during the state of emergency allowed the regime to somewhat curb the growth of the anti-racist movement. But the fight took on new forms, and continued and expanded. Several million workers participated in the political strikes held on 5 May and 12 June 1987, and in August that same year, the largest strike in the history of the country was held by miners. At the same time, it was clear that the working class was growing more politically conscious. In July 1987, COSATU, with a membership of one million, agreed to support the Freedom Charter—the ANC policy-making document. The number of workers drawn to socialism—and not a reformist version of socialism—was on the increase. For example, a COSATU resolution concerning the Freedom Charter and socialism noted: "The demands of the Charter are completely relevant to our ongoing struggle for socialism. No capitalist country in the world—even the social democratic countries—has been able to guarantee its people all the demands that are in the Charter."¹⁴⁰

At the same time, the Umkhonto we Sizwe units continued military operations, with reinforcements receiving training directly on South African territory.

There was intense fighting in Namibia, where the colonial authorities often resorted to repressive measures in dealing with demonstrators marching under the SWAPO banner. The so-called transition government of national unity set up in Namibia by South Africa was unable to muster any significant support from the country's African population.

The People's Liberation Army of Namibia regularly conducted military operations not only in the north but also in the centre and south of the country. In 1987 their number rose again.

The South African government continued its policy of aggression and blackmail against the independent African states. In late 1987 the South African army and air force openly intervened on the side of UNITA in military action against Angolan government forces. Pretoria even admitted that the intervention had been undertaken to prevent UNITA from being defeated. White South Africans were growing increasingly alarmed at and skeptical of their government's actions as the number of human casualties began to rise and dozens of airplanes and helicopters were lost in operations in Angola.

The entire southern African region, particularly South Africa, remained a focus of attention in the international community. But by imposing strict censorship, the South African authorities managed to control the amount of information coming out of the country. Only rarely did television viewers see black townships where the police dealt savagely with demonstrators. Pretoria's goal was clear—to create an image of stability in South Africa, to convince the monopolies and governments in the West that the country was a reliable political and economic partner, a "heaven for capital investors".

Under these circumstances, it was especially important that the political forces supporting the struggle against apartheid, and these of course included the Social Democrats, continued to push forward.

Another meeting on the region's problems, though smaller than those conducted in Arusha and Gaborone, was held by the Socialist International on 20-21 March 1987 in Lusaka. Here the SISAC contact group met with representatives of the front-line states, the ANC and SWAPO. The choice of location for the conference was as meaningful as the decision to meet in Gaborone: Zambia is the country that leads the group of front-line states, and the ANC administrative headquarters is located in the capital city of Lusaka. This point was stressed by an ANC spokesman, who thanked the Socialist International, "not only for this dramatic renewal of support; but mainly for once again choosing to do it in our own embarked region".¹⁴¹ The ANC appealed to the social democratic parties "to see to it that Western Europe and Japan give concrete expression to their condemnation of Apartheid" and that the Socialist International, which already recognizes both SWAPO and the ANC, "should promote wider and fuller recognition of these organizations through elevation of their status".¹⁴²

Joop den Uyl then reported on the results of the meeting at a regular session of the Socialist International Council in Rome (8-9 April 1987), noting that the meeting "ended with complete

agreement on the need for binding sanctions against the South African apartheid regime and for increased support to the ANC and SWAPO of Namibia".¹⁴³

At the Lusaka meeting, the Secretary General of the Social Democratic Labour Party of Sweden informed the delegates that the SAP government had decided to introduce into Riksdag a trade boycott bill against South Africa. This measure invoked extreme displeasure in South Africa: the pro-government newspaper *Citizen* commented on the action: "Go to Hell".¹⁴⁴

The reaction of the national liberation movements was, of course, just the opposite. Oliver Tambo, who was a guest of honour at the May Day rally held by the SAP in Stockholm, stressed the importance of Sweden's introduction of comprehensive sanctions against South Africa.¹⁴⁵

The bill proposed by the Social Democrats was approved in May 1987 by a majority of votes in Riksdag—234 against 66. A similar bill had been approved even earlier, in April 1987, in Norway, and in June that same year—in Finland.¹⁴⁶ The adoption of the new law in Finland in fact "merely formalized an already existing situation, since a trade union ban on transport and voluntary boycotts by companies and the government over the last two years had already stopped almost all of Finland's trade with South Africa".¹⁴⁷ In 1986 Finland imported only 3.6 million markkaa worth of goods from South Africa, significantly down from the more than 122 million markkaa of imported goods in the early 1980s. The amount of exports decreased accordingly: from 340 mln to 12.6 mln markkaa. This provided a good example of the effectiveness of "people's sanctions" that were able to force governments, whether social democratic, bourgeois or coalition (as in the case of Finland), to take measures they would have rather avoided. For example, in summer 1986, Paavo Vayrynen, Finland's minister of foreign affairs, stated that a total trade boycott for Finland was not feasible.

In addition to introducing positive changes in their own policies, the Scandinavian countries also endeavoured to influence the position of major Western states. This was demonstrated by the September 1987 visit of the Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson to the United States.

In his address to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, he noted that an economic boycott of South Africa would be effective only if all that country's major trading partners joined it. The SAP leader expressed his disappointment that "a proposed mandatory trade embargo was stopped through the use of the veto [in the Security Council. —V.B.] by the United Kingdom and the United States".¹⁴⁸

The Socialist International demonstrated its increased concern for the problems of the Third World by holding the first Council session in Africa (Dakar, October 1987), after convening its first congress in a developing country (Peru). The meeting was held to discuss the topic, "Africa in crisis—the socialist alternative", and the goal was to "offer possibilities for the SI and its member parties to develop a dialogue with progressive political forces in Africa".¹⁴⁹ The SISAC presented its report on the development of events in the region and the actions of the Committee. Many of the delegates who spoke at the meeting demanded that comprehensive sanctions against South Africa be imposed immediately and that the UN Security Council's Resolution No. 435 be implemented without qualification. Also, the policy of linkage was rejected. The resolution passed by the SI Council did not, however, include a proposal for comprehensive sanctions nor a statement about the refutation of linkage. In general the tone of the resolution was more moderate in comparison with the documents of the meeting in Gaborone. It is quite possible that the Council resolution represented a "resultant of forces", since, like other decisions of the Socialist International, it was adopted by consensus.

If we consider the Arusha Conference a "new departure", in the years that followed international social democracy made considerable progress in approaching the position of the liberation forces in southern Africa. The most important event that occurred during this time was the adoption by a number of social democratic or coalition governments of decisions to break off economic ties with South Africa. More and more Social Democrats were willing to acknowledge the right of the peoples of South Africa and Namibia to choose their forms of struggle against Pretoria.

This positive development, which was especially evident during the powerful upsurge of the anti-racist movement in South Africa in 1985-1986, provided even more opportunities for developing mutual understanding and cooperation between the Social Democrats and Communists concerning the problems of the region.

But that is not the whole point. New prospects for cooperation were also the result of changes in the international climate which appeared primarily due to ideas about the interdependent and integral nature of the modern world. These were the principal foreign policy concepts expressed at the 27th Congress of the CPSU. With regard to both global and regional problems, Communists are seek-

ing an open and honest dialogue that takes into account mutual concerns and the findings of world science.

As in other parts of the world, the Soviet Union is making efforts to reach a just political solution in southern Africa. This solution must entail a cessation of South African aggression against independent African states, genuine Namibian independence and the elimination of apartheid.

Essentially, the same goals are proclaimed in the documents of the Socialist International. Moreover, as the situation in southern Africa changes, positions are, to a certain extent, converging on how these goals can be achieved.

The USSR has actively supported the talks between Angola, Cuba, South Africa and the United States on a political settlement in South-Western Africa, which began in May 1988.

The Soviet Union is by no means against talks dealing with the problems of South Africa itself (no doubt the most difficult problems in the region). These talks would have to include representatives of national liberation forces and the current South African authorities. But conditions must be ripe before such talks can begin.

On 5 November 1987, speaking at the Meeting of Representatives of Parties and Movements, which had come to Moscow for the 70th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, Oliver Tambo stated: "We wish here to reiterate that the African National Congress has never been opposed to a negotiated settlement of the conflict in South Africa. But, equally, we have never had any doubt but that the apartheid regime was not, and is not as yet ready for such a settlement. The objective conditions which would compel serious, genuine, as well as honest negotiations on the part of the regime have not yet matured".¹⁵⁰

But does the very possibility of holding such talks signify that the Social Democrats, who for years had insisted only upon a peaceful struggle against apartheid and refused (as some of them still do) to support armed resistance to the racists, were right in their line of thinking? No, there must be another conclusion: on the contrary, this possibility has emerged as a result of the struggle—both political and armed—that patriotic forces of South Africa have been waging for years. As a matter of fact, thanks to the persistent struggle of patriots, it became possible to reach a political settlement in Zimbabwe and adopt the UN Namibia plan in the form of the Security Council's Resolution No. 435 (although as events in Namibia have shown, South Africa and its imperialist patrons are capable of disrupting the implementation of plans already agreed upon).

It is also important to note that appeals for "peaceful negotiations" should not be used as a cover for pressurizing the forces of national liberation.

According to Oliver Tambo: "The racist regime has raised the issue of negotiations in order to achieve two major objectives. The first of these is to defuse the struggle inside our country by holding out false hopes of a just political settlement which the apartheid regime has every intention to block. Secondly, this regime hopes to defeat the continuing campaign for comprehensive and mandatory sanctions by sending out bogus signals that it is ready to talk seriously to the genuine representatives of the people of our country."¹⁵¹

General Secretary of the South African Communist Party Joe Slovo continued, as it were, this line of thought in his address to the Meeting: "This does not mean that those who run the apartheid state will never be forced to seat themselves around a *genuine* negotiating table. But it does define the immediate priorities. From an international point of view, these priorities are the following:

- "1. Support for the armed and political struggle of the liberation forces in Namibia and South Africa under the leadership of the SWAPO and ANC.

- "2. Strengthening the economies and defences of the front-line states.

- "3. Isolating the racist regime.

"We have claimed publicly, and we claim again that if comprehensive mandatory sanctions were imposed, Botha would be sitting at a genuine negotiating table within a short time."¹⁵²

The fact that Communists, Social Democrats and representatives of other political forces gathered in Moscow has demonstrated that new opportunities have emerged for a dialogue between peace-loving democratic forces. The topic discussed more frequently than the other regional issues during this dialogue was the problem of southern Africa. For example, Steen Christensen, General Secretary of the Social Democratic Party of Denmark called the comprehensive trade and economic sanctions against the repugnant apartheid regime in southern Africa and the Nordic countries' assistance to the front-line states, the ANC and SWAPO to be an example for other states, especially in the West, to follow.¹⁵³

The participation of delegations from the social democratic parties and also an SI Vice-President Kalevi Sorsa at the 70th anniversary celebration of the Great October Revolution and the Meeting of Delegations of Parties and Movements showed that old stereotypes entrenched in the SI were being overcome by a new way of

thinking. Kalevi Sorsa himself noted that the Socialist International was "in the process of critically re-evaluating itself and renewing its fundamental programme". He expressed the desire that the new programme should open the door to the outside world and be a programme of dialogue and cooperation: "A promising future for dialogue within the international workers' movement can be seen."¹⁵⁴

Yet another factor holds promise of international cooperation on the problems of southern Africa. The long-term economic interests of the countries where the Social Democrats are in power (or where they have hopes of gaining office) require stability in southern Africa (as opposed to the short-term interests of achieving superprofits by exploiting cheap African labour with the aid of the apartheid regime). Only under these circumstances the West will be able to maintain reliable economic links (which, naturally, must be mutually beneficial) with the countries in the region.

In order to achieve this, the apartheid regime must be abolished, Namibia decolonized and aggression against the independent African states halted. The Soviet Union is well aware of the economic significance of South Africa (and other regions) as a source of raw materials for the West. "To cut these links is the last thing we want to do, and we have no desire to provoke ruptures in historically formed, mutual economic interests," Mikhail Gorbachev observed.¹⁵⁵

The abolition of racial-colonial rule in South Africa and Namibia and securing peace in southern Africa have become concerns of all mankind, especially as of late. "A crime against humanity"—that is how UN decisions define apartheid.

It would be no exaggeration to say that following the problems of eliminating the threat of nuclear war and preserving the environment, abolishing apartheid is another issue that brings together broad strata of the world public.

Joe Slovo writes: "Apartheid is the Nazism of the modern period, and the struggle against it transcends the class framework. The potential does exist, therefore, to mobilize against apartheid the spectrum of forces so as to shorten the pain and anguish through which our way to victory lies."¹⁵⁶

3. Back in Arusha

The international conference, "Peoples of the World Against Apartheid and for Democracy in South Africa", held on 1-4 December 1987, provided an example of the successful mobilization of a wide spectrum of political forces. And once again this topic

sounded loudly in the Conference Centre of Arusha, Tanzania. But this time the forum was organized not by an international organization but by a national liberation movement itself—the ANC. The conference was held as the final commemorative event of the 75th anniversary of the ANC, which was celebrated throughout the entire year of 1987. The high-level delegations attending the conference in Arusha at the invitation of the ANC as well as the organizational skill involved demonstrated to the international community the growing influence of the ANC and the organization's efficiency.

Approximately 500 delegates from all corners of the world attended the new conference in Arusha. Among them was a large group of Social Democrats representing a number of SI parties, trade unions, and international and national public organizations. The Socialist International was represented by Lisbet Palme.

The tone of the conference was set in the opening speeches given by the leaders of the ANC and SWAPO, Oliver Tambo and Sam Nujoma, and also by the First President of Tanzania and Chairman of the CCM Party, Julius Nyerere.

Among other things, Tambo praised the actions of the Scandinavian countries to cut off economic cooperation with South Africa. He noted that the Socialist International, like the UN, OAU and other international organizations, had mobilized forces that constituted a base from which "to launch a determined drive throughout the world for comprehensive sanctions".¹⁵⁷

President Nyerere, a man deeply respected throughout the world as a peace advocate, an opponent of the nuclear threat and the leader of a country that consistently pursues an anti-racist and anti-colonial policy, said in his address: "We are told by the Reagans and Thatchers of this world that we should abandon the Armed Struggle—which they call terrorism—and support the Government and its reforms. With our leaders in jail, and thousands of men, women—and even children—in detention, we are told that we should negotiate with the Apartheid Government to get more reforms."¹⁵⁸

Stressing that no a single true fighter for freedom and justice in South Africa had any liking for violence, he said: "I believe that the ANC will joyfully abandon the armed struggle once the need for it has gone."¹⁵⁹ President Nyerere noted that the ANC had been forced to take up arms inasmuch as all other methods of opposition were closed to them and to the country's black majority. He then described the reforms in South Africa as only "an amelioration in the conditions of the Prison House which is apartheid".¹⁶⁰

"The struggle must be continued on all fronts, for the Armed Struggle is not an alternative to political struggle, any more than the political or economic struggle can at present replace the work of the Freedom Fighters... It is the combination of political, economic and military struggle which will bring us to victory."¹⁶¹

The Tanzanian leader expressed his support for the conditions set forth by the ANC for initiating negotiations with the South African regime, saying these could not be "negotiations between Prisoners and Prison Authorities". He declared that genuine negotiations about fundamentals, i.e., the abolition of apartheid and transfer of power to a non-racial government, were not yet possible. The time for them will come when "the South African racist government and its institutions of military power have accepted that racial government is no longer possible".¹⁶²

The participants in the conference unanimously adopted its declaration and programme of action to increase efforts to isolate South Africa in full support of the liberation of southern Africa.

Thus, the new conference in Arusha had much in common with the previous meeting, above all in the subjects discussed. But the three years that separated them witnessed a serious shift for the better in the position of the Social Democrats on southern Africa (though significant differences remained) and deep-going changes in the international situation. And whereas the first Arusha conference revealed a large degree of exclusiveness or even sectarianism on the part of the social democratic leaders who organized it, the second demonstrated new and increasing possibilities for achieving mutual understanding and drafting a common programme of action on southern Africa by a broad spectrum of social and political forces in the international community.

NOTES

¹*Socialist Affairs*, No. 6, 1981, p. 206.

²*Ibid.*, No. 6, 1982, p. 241.

³*The Times*, May 28, 1984.

⁴*The Arusha Conference*, London, 1985, p. 10.

⁵See *ibid.*

⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁸See *ibid.*, p. 10.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 86.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 86-87.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 88.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 57.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 95.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 19, 20.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 134.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 133.

²⁰*The Arusha Conference*, p. 13.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 132.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 60.

²³*Ibid.*

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 65.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 132.

²⁶*Ibid.*

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁸*Daily News*, September 5, 1984.

²⁹*Ibid.*

³⁰*Socialist Affairs*, No. 4, 1984, p. 9.

³¹*Ibid.*, No. 3, 1985, p. 29.

³²*Ibid.*, No. 4, 1985, p. 37.

³³*Scandinavian Newsletter on Southern Africa*, No. 1, 1985.

³⁴*Business Day*, Johannesburg, February 27, 1985.

³⁵*Sweden and South Africa*, Stockholm, September 1985.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 4.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 5.

³⁸*Communiqué. Meeting of the Nordic Foreign Ministers, Oslo, 17-18 October, 1985*, p. 4.

³⁹*Anti-Apartheid Work in Sweden*, Stockholm, 1985, p. 4.

⁴⁰Chris Child, *Apartheid, Economic Collaboration, and the Case for the United Nations Comprehensive Mandatory Sanctions Against South Africa*, UN Centre Against Apartheid. Notes and Documents, 6/84 July 1984.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁴²*Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg, April 9, 1985.

⁴³*Morning Star*, October 29, 1985.

⁴⁴See *ibid.*, November 2, 1985.

⁴⁵See *The Arusha Conference*, p. 47.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*

⁴⁷See *L'Humanité*, July 3, 1985.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*

⁴⁹*Discours de M. Maurice Cukierman, Secrétaire Nationale AFASPA*, p. 2.

⁵⁰*International Emergency Meeting of Solidarity with the Militant People of South Africa, Addis Ababa, October 11-13, 1985*, Speech of Comrade Oliver Tambo, President of the ANC, p. 42.

⁵¹*Revista Internacional*, No. 4, 1985, p. 90.

⁵²See *ibid.*

⁵³*The Swedish People's Parliament Against Apartheid in Stockholm, 21-23 February 1986, Final Document*, p. 16.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, p. 12.

- ⁵⁵*The Swedish People's Parliament Against Apartheid...*, p. 12..
- ⁵⁶*Ibid.*, p. 11.
- ⁵⁷*Ibid.*, p. 8.
- ⁵⁸*Ibid.*, p. 7.
- ⁵⁹From Olof Palme's last public speech, made at the "Swedish People's Parliament Against Apartheid" on February 21, 1986, in Stockholm, The Olof Palme Memorial Fund for International Understanding and Common Security, Stockholm, 1986, p. 7.
- ⁶⁰*Sechaba*, April 1986, p. 22.
- ⁶¹*Ibid.*
- ⁶²*Socialist Affairs*, No. 1, 1986, p. 3.
- ⁶³Speech by Mrs. Lisbet Palme at ANC's International Solidarity Conference in Arusha, December 1, 1987, p. 2.
- ⁶⁴*Sechaba*, April 1986, p. 22.
- ⁶⁵*Socialist International Press-Release No. 10/86*, High-Level Meeting in Botswana—Press Statement by President Willy Brandt, p. 1.
- ⁶⁶Remarks by His Excellency the President, Dr. K.D. Kaunda at the Meeting of the Presidium of the Socialist International, Botswana, April 18, 1986, pp. 2, 7.
- ⁶⁷Willy Brandt, *Socialist International*, SI Meeting, Gaborone, Botswana, April 18-19, 1986, p. 3.
- ⁶⁸*Ibid.*, p. 4.
- ⁶⁹*Ibid.*
- ⁷⁰*Ibid.*
- ⁷¹*Ibid.*
- ⁷²*Ibid.*, p. 5.
- ⁷³*Ibid.*, p. 6.
- ⁷⁴*Ibid.*
- ⁷⁵*Ibid.*, p. 7.
- ⁷⁶*Ibid.*
- ⁷⁷*Ibid.*, p. 11.
- ⁷⁸*Ibid.*, p. 8.
- ⁷⁹*Ibid.*
- ⁸⁰*Ibid.*
- ⁸¹See *ibid.*, p. 9.
- ⁸²*Ibid.*
- ⁸³*Ibid.*
- ⁸⁴*Ibid.*, p. 11.
- ⁸⁵*Ibid.*
- ⁸⁶Speech Made by Mrs. Brigitta Dahl, Sweden's Minister for Environment and Energy, at the Meeting of the Socialist International in Botswana, April 18-19, 1986, p. 3.
- ⁸⁷*Ibid.*, p. 4.
- ⁸⁸*Ibid.*, p. 6.
- ⁸⁹Speech by Gro Harlem Brundtland, Leader of the Labour Party, Norway, p. 1.
- ⁹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 3.
- ⁹¹*Ibid.*, p. 5.
- ⁹²Speech by Anker Jorgensen, Chairman of the Danish Social Democratic Party, Gaborone, 18-19 April, 1986, p. 3.
- ⁹³Speech by Kerry Sibraa, Joint Chairman of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, the Australian Labour Party (ALP), Gaborone, Botswana, April 18-19, 1986, p. 5.

- ⁹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 11.
- ⁹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 18.
- ⁹⁶*Socialist International Press-Release No. 10/86*, p. 1.
- ⁹⁷See *ibid.*, p. 3.
- ⁹⁸*Socialist Affairs*, No. 2, 1986, p. 18.
- ⁹⁹Statement by Mr. Willy Brandt on His Talks in South Africa, April 22, 1986.
- ¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, p. 1.
- ¹⁰¹*Ibid.*
- ¹⁰²*Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.
- ¹⁰³*Ibid.*, p. 2.
- ¹⁰⁴*Socialist Affairs*, No. 2, 1986, p. 3.
- ¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*
- ¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*
- ¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*
- ¹⁰⁸*Mission to South Africa. The Commonwealth Report. The Findings of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons on Southern Africa*, Published by Penguin Books for the Commonwealth Secretariat, Harmondsworth, 1986.
- ¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, p. 138.
- ¹¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 222.
- ¹¹¹*Socialist Affairs*, No. 2, 1986, p. 20.
- ¹¹²*Global Challenge. From Crisis to Cooperation: Breaking the North-South Stalemate, Report of the Socialist International Committee on Economic Policy* Chaired by Michael Manly, President Willy Brandt, p. 180.
- ¹¹³*Ibid.*, p. 179.
- ¹¹⁴*Summary of Proceedings of the Congress of the Socialist International, Lima, Peru, June 20-23, 1986*, p. 4.
- ¹¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 11.
- ¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 23.
- ¹¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 24.
- ¹¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 29.
- ¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 40.
- ¹²⁰*Ibid.*
- ¹²¹*Ibid.*, p. 24.
- ¹²²*Ibid.*, p. 41.
- ¹²³*Ibid.*, p. 47.
- ¹²⁴*Socialist Affairs*, No. 4, 1986, p. 29.
- ¹²⁵See *ibid.*, No. 2, 1986, p. 69.
- ¹²⁶See *ibid.*, No. 4, 1986, pp. 66-67.
- ¹²⁷See *ibid.*, p. 67.
- ¹²⁸*Workshop on Namibia and Sanctions Against South Africa, Stockholm, October 15-19, 1986*, p. 8.
- ¹²⁹See *Morning Star*, June 27, 1986.
- ¹³⁰See *The Financial Times*, July 29, 1986.
- ¹³¹See *Socialist Affairs*, No. 3, 1986, pp. 39-41.
- ¹³²*Ibid.*, p. 40.
- ¹³³*Ibid.*
- ¹³⁴*Social Democratic Party of Germany, Congress at Nuremberg, August 25-29, 1986, Resolution No. 2 "Situation in Southern Africa"*, p. 11.
- ¹³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 1.

¹³⁶Ibid., pp. 7-8.

¹³⁷*O Jornal*, Lisbon, September 12-18, 1986.

¹³⁸See *Pravda*, October 27, 1986.

¹³⁹*Socialist Affairs*, No. 3, 1987, p. 66.

¹⁴⁰*SASPU National, Last Quarter 1987, Supplement on the Freedom Charter*, Johannesburg, p. 2.

¹⁴¹*Statement Presented by the ANC to the Meeting of the Socialist International, the Governing Parties of the Front-Line States as well as the ANC and SWAPO in Lusaka, Zambia, from 20-21 March 1987*, p. 1.

¹⁴²Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁴³*Socialist Affairs*, No. 2, 1987, p. 26.

¹⁴⁴See *Speech by the Secretary General of the Swedish Social Democratic Party in Lusaka, Saturday, March 21, on the Occasion of the Meeting between the Socialist International and Front-Line States' Parties*, p. 3.

¹⁴⁵See *Sechaba*, July 1987, p. 24.

¹⁴⁶See *Socialist Affairs*, No. 3, 1987, p. 65.

¹⁴⁷Ibid., p. 66.

¹⁴⁸*Address by the Prime Minister of Sweden, Mr. Ingvar Carlsson, to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, on September 11, 1987*, p. 10.

¹⁴⁹*Socialist Affairs*, No. 2, 1987, p. 34.

¹⁵⁰*Meeting of Representatives of the Parties and Movements Participating in the Celebration of the 70th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1988, p. 193.

¹⁵¹Ibid.

¹⁵²Ibid., pp. 335-336.

¹⁵³Ibid., p. 122.

¹⁵⁴*Pravda*, November 4, 1987.

¹⁵⁵Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika. New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, Collins, London, 1987, p. 178.

¹⁵⁶*World Marxist Review*, No. 10, 1985, p. 56.

¹⁵⁷*Speech of the President of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, at the Opening Session of the International Conference Against Apartheid, Arusha, Tanzania, December 1-4, 1987*, p. 11.

¹⁵⁸*Address by Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, Chairman of Chama Cha Mapinduzi, at the Opening of the ANC Conference, Arusha, December 1, 1987*, p. 5.

¹⁵⁹Ibid.

¹⁶⁰Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁶¹Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁶²Ibid.

CONCLUSION

An analysis of the policy documents and activity of international social democracy in relation to the southern African national liberation movements in the 1960s-1980s makes it possible to highlight four stages.

At the *first stage* (the 1960s), while speaking of the need to expand SI activity in Africa, the leadership of social democracy took no real measures to establish ties with the national liberation organizations, refrained from expressing open support for their activity, and confined itself to verbal condemnation of colonialism and apartheid. Moreover, some leaders of social democratic parties which headed or were part of their countries' governments facilitated their cooperation with the colonial and racist regimes.

The evolution of the Social Democrats' policy toward recognition of and some practical assistance to the national liberation movements proceeded very slowly and only speeded up at the turn of the 70s.

At the *second stage* (the first half of the 70s) the increasingly obvious successes of the anti-colonial and anti-racist fighters in a situation of detente, a general shift in the correlation of forces in favour of peace and substantial changes in the social democratic movement itself forced the SI leadership to take the course toward establishing ties with national liberation organizations.

The *third stage* (from the mid-70s to the mid-80s) began when the collapse of Portuguese colonialism and the dramatic escalation of the liberation struggle in southern Africa made it necessary for the Socialist International to draw up a specific programme of action. The greater attention paid to the problems of the region stemmed, among other things, from an understanding of its importance for the West's strategic and economic interests, and the possibility of progressive forces coming to power in other southern African countries after Angola, Mozambique and, some time later, Zimbabwe, and a wish to strengthen SI positions in the independent African states, which were very sensi-

tive to the issues involved in the liquidation of colonialism and apartheid.

The leadership of international social democracy was strongly pressured by the left in its ranks, who wanted resolute measures to end links with the racists and invigorated support for the national liberation movements and front-line states of southern Africa. The general humane traditions of the social democratic movement as a whole and the anti-imperialist potential of its most advanced section also had an effect. This pressure, along with the right forces' desire to "be involved" in the successes of the national liberation movements, forced the social democratic leadership to modify its political line and meet some of the demands that had been made by the left.

SI leaders spoke of the need for a peaceful settlement of the problems of southern Africa, opposing it to what they saw as the unacceptable or undesirable path of violence and revolution. However, the national liberation movements went over to the armed form of struggle only when it became clear that their objectives could not be achieved by peaceful means. Furthermore, they do not absolutize armed struggle but combine it with other forms, including political and diplomatic ones.

While acknowledging to a certain extent the inevitability of armed struggle for freedom in southern Africa, the leaders of international social democracy still did not take a clear position in support of all the forms of struggle chosen by the national liberation movements. Some of them had searched for reformist elements inside those movements and maintained contacts with splinter and conciliatory organizations in an effort to create a "third force". Social democracy tried to obscure the social dimension of the national liberation struggle.

International social democracy's efforts in the newly free countries, including in southern Africa, were objectively directed at making some concessions to the national liberation forces so as to keep these countries in the system of the world capitalist economy and preserve Western strategic positions in the region. Its actions to disseminate reformist ideology in the national liberation movements and bring them under its influence became increasingly vigorous at the final stage of the struggle for political independence and choice of path of further development, when greater differentiation in those movements was inevitable.

Although declarations by international social democracy recognized the need for political and practical assistance to the national liberation movements and for measures to reduce ties with the racist Pretoria regime, many of them were not

implemented by the social democratic parties and the governments they headed.

Both the documents and activity of Social Democrats often revealed a desire to isolate the southern African national liberation movements from their allies—the socialist community and the international communist movement. The assistance on the part of social democratic parties was frequently motivated by a striving to counter "Soviet influence". The Soviet Union's policy in southern Africa was often placed in the same category as that of the USA and was contrasted to the Social Democrats' actions, which were regarded as "correct intervention" and the most valuable support to the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid fighters.

Further positive changes in the policy of international social democracy in southern Africa in the recent period marked by a mighty upsurge of the national liberation struggle, allow us to speak of the beginning of its *fourth stage* in the mid-1980s. This stage is characterized by a further convergence of the positions of the Socialist International and most of its member parties with the demands of freedom fighters to recognize the just and justified nature of all forms of struggle, including an armed struggle. For the first time, some governments headed by Social Democrats agreed to sever their economic ties with South Africa. They continued to expand their practical support for the national liberation movements and mass democratic organizations in South Africa and Namibia, and also for African nations who have fallen victim to Pretoria's aggression and blackmail.

With the growing military and political cooperation with South Africa by imperialism's most aggressive quarters, the Socialist International's recognition of the just character of the national liberation struggle in southern Africa and its condemnation of the racist regime's repression and aggression have been very important.

Differentiation on the issue of the liberation struggle in the region is increasing in the Socialist International. The development of Social Democrats' contacts with the national liberation movements is having a positive impact on this process and is helping to strengthen the positions of left Social Democrats. In its turn, further evolution of the Social Democrats' position, manifested, for example, at the SI-sponsored meetings on southern Africa, opens up new possibilities for joint actions with Communists. These may be carried out in different forms both in individual countries and on an international scale, including within the broad international movement of solidarity with the peoples of southern Africa.

"However great the differences between various trends of the working-class movement may be, they present no obstacle to a fruitful and systematic exchange of views, parallel or joint actions to remove the threat of war, improve the international situation, eliminate the vestiges of colonialism, and uphold the interests and rights of the working people."*

REQUEST TO READERS

Progress Publishers would be glad to have your opinion of this book, its translation and design and any suggestions you may have for future publications.

Please send all your comments to 17, Zubovsky Boulevard, Moscow, USSR.

* *The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, A New Edition*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1986, p. 79.

Progress Publishers

To Be Published:

TOKAREVA Z. *The OAU: Twenty-Five Years of Fighting*

This is the first book by a Soviet Africanist to offer a comprehensive review of the 25 years of the Organisation for African Unity.

The author examines the OAU role in the struggle for the complete decolonisation of Africa, for political stability on the continent, for social progress of the young African states, for disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war and the establishment of world peace.

Written in a lively style the book is meant for specialists and the general reader.

Progress Publishers

Ready For Publication

Gromyko Anat., Galy B., Macnamara P., Sklare P., Echeverria L. *Will Mankind Survive?*

Specialists from various countries — Russia, America, Egypt and Mexico are conducting constructive polemics in regards to the important global problems of contemporary international relations, focusing on the search for the optimal solutions of such problems as:

- the possibility of the realization of the programs "Disarmament for Development";
- overcoming the backward aspects of underdeveloped countries, especially in Africa;
- the support of a new order of world economics;
- the political regulation of regional conflicts;
- the solution to urgent ecological problems.

This book in the form of a dialogue is intended for general readership.

Progress Publishers

Issued:

URNOV, A., *South Africa vs. Africa (In the 1960s-1980s)*

This monograph, written by a prominent Soviet specialist on Africa, examines the African policy of the RSA's racist regime over the past 25 years.

The author reveals the animosity of this policy towards the African peoples' life interests, traces the attempts of the regime's ruling circles to perpetuate the racist order in the south of the continent and to subordinate liberated countries to its influence through neo-colonialist methods.

This book is intended for specialists, teachers and students of institutes of higher learning and journalists.

CK-88/20-50

DESKTOP PUBLISHING SYSTEMS FROM RANK XEROX

Rank Xerox EEO announce the complete system for all your desktop publishing requirements.

Long established in the electronic printing market, Rank Xerox can now provide the capability of producing technical manuals and professional publications which include drawings, diagrams, scanned images and typeset quality text.

Using Xerox Ventura publisher software and outputting to a Xerox 4045 laser printer, publications can be produced in a variety of European languages. A fully featured Cyrillic version of Ventura is currently under development which will give a multi-lingual Latinic/Cyrillic capability.

Rank Xerox can provide all the components of your DTP system, including the micro computer, full page screen display, scanner and laser printer. Full technical support and on-site service is provided together with customer training.

For full details and a comprehensive demonstration please contact the Rank Xerox Moscow office or our head office in London.

RANK XEROX MOSCOW
4 DOBRYNINSKI PEREULOK
DOM 6/9
FIRST FLOOR
MOSCOW USSR

RANK XEROX EEO
WESTBOURNE HOUSE
14-16 WESTBOURNE
GROVE
LONDON W25RH
U.K.